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Since 1945, nuclear weapons have impacted world politics and the world has 
sought to control their spread. This has resulted in the nonproliferation regim e and its 
centerpiece: the Treaty on the Nonproliferation o f  Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 
Understanding nonproliferation compliance is important to determining whether the NPT 
is contributing to stopping the spread o f  nuclear weapons. If the NPT is having no 
influence on state behavior, then the international community can decide if  its efforts 
should be redirected from treaties to other nonproliferation efforts.
There are several competing theories on why states do or do not comply with 
treaties. One o f  the most common thoughts is that states act in their own best interest at 
the moment. However, domestic politics and the influence o f  internal factors have 
gained recognition and popularity. Dr. Beth Simmons is one o f  the leading scholars in 
this area.
Simmons has done extensive qualitative and quantitative research resulting in the 
proposition that in the case o f human rights treaties mobilization o f domestic groups, 
agenda setting, and litigation influence treaty compliance. Simmons argues that the 
neorealist focus on state interests within treaty compliance is not satisfactory.
While the Simmons’ theory developed from human rights treaties, it may be 
applicable to nonproliferation. Both issue areas deal with security: individual for human
rights and national for nonproliferation. Furthermore, the human rights treaties used by 
Simmons and the NPT share similar timelines in world history, are widely ratified, and 
utilize oversight bodies. And yet they all lack direct enforcement capabilities. Like the 
human rights issues, nuclear weapons issues sometimes cause an emotional reaction. 
Finally, while it goes against accepted international norms to violate human rights and 
proliferate, infractions still occur in both issue areas. Perhaps, the most common reason 
for the violations is for the security o f  the ruling regime.
Does the domestic politics theory on compliance with human rights treaties assist 
in explaining NPT compliance? Given the success o f the theory in the area o f  human 
rights and the similarities o f  human rights treaties to the NPT, it will be meaningful to 
evaluate the domestic politics theory o f treaty compliance and use the theory in the area 
o f nonproliferation to gain a greater understanding o f  treaty compliance more generally 
and to test whether the issue area matters.
This dissertation seeks to assess whether Simmons’s domestic politics theory o f 
compliance (i.e. mobilization o f  domestic groups, agenda setting, and litigation) is a 
useful prism for viewing the high politics issues area o f  national security, specifically on 
nuclear weapons, by exploring six Nonproliferation Treaty member states situations o f 
compliance, noncompliance, and potential compliance concern. Ultimately, it shows that 
the theory is not very useful in explaining compliance (or noncompliance) because the 
mechanisms are not present when analyzing the NPT. Mobilization is somewhat present 
in two cases but not directly tied to the NPT and nonproliferation. This means that the 
theory should be modified to account for its shortcomings with treaties concerning high 
politics issues.
Copyright, 2013, by Kimberly Van Dyke Gilligan, All Rights Reserved.
There is no evil in the atom; only in men's souls. -A dlai Stevenson, 1952
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Since 1945, nuclear weapons have played a vital role in international politics. 
They continue to do so being perceived as overt threats, security enhancers, and prestige 
enhancers. Given how dangerous nuclear weapons are the issue o f  nonproliferation and 
the international effort to stop the spread o f nuclear weapons is critically important.
A key step in stopping the spread o f nuclear weapons is for states to first commit 
themselves voluntarily not to acquire the weapons and not to assist other states in their 
pursuit o f  the weapons. States make this commitment by ratifying the Treaty on the 
Nonproliferation o f  Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Given that most everyone can agree a 
world with more nuclear weapons states is a scary prospect (with Kenneth W altz being 
the famous dissenter),1 it is important to understand compliance with the NPT. Put 
another way, understanding whether the NPT influences nonproliferation compliance is 
important to knowing whether the NPT is contributing to stopping the spread o f  nuclear 
weapons. I f  the NPT is having no influence on state behavior, then the international 
community should redirect its efforts to other nonproliferation endeavors. The question 
asked in this dissertation is: can treaties influence compliance? And, if  so, how do they 
do so? More specifically, does the NPT influence nonproliferation compliance at the 
national level?
A review o f the literature on treaty compliance reveals a primarily neorealist 
perspective. The commonly accepted belief is that state compliance can be explained by
1 Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Spread o f  Nuclear Weapons: More May Better," Adelphi 
Papers, no. 171 (1981).
2balance o f power and states acting in their own best interests.2 However, Dr. Beth 
Simmons has recently argued that treaties themselves influence state compliance by 
influencing politics at the domestic level.3
Simmons has done extensive qualitative and quantitative research resulting in the 
proposition that mobilization o f domestic groups, agenda setting, and litigation influence 
compliance o f  a state in the case o f  human rights treaties. Simmons refers to this trifecta 
as the domestic politics theory o f  compliance. As the Director of the Weatherhead 
Center for International Affairs and Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs at 
Harvard University, Simmons is a very well-respected and influential scholar.4
Simm ons’ seminal work is her 2009 book, Mobilizing fo r  Human Rights: 
International Law in Domestic Politics, which presents her argument for the domestic 
politics theory o f treaty com pliance.5 Simmons argues in her award-winning book that 
the neorealist focus on state interests for treaty compliance is not satisfactory.6 She does 
not claim her findings are sufficient to explain compliance behavior but that they do play 
a pivotal role in compliance. Her research focused on case studies within the low politics 
area o f human rights. Given how influential her theory has been, it is important to
2 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979).
3 Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing fo r  Human Rights: International Law in Domestic 
Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
4 Harvard University, "People: Beth Simmons,"
http://www.gov.harvard.edu/people/faculty/beth-simmons (accessed November 30,
2 0 1 2 ).
5 Simmons, M obilizing fo r  Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics.
6 According to Simmons' university biography page (Harvard University, "People: Beth 
Simmons."), Mobilizing fo r  Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics won 
the “2010 American Society for International Law ’s Certificate o f Merit for a Preeminent 
Contribution to Creative Scholarship, the American Political Science A ssociation’s 
Woodrow Wilson Award for best book published in government, politics or international 
relations, and the International social Science Council’s Stein Rokkan Award for a very 
substantial and original contribution to social science research"
3understand what other fields o f study it may be applied successfully and what limitations 
it may have. This dissertation seeks to understand whether Simmons’ domestic politics 
theory o f compliance (i.e. mobilization o f  domestic groups, agenda setting, and litigation) 
is applicable to the high politics issues o f  national security, specifically on the 
proliferation o f nuclear weapons. It does so by exploring the situation o f  six NPT states’ 
with differing experiences o f compliance and noncompliance.
W hile the Sim m ons’ theory developed from human rights treaties, it may be 
applicable to nonproliferation. Both issue areas deal with security: individual for human 
rights and national for nonproliferation. Furthermore, the human rights treaties used by 
Simmons and the NPT share similar timelines in world history, are widely ratified, and 
utilize oversight bodies. And yet they all lack direct enforcement capabilities. Like the 
human rights issues, nuclear weapons issues sometimes cause an emotional reaction. 
Finally, while it goes against accepted international norms to violate human rights and 
proliferate, infractions still occur in both issue areas. Perhaps, the most common reason 
for the violations is for the security o f  the ruling regime.
The domestic politics theory o f treaty compliance has been applied successfully to 
human rights treaties, which are by their very definition for the individual's security. 
Therefore, the individuals that comprise the domestic population are the largest 
stakeholders. This may or may not hold true for national security issues, such as 
acquiring nuclear weapons. Groups that mobilize at the domestic level to demand their 
rights under international law may not demand compliance with international laws that 
involve national security issues. Given the success o f the theory in the area o f  human 
rights and the similarities o f human rights treaties to the NPT, it will be meaningful to
evaluate the domestic politics theory o f treaty compliance and use the theory in the area 
o f nonproliferation to gain a greater understanding o f treaty compliance more generally 
and to test whether the issue area matters. By understanding compliance with the NPT 
policymakers may be able to work more efficiently and effectively on nonproliferation 
agreements.
The domestic politics theory o f  compliance is comprised o f three elements: the 
mobilization o f domestic groups, agenda setting, and litigation. The first element is the 
mobilization o f  domestic groups. These groups can be motivated to organize and 
inspired to influence their government based on a treaty. Simm ons’ argues that a treaty 
may increase the odds o f success and thereby increase motivation o f  a group to mobilize 
for change. There have been moments in history o f  strong anti-nuclear weapons 
movements. M obilization has occurred against the weapons and the treaty gives further 
credibility and hope to those mobilizing.
The second point that Simmons advances is that negotiating and ratifying a treaty 
can influence or set domestic agendas. Treaties can bring issues to the forefront o f the 
elite agenda setters’ attention and the nation’s population in general. A treaty gives text 
to a concept and something for people to speak directly about in specific terms. The elite 
agenda setters may have a variety o f international and domestic reasons to ratify and 
possibly comply with a treaty. The domestic population now has a legal foothold on 
which to demand action from its government. In the nonproliferation arena this means 
that the decision to build nuclear weapons must be held in order for states to determine 
whether they will ratify the NPT. This brings up the third part o f Sim m ons’ domestic 
policy theory o f  treaty compliance, litigation.
5The final part o f Sim m ons’ domestic politics theory o f  compliance is litigation. 
With treaty ratification, citizens now have a legal mechanism, which depending on the 
legitimacy o f the judiciary system, can be used to demand (and possibly even ensure) 
compliance and not simply state lip service to a treaty and its mandate. In the world o f 
nuclear proliferation this means a state that has ratified the treaty may now fear that its 
domestic population can hold the national government accountable. Right and wrong are 
now explicitly written out in a treaty and the domestic population can observe and judge 
compliance o f its own government and bring legal action as necessary.
Simmons argues that within human rights treaties there is a disparity o f 
compliance perhaps based on the specific issue. Those issues that have related actions 
that are “centrally administered and easy to observe” are more likely have state 
compliance then those issues that involve actions that are “decentralized and often 
furtive.”7 Simmons offers the example o f state administered death penalty at the national 
level, as opposed to torture, which may be administered widely at the local level. In 
comparison, a pursuit o f nuclear weapons will be a centralized tightly controlled state 
effort and therefore in theory it should be straightforward for a government to control 
compliance (or noncompliance).
Simmons theory and findings are based on studying compliance with human 
rights treaties. W hat about when the issue is nuclear weapons and nonproliferation?
First, we should understand nuclear weapons and then compare the two issue areas.
7 Simmons, M obilizing fo r  Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics, 358.
6Nuclear Weapons
Since the 1945 nuclear weapon test in a New Mexico desert, nuclear weapons 
have taken on many meanings. It has been argued that these weapons o f  mass destruction 
represent the end o f a world war, prestige, scientific prowess, Cold W ar stability, and 
national security (in the form o f deterrence). For those against nuclear weapons, these 
bombs also represent potential genocide, possible accidents, a future in a state o f  nuclear 
winter, as well as targets o f terrorists and sabotage.
Nuclear weapons are unique because o f  their important role in international 
politics. The fungibility o f nuclear weapons m ay be debatable but the power and prestige 
that comes with the weapons is not. It is no coincidence that the five perm anent members 
o f the United Nations Security Council are the five nuclear weapons states recognized by 
the NPT. According to the Article IX o f the NPT, only states that have “manufactured 
and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January,
1967” are recognized as nuclear weapons states under Article IX o f the treaty. Many 
states have sought nuclear weapons at some point, perhaps to be a part o f  this elite club. 
Those states that evolve their programs to the full development of weapons have seen 
how this changes the international playing field. North Korea, for example, has only a 
handful o f  weapons but it demands greater attention from the international community 
than if it had no weapons at all. Yet, most states have given up their “right” to pursue 
nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons are infamous as a threat to nations and individuals. Nuclear 
weapons contain a tremendous potential energy and resulting destructive power. Even a 
primitive nuclear weapon, such as the one dropped on Hiroshima, contains in a single
7weapon the equivalent destruction power o f 15 kilotons o f TNT.8 Any given modem 
nuclear weapon may be equal to millions o f tons o f TNT. The largest nuclear weapon in 
history is the U SSR’s Tsar Bomba (also known as the King o f Bombs). This weapon was 
designed to be 100 megatons o f TNT but to reduce the fallout during the test it was only 
detonated to half its potential, which was equal to a yield o f  50 megatons o f TNT.9 This 
resulted in a shock wave that could be felt 700 kilometers away and complete destruction 
within the 55-kilometer radius. A bomb this size may not be militarily useful but it 
illustrates the destructive power that can be raged against humankind. How can we 
control the spread o f this technology and avoid destruction?
There are three possible methods for controlling the spread o f  nuclear weapons. 
There is deterrence, which is to say a threat based approach. There are security 
assurances, both positive and negative, which are to assuage threats. Finally, there are 
political approaches, such as treaties.
Deterrence is the credible threat o f retaliation for undesirable/noncompliant 
behavior and is completely dependent upon punishm ent.10 The extreme example in 
security is Mutually Assured Destruction, also known as MAD, and MAD is exactly what 
it is. MAD is the concept that if  the states involved in a conflict both have enough 
nuclear weapons to survive an attack and retaliate by annihilating the enemy than neither 
side will launch an attack, which at that point is tantamount to national suicide. MAD is 
often used to describe the Cold War relationship between the US and the Soviet Union
8 John Malik, "The Yields o f the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Nuclear Explosions," (Los 
Alamos, N.M.: Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1985), 1.
9 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, "The Soviet Weapons Program - the Tsar Bomba," 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Russia/TsarBomba.html (accessed November 30, 2012).
10 Graham Evans and Richard Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary o f  International 
Relations (London: Penguin, 1998), 126.
stockpiles.11 Weapons states and nonaligned states agreed that “something had to be 
done to cap the flow o f nuclear weapon technology or the actual transfer o f such weapons 
before matters ran out o f control.” 12
On a related issue, security assurances may be another method o f stemming 
proliferation o f nuclear w eapons.13 There are positive and negative security assurances. 
Positive security assurances (usually referred to as security guarantees) are commitments 
to come to the aid o f a state threatened by the use o f force. If  the use o f  nuclear weapons 
is an option in defending said state, it is considered to be under a nuclear umbrella. A 
negative security assurance is the commitment not to use nuclear weapons against a state. 
The idea is that by offering security a state will be less likely to pursue nuclear weapons 
to bolster its own security. Positive and negative security assurances take the form o f b i­
lateral agreements, multi-lateral agreements, and treaties (such as nuclear weapon free 
zones). There are over a dozen o f  these types o f agreements but no single all- 
encompassing agreement (or treaty).14
Why create a nonproliferation treaty rather than use deterrence or security 
guarantees to stop the spread o f  nuclear weapons? Threatening a country for developing 
nuclear weapons reinforces for the victim state the value o f the weapons (and that the 
state which possesses nuclear weapons makes the rule). A treaty will offer benefits for 
compliant behavior rather than only punishment offered by deterrence.
11 Ibid., 312.
12 Thomas C. Reed and Danny B. Stillman, The Nuclear Express (Minneapolis: Zenith 
Press, 2009), 143.
13 James J. Writz and Peter R. Lavoy, eds., Over the Horizon Proliferation Threats (Palo 
Alto: Stanford University Press, 2012), 240.
14 Ibid., 241.
9Robert Cooper said it best, “it may be that modem science, which gave us the 
weapons, will also give us the means o f  controlling them. But history suggests that the 
solution to the problems o f technology is better politics rather than better technology.” 15 
In fact, there is a long history o f trying to use politics to control nuclear weapons. 
President Eisenhower was one o f  the first to suggest policy to control proliferation, 
believing that decisive policy decisions could make a difference he asked that the 
decisions “be the decisions which will lead this world out o f  fear and into peace.” 16 
Perhaps, the most effective and celebrated o f these policies is the NPT.
Policy in the form o f a treaty may be the only way o f slowing and possibly 
stopping the spread o f  nuclear weapons. Deterrence has not proven sufficient for 
stopping the spread o f  nuclear weapons. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expanded 
on this concept when he said, “Unfortunately, the doctrine o f nuclear deterrence has 
proven to be contagious. This has made non-proliferation more difficult, which in turn 
raises new risks that nuclear weapons will be used.” 17
If it is assumed that treaties are critical to controlling the spread o f nuclear 
weapons, then compliance is the essential issue. No treaty is perfect and there will 
always be a state that fails to comply or attempts to cheat. Nonproliferation treaties and 
agreements give the international community a structure to create and codify
15 Robert Cooper, The Breaking o f  Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty First 
Century (London: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004), 5.
16 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Atoms for Peace" (paper presented at the 470th Plenary 
Meeting o f  the United Nations General Assembly, New York, NY, 1953).
17 Ban Ki-moon, "The United Nations and Security in a Nuclear-W eapon-Free World" 
(paper presented at the Nuclear Disarmament: A Compass Point for Progress and 
Accountability, New York, 2008).
10
international norms, a way to control the chaos and identify the cheaters. Kennedy 
perhaps put it best in 1963 in his commencement speech to American University:
No treaty, however much it may be to the advantage o f  all, however tightly it may 
be worded, can provide absolute security against the risks o f deception and 
evasion. But it can - - if  it is sufficiently effective in its enforcement and if  it is 
sufficiently in the interests o f its signers - - offer far more security and far fewer 
risks than an unabated, uncontrolled, unpredictable arms race.18
Comparing Nonproliferation and Human Rights
On the surface nonproliferation law and human rights law seem very different, but 
on several levels, they are comparable. In both cases, states commit themselves to a 
course o f action that infringes upon their national sovereignty. The two also address 
security. Human rights deals with individual security and nonproliferation has a focus on 
state and individual security. Human rights essentially seek to ensure that “everyone has 
the right to life, liberty and security o f person.” 19 Nonproliferation seeks “to make every 
effort to avert the danger o f such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security o f 
peoples.”" These definitions aid in understanding the cosmopolitan view that most 
people can agree on: it is a good thing to be pro-human rights and pro-nonproliferation 
(anti-spread o f nuclear weapons).
18 John F. Kennedy, "Commencement Address at American University, June 10, 1963" 
(paper presented at the American University Spring Commencement, Washington, DC, 
1963).
19 United Nations General Assembly, "Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights," in 
Resolution 217 A (III) (10 December 1948), Article III.
20 "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons," in UN Registration Number I- 
10485 (05 March 1970), Preamble.
Furthering the idea that human rights and nonproliferation are both about security, 
they both have similar goals but differing entities to protect. The pursuit o f human rights 
is often viewed as in the protection o f the individual and the pursuit o f nuclear weapons is 
often viewed as in the protection o f the nation. Human rights are not seen as playing a 
key role in national security. In some cases it is said that human rights even hinder 
national security by disallowing certain practices that some believe are in the interest o f 
national security. Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, are seen as increasing defenses 
and some believe the weapons are very much in the interest o f national security. The 
same could be for regime security.
Both human rights violations and nuclear weapons proliferation may be 
incentivized by regime security (or to maintain the government state quo). A government 
may violate human rights to remain in power, such as to hold back a minority or 
opposition group. For centuries this practice was considered acceptable. A government 
may seek to build or acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent against other states 
interfering or attempting to overthrow the controlling regime. The concept o f bolstering 
national defenses to prevent regime change and maintain status quo o f  government is also 
a centuries old practice. Iran is attempting to do this right now by pursuing nuclear 
weapons for national and regime security.21
It is now against established international norms to violate human rights and to 
proliferate, but both still happen. States often have interests that lead them to turn a blind 
eye to these practices. For example, a state may not condemn a state committing blatant 
human rights violations for the sake o f stronger economic ties. Along the same lines, a
2'Clifton W. Sherrill, "Why Iran Wants the Bomb and What It Means for US Policy," The 
Nonproliferation Review  19, no. 1 (March 2012).
state may not respond harshly to a state seeking to proliferate because o f a reliance on a 
mutual trade agreement.
The timing o f the two issue areas’ development in international law is also 
similar. The main human rights treaty, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, was 
brought about after the atrocities o f W orld W ar II and the Holocaust. In fact, Simmons 
argues that human rights as a matter o f treaty law had a “nearly complete absence prior to 
the end o f World War II.”22 Upendra Baxi and Kate Hamburger Kolleg disagree, and in 
their review o f Simmons book point out this is a Western centric view not a world view 
o f the history o f human rights.23 Likewise, prior to W orld W ar II and the bombing o f 
Japan, the world has no idea that the nuclear era was just around the comer.
Additionally, both human rights and nonproliferation had increased attention again in the 
1970s. It was then that large strides were once again made in human rights.24 For 
example, this period o f  time included Amnesty International’s campaign against torture, 
leading to the UN General Assembly Declaration Against Torture and eventually the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT). There was also more movement on advancing w om en’s issues, 
including the UN Decade for Women. For nonproliferation, there was perhaps the 
biggest development since the creation o f  the International Atomic Energy Agency: the 
ratification o f the NPT.
The treaties that Simmons used for in her research are also similar to the NPT in 
that they are each almost universal in their state memberships. The NPT currently has
29
“ Simmons, Mobilizing fo r  Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics , 36.
23 Upendra Baxi and Kate Hamburger Kolleg, "Mobilizing for Human Rights: 
International Law in Domestic Politics," Law and Politics Book Review  22, no. 1 (2012).
24 Simmons, Mobilizing fo r  Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics , 50.
13
189 member states (not including North Korea).25 The Convention on the Rights o f  the 
Child (and its Optional Protocol Relating to Children in Armed Conflicts) is a case study 
in Simmons’ research that also has nearly universal membership.26 The Convention on 
the Elimination o f All Forms o f Discrimination against W omen is another such 
example.27
Simm ons’ case study treaties all rely on an oversight com mittee.28 The NPT 
utilizes the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as its oversight body.
According to Article III o f the NPT, each state is required to enter an agreement with the 
IAEA, “for the exclusive purpose o f  verification o f the fulfillment o f its obligations 
assumed under this Treaty.”
Simmons believes that the US and USSR used human rights treaties “selectively
i n
to try and gain the moral high ground.” Likewise, commitments to some 
nonproliferation treaties can be used to gain moral high ground in an attempt to show a 
greater commitment to nonproliferation.
As Simmons found with human rights treaties, the NPT does not have 
“unconditional effects.”31 Ratification does not mean there are no noncompliance cases. 
Even treaties that have near universal memberships will have cheaters. Nevertheless, in 
some cases, the treaties may make a difference in state behavior.
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "NPT Membership," Nuclear Threat Initiative, 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/apmnpt.pdf (accessed 
November 30, 2012).
26 Simmons, Mobilizing fo r  Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics, 315.
27 Ibid., 233.
28 Ibid., 262.
29 "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons," Article III.
30 Simmons, Mobilizing fo r  Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics, 353.
31 Ibid., 273.
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A less obvious similarity lies in what could be termed a “national security clause.” 
Some human rights violations, such as torture, are practiced in the name o f national 
security. According to Simmons this is done “out o f  self-constructed ‘necessity,’ 
justifying their practices with references to security and the public or national interest.”32 
There is an obvious link here with states defending the pursuit of nuclear weapons for 
security reasons and national interests. North Korea claimed it was “defending supreme 
national interests” when it withdrew from the NPT for the first time in 1993.33
A shared perceived weakness o f  human rights and the nonproliferation regime is 
the increasing role o f  non-state actors in the international system. As Upendra Baxi and 
Kate Hamburger Kolleg point out in their review o f Sim m ons’ book, there is discussion 
o f  armed opposition groups but non-state actors do not play a prominent role.34 N on­
state actors do not make commitments nor are they held responsible under these treaties. 
States pledge not to commit atrocities and not to pursue nuclear weapons. Yet, non-state 
actors are capable o f  committing atrocities and pursuing nuclear weapons.
Another type o f non-state actor is transnational activists. Transnational activists, 
and transnational advocacy networks, are composed o f "relevant actors working 
internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common 
discourse, and dense exchanges o f  information and services."35 The human rights issue 
area has many transnational actors (taking the form o f nongovernmental organizations)
32 Ibid., 305.
3 3 Monterey Institute o f International Studies, "IAEA-North Korea: Nuclear Safeguards 
and Inspections 1993," http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_north_korea/nuc/iaea93.htm 
(accessed November 30, 2012).
34 Baxi and Kolleg, "Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic 
Politics."
35 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1998), 2.
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forming transnational advocacy networks, such as Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Without Frontiers.36 Nonproliferation also has transnational actors, such as the 
Nuclear Threat Initiative, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the 
W orld Institute for Nuclear Security, and the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace.37
Related to transnational actors are campaigns and mass movements. Campaigns 
"usually have a concentrated period o f intense activity" with a specific goal, while mass 
movements are broader and "often require a number o f campaigns to achieve large 
goals."38 Campaigns and movements exist in human rights, for example the US civil 
rights movement and the more specific M ontgomery Bus Boycott campaign. There have 
been mass movements against nuclear weapons testing and nuclear power. For example, 
there is the anti-nuclear power movement in Germany and the campaign that took the 
form of mass occupation o f  proposed Wyhl nuclear power plant site in Germany.39 (This 
is not quite nuclear nonproliferation but the connection will be discussed in greater detail 
later.)
36 United for Human Rights, "Human Rights Organizations,"
http://www.humanrights.com/voices-for-human-rights/human-rights-organizations/non- 
govemmental.html (accessed November 30, 2012).
7 Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Project on Nuclear Issues: Reference 
Desk," Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://csis.org/program/reference- 
desk (accessed November 30, 2012).
38 Global Nonviolent Action Database, "Campaigns, Not Movements," Swarthmore 
College, http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/campaigns-not-movements (accessed 
November 30, 2012).
39 Global Nonviolent Action Database, "Mass Occupation o f Proposed Wyhl Nuclear 
Power Plant Site in Germany, 1974-1977," Swarthmore College, 
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/mass-occupation-proposed-wyhl-nuclear- 
power-plant-site-germ any-1974-1977 (accessed November 30, 2012).
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Finally, human rights treaties and the NPT share a lack of direct enforcement.
Not just physical enforcement but also in the sense o f diplomatic enforcement. As 
Simmons points out in regard to human rights laws, "peers cannot act as reliable 
enforcers o f the regime."40 Other states may ignore noncompliance events because o f 
political or economic concerns or perhaps because o f the costs associated with raising the 
issue and enforcement. In the case o f human rights, a state may feel since it is outside 
their territory and does not directly affect national security, noncompliance does not 
require a forceful response (or a response at all). For nonproliferation, states can take 
unilateral actions, such as cutting diplomatic ties or sanctions. Otherwise, the IAEA 
reports the noncompliance to the UN Security Council, who can than vote on the level of 
enforcement/response (or to have a response at all). The fact o f "reliable enforcers" is 
more difficult because o f the UN Security Council's structure, which includes veto power 
for the permanent members.41
Given the similarities between the two different issue areas, it will be meaningful 
to evaluate the Simm ons’ domestic politics theory o f  human rights treaty compliance and 
its applicability in the area o f nonproliferation to gain a greater understanding o f why 
states comply with international agreements and if the issue area matters. As described in 
Mobilizing fo r  Human Rights, Simmons found in international human rights law that the 
states that ratify with no intention o f complying, may in the end comply due to the 
mobilization o f stakeholders.42 In particular, ratification o f a treaty can generate political 
pressures on a state to comply. Simmons’ research found stable democracies and stable
40 Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics, 126.
41 United Nations Security Council, "Members," http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp 
(accessed November 30, 2012).
42 Simmons, Mobilizing fo r  Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics.
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autocracies are less likely to commit and comply with international human rights treaties. 
This dissertation seeks to compare an assessment o f nonproliferation compliance with 
human rights compliance.
The Nonproliferation Regime and the NPT
Now that nonproliferation and human rights have been compared, it is time to 
delve deeper into the nonproliferation regime and the NPT, which is the focus for 
exploring the domestic politics theory's usefulness in high politics issues. A regime is 
defined as “a framework o f  rules, expectations and prescriptions between actors in 
international relations.”43 One o f the key components o f regimes is international laws 
and agreements. The international nonproliferation regime is comprised o f  several 
treaties and organizations but the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f  N uclear Weapons 
(NPT or INFCIRC/140) is the “linchpin” o f the regim e.44
Nonproliferation is an issue area that has seen significant development in 
international law. This has come in the form o f multi-national treaties and bi-lateral 
agreements. As Simmons used the pinnacle human rights treaties for her research, this 
study will use the treaty centerpiece o f  the nonproliferation regime: the NPT. The NPT 
and human rights treaties have a number o f  commonalities.
Both human rights treaties and the NPT state the necessity o f  security that 
precipitated the creation o f  the treaties. The preamble o f the NPT sets the treaty's central
43 Evans and Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary’ o f  International Relations, 471.
44 Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu in Paul Williams, ed. Security Studies: An Introduction  
(London: Routledge, 2008), 364.
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purpose: “Considering die devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a 
nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger o f such a 
war and to make measures to safeguard the security o f  peoples.”45
While security is the obvious underlying concern for creating the treaty, it is 
important to understand that several factors contributed to nonproliferation taking the 
form o f an international treaty. The alternative (or even complementary) methodologies 
to a treaty are secrecy and denial.
First, keeping the technology as a military secret was obliviously not enough to 
stop proliferation. The Soviet nuclear program made its important early gains through 
espionage o f the US program, while the UK program was assisted directly by the US.46 
There was serious concern that other states may have their own capabilities with time, 
even without direct (or indirect) assistance from the US. This becomes truer with time as 
the interconnectedness o f  the world increases and technological advances make it easier 
to transfer nuclear knowledge.
Second, denial did not appear a viable option as new uranium deposits were being 
discovered around the world.47 Keeping the material to an exclusive group for trade 
would not last. Finally, the increase in available uranium meant an anticipated expansion
48in nuclear reactors. The concern ultimately being that nuclear reactors can be used for 
production o f electricity and for the production o f  plutonium.49
45 "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons," Preamble.
46 John Simpson, Jenny Nielsen, and Marion Swinerd, N P T Briefing Book , 2010 ed. 
(Southampton, UK: Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, 2010), Part 1-4.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 W orld Nuclear Association, "The Nuclear Fuel Cycle," http://www.world- 
nuclear.org/info/inf03.html (accessed November 30, 2012).
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These factors o f  secrecy and denial collectively meant that there was not a useful 
methodology for stopping proliferation and that it had become a “necessity to do this 
through voluntary and co-operative international arrangements.”50 These international 
arrangements include several treaties, with the center piece o f  the legal framework o f 
nonproliferation being the NPT.
By also being a law-making treaty, the NPT is a normative treaty. This means 
that a large number o f  states belong to the treaty and the treaty expands on the accepted 
"perception o f international law upon any given topic or establish new rules which are to 
guide them for the future in the international conduct.” 51 The NPT is an exceptional 
treaty with almost universal membership and it elaborates upon the shared perception that 
the spread o f nuclear weapons is bad.
Finally, the NPT m ay be considered a self-enforcing treaty. According to 
Simmons, a self-enforcing agreement is one in which “two or more parties adhere to the 
agreement as long as each gains more from continuing the agreement than from 
abrogating it.”32 It is in each individual state’s interest to not have other states posses 
nuclear weapons as that is fewer weapons that could potentially be used against said 
state. This relies on the concept o f reciprocity. Simmons found this unsatisfactory in 
human rights treaties because a state would not lower its human rights standards in 
response to another state’s human rights crimes.53 It may be possible to view reciprocity 
in the form o f suspension o f  aid to a violating state, which may only serve to hurt the
50 Simpson, Nielsen, and Swinerd, N PT Briefing Book, Part 1-4.
51 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 5th ed. (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 90.
52 Simmons, Mobilizing fo r  Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics, 116.
53 Ibid., 123.
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offending state’s citizens. With the NPT this reciprocity is a denial o f peaceful uses 
cooperation and a denial o f trade o f nuclear technologies. If reputation is a serious 
concern, and a state does not want to be seen as unreliable, the likelihood o f compliance 
increases making the treaty almost self-enforcing.54
The Content o f  the N PT
So, what are states agreeing to when they ratify the NPT? While the focus o f  this 
research is on nonproliferation compliance, the NPT is greater than this focus. The NPT 
has two well-known objectives: prevent the spread o f  nuclear weapons and international 
disarmament. There is a third, and often ignored objective, to spread the technology and 
knowledge o f peaceful uses o f nuclear energy. Collectively, these objectives are often 
referred to as the three pillars. The three pillars are: nonproliferation, peaceful uses o f 
nuclear energy, and disarmament.55 There are eleven articles outlining the responsibilities 
and commitments o f the states that choose to be a party to the NPT. These articles can be 
divided into the three pillars, with the some left over articles for administrative purposes.
Nonproliferation Pillar
Nonproliferation is for some, like the US government, the most important pillar.56 
The first article o f  the NPT requires nuclear weapons states not to transfer nuclear 
weapons, control over nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon technology or give any
54 Ibid., 117.
55 Government o f Canada, "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty," 
http://www.intemational.gc.ca/arms-armes/nuclear-nucleaire/npt-tnp.aspx (accessed 
November 30, 2012).
56 Harold Muller, "A Treaty in Troubled Waters: Reflections on the Failed NPT Review 
Conference," The International Spectator, no. 3 (2005): 41.
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assistance related to developing nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear weapons state. This is 
the twin to Article II. The second article is the responsibility o f the non-nuclear weapons 
states. It requires these states to not to receive nuclear weapons or anything related to 
nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear weapons states are also committed not to pursue nuclear 
weapons with or without another state’s assistance. Collectively, this is the backbone of 
the nonproliferation regime.
Article III requires non-nuclear weapons states to place their facilities under 
safeguards. This article mandates states conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA 
within 18 months o f  a state’s entry-in-force with the NPT. The purpose o f this article is 
to verify that states are in compliance with articles I and II o f the NPT. The agreement 
utilized is known as a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the model used for 
writing each state’s agreement is known as IAEA Informational Circular 153 
(INFCIRC/153).57
How are the nuclear weapons states that are party to the treaty affected by Article 
III? They are not required under the NPT to have IAEA safeguards at their facilities. 
Rather these states have what is known as Voluntary Offer Agreements.58 The US, 
Russia, UK, France, and China have Voluntary Offer Agreements with the IAEA, which 
is an agreement modeled after INFCIRC/153. It is however stronger on safeguards for 
specific facilities but less comprehensive as not all facilities are included. This 
agreement gives a state the opportunity to offer to the IAEA some (or even all) o f its 
materials and/or facilities for safeguards. This is to belie the sometimes-perceived
37 International Atomic Energy Agency, "IAEA Safeguards Glossary," in International 
Nuclear Verification Series (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2002), 7.
58 Ibid., 8.
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commercial disadvantage o f having safeguards. It is up to the IAEA to choose whether to 
apply safeguards on the materials and/or facilities offered.
Articles IV and V include the activities and materials that will be safeguarded.
The purpose o f “safeguards is the timely detection o f  diversion of significant quantities o f 
nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture o f nuclear weapons 
or o f other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence o f  such 
diversion by the risk o f early detection.”59
Article VII allows parties to the treaty to enter into regional treaties concerning 
nuclear weapons. This article is referring to nuclear weapon free zone (NW FZ) treaties 
in particular. M any states have chosen to jo in  these treaties. There are currently five 
regional treaties establishing such zones.60 These treaties are the Treaty o f Tlatelolco 
(Latin America and the Caribbean NW FZ), the Treaty o f Rarotonga (South Pacific 
NW FZ), the Treaty o f Bangkok (Southeast Asia NWFZ), the Treaty o f Pelindaba 
(African NW FZ), and the Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty. There are 
currently calls in the international community for a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free 
Zone.61 There are also related treaties covered by this article that prohibit the deployment 
o f nuclear weapons in more controversial areas. These are “ the Antarctic Treaty, the
59 International Atomic Energy Agency, "Structure and Content o f Agreements between 
the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
o f Nuclear W eapons," in Informational Circular 153 (Corrected) (1972).
60 Arms Control Association, "Nuclear-W eapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) at a Glance," 
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nwfz (accessed November 30, 2012).
61 United Nations, "UN Study on Effective and Verifiable Measures Which Would 
Facilitate the Establishment o f  Nuclear-W eapon-Free Zone in the Middle East," ed. 
Department for Disarmament Affairs (New York, NY: United Nations, 1991).
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Outer Space Treaty, the Moon Agreement, and the Seabed Treaty [that] denuclearize and 
demilitarize specific areas o f the globe, as well as outer space.”62
Peaceful Uses o f  Nuclear Energy Pillar
Article IV states that “nothing in the treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the 
inalienable right o f  all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with 
Articles I and II o f  this Treaty.” Iran has cited this article continuously in defense o f  its 
enrichment research and production (although some influential members o f the 
international community believe this may be a ploy to conceal a weapons program). 
Article V explains that non-nuclear weapons states shall receive any benefits possible 
from peaceful nuclear explosions by weapons states.
Disarmament Pillar
Article VI may be one o f the most important articles in the whole treaty. It directs 
that nuclear weapons states “pursue negotiations in good faith” to end the arms race (that 
was happening at the time), for nuclear disarmament and to create “a treaty on general 
and complete disarmament.” The arms race has ended and now (debatable) progress is 
being made towards nuclear disarmament. Non-nuclear weapons states and the Non- 
Aligned Movement often cite this article in urging the super powers to do more for
62 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "NWFZ Tutorial,"
http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/nwfztutorial/ (accessed November 30, 2012).
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peace.63 Disarmament was largely ignored during the Cold War, a time when the Soviet 
Union and the US were rapidly building their arsenals.
Administrative Articles
Article VIII has two main objectives. The first objective is to explain how states 
can propose and pass amendments to the treaty. For an amendment to pass, it would 
require a majority vote that includes all o f the Board o f Governors representatives (which 
also means all five o f the nuclear weapon states). The treaty has never been amended.
The second objective is to create a conference that is to be held every five years. The 
conference is for “reviewing the operation o f the treaty.” These conferences are always 
politically charged. Because it can be difficult to accomplish much at an international 
conference, the states have preparatory meetings in the years between review conferences 
in order to keep momentum going and discuss ideas.
Article IX explains that the treaty is open to all states for ratification and how the 
treaty comes into force. The important detail contained in this article is that a nuclear 
weapons state is one that has “manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or another 
explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967.”
Article X contains two important points. First, a state can withdraw from the 
treaty if the state decides it is in its national interest and gives the other treaty members 
and the UN Security Council three m onths’ notice. This has happened only once. North
63 Jaswant Singh, "Against Nuclear Apartheid," Foreign Affairs 77, no. 5 (1998): 50.
Korea submitted its notice on 12 March 1993.64 Second, after the treaty is in force for 
twenty-five years a conference will be held to decide if  the treaty shall continue 
indefinitely or for another fixed period. In 1995, the parties to the treaty voted to extend 
the treaty indefinitely.65 This decision was taken with the backdrop o f  the newly 
discovered clandestine activities o f North Korea and Iraq.66 This lengthened the shadow 
o f the future for those states involved and perhaps thinking o f  cheating (i.e. taking 
noncompliant actions).67
Finally, Article XI is informative and contains no obligations for the states. This 
article explains that authentic translated copies o f  the NPT will be “in the archives o f the 
Depositary Governments” and transferred to the governments of the parties o f the treaty.
Findings
Applying the domestic politics theory o f treaty compliance to human rights 
treaties helps explain why states keep their treaty obligations. Simmons does not argue 
that domestic politics theory independently explains treaty compliance but that the theory 
does help scholars and policy makers to gain a better understanding o f  the puzzle that is 
treaty compliance. But does the theory aid in understanding compliance in high politics 
issue areas?
64 International Atomic Energy Agency, "IAEA & DPRK,"
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeadprk/fact_sheet_may2003.shtml (accessed 
November 30, 2012).
65United Nations, "Extension o f the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f N uclear 
Weapons," in Conference o f  the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f  Nuclear 
Weapons (New York, NY: United Nations, 1995).
66 Reed and Stillman, The Nuclear Express, 145.
67 Robert M. Axelrod, The Evolution o f  Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
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Considering the state o f the world in June 2012, six states are used as sample o f 
the international community in relation to the NPT. These states are divided into three 
groups: those o f no compliance concern, those that have already failed to comply, and 
those that are o f potential proliferation concern. Germany and Kazakhstan are strong 
proponents o f the nonproliferation regime and are the states o f  no proliferation concern. 
Syria and Libya are the noncompliant states as they have both failed to comply with their 
NPT obligations. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are challenging and are both considered 
potential future proliferation concerns. W hen analyzing these states o f  varying 
compliance through the perspective o f  domestic politics theory, there are mixed results.
The following pages will show that the domestic politics theory o f  treaty 
compliance does not very well explain state compliance with the NPT. The German and 
Kazakhstan case studies have some mobilization but no litigation or agenda setting. Even 
then the mobilization in Germany is against nuclear power more generally and the 
mobilization in Kazakhstan is against nuclear weapons testing. All three mechanisms o f 
the domestic politics theory (i.e. mobilization, agenda setting, and litigation) are lacking 
in the noncompliance cases o f Syria and Libya. This is as expected. Similarly, the 
Egyptian and Saudi Arabia cases o f  potential proliferation concern have no evidence o f 
mobilization, agenda setting, or litigation related to nonproliferation.
The domestic politics theory o f  treaty compliance is not an all-encompassing 
theory that explains compliance, nor did Simmons ever claim it to be. The theory is a 
tool we can use to view and understand treaty compliance. In the high politics issue area 
o f nation security, and nonproliferation specifically, the domestic politics theory does not
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seem to be extremely useful but it should not be fully discounted. Perhaps, this means 
that the theory should be modified to account for high politics issues.
Dissertation Structure
Chapter 2 explores alternate theories on state compliance with international 
obligations. Compliance theories and ideas are reviewed to complete a well-rounded 
review on variables relevant to understanding the compliance o f  a state to a particular 
treaty. The focus is on introducing Simm ons’ domestic policy theory o f  compliance: 
domestic mobilization, agenda setting, and litigation. The chapter also includes an 
explanation o f the methodology and the reasoning behind the case study choices.
The six states assessed can be broken into three categories. There are states that 
are very obviously not going to proliferate and strong proponents o f  the nonproliferation 
regime and there are those states that have already failed to comply. The third category is 
those states that have not failed to comply but may do so in the future. They are future 
potential challenges for the nonproliferation community. Some of the states are currently 
undergoing dramatic political changes and so for the sake o f  this dissertation, analyses 
will assume a cut-off date in history o f June 2012.
For each state, there is an introduction to the specific situation o f the state, 
followed by an overview, which includes the state’s history with nonproliferation and 
why they might want to proliferate, any important issues or concerns that have been 
raised in the past, as well as their history with the NPT itself and the international 
nonproliferation regime more broadly.
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The status o f nuclear power in the state is also reviewed to draw a more complete 
picture o f each state. Next, each state is analyzed applying Simmons’ domestic politics 
theory o f treaty compliance. This includes reviewing the theory’s mechanisms o f 
domestic population mobilization, agenda setting, and litigation for each state’s particular 
situation in a scholarly search for evidence. Conclusions are then drawn for each state on 
whether compliance/noncompliance can be better understood using domestic politics 
theory.
Each chapter o f case studies also finishes with a section on broader conclusions 
for the category o f states discussed (as opposed to conclusions on the specific states 
covered in the case study itself). The conclusion section also includes a table comparing 
the states in the case study and the application o f domestic politics theory mechanisms. 
The case study chapters are (3) States o f  No Proliferation Concern, (4) States That Have 
Already F ailed  to Comply, and (5) States That are o f  Potential Proliferation Concern.
Chapter 3 includes the first two states, which are not o f  potential proliferation 
concern. These are Germany and Kazakhstan. They were both proliferation concerns for 
the international community in the past but have solid records in the nonproliferation 
regime today. Kazakhstan exemplifies the spirit o f nonproliferation in having given up 
the weapons it inherited from the Soviet Union and joining the NPT. Germany illustrates 
that it is possible to increase dedication to the nonproliferation regime. Both, Germany 
and Kazakhstan will show the importance o f domestic populations on national decisions.
Chapter 4 includes the next two states and its focus is on states that have already 
failed to comply. Non-compliance is a political decision among states and therefore 
debatable. The decision for choosing the noncompliant states for this dissertation is
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based on previous judgm ents by the IAEA Board o f Governors. These states are Syria 
and Libya. Both states were found in noncompliance this decade and neither still has a 
nuclear weapons program (at least to the international community’s knowledge as o f  June 
2012).
The case study chapters are rounded out with chapter 5, with two states that are 
capable o f acquiring nuclear weapons and are o f  potential proliferation concern. Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia were chosen to represent states that are a proliferation concern. Despite 
the seemingly difficult task o f selecting potential proliferators, these two states are logical 
choices and supported by contemporary researchers. For example, Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia are from The Nuclear Tipping Point, which is an edited volume focused on states 
that could go nuclear and the policies that affect them.68 Their potential to proliferate is 
explored further in this chapter. Each o f  these states has a unique history with 
proliferation and concerns that could tip them in the direction o f acquiring nuclear 
weapons. They are o f  serious concern because they have the capacity to acquire nuclear 
weapons should they chose to do so.
Chapter 6 offers an analysis o f how useful the domestic politics theory o f treaty 
compliance is in the high politics issues area o f  nonproliferation. A table is offered 
comparing the different cases and the application o f domestic politics theory’s 
mechanisms. While the theory is not especially useful the concept o f  what this means for 
the theory and for nonproliferation is thoroughly explored. It was never expected that the 
theory would be sufficient in explaining compliance and Simmons never claims that it is.
68 Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhom, and Mitchell Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping 
Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2004).
30
However, it may prove to be a useful lens through which the international 
nonproliferation community can further understand treaty compliance.
Finally, this chapter summarizes the research and draws conclusions, ending the 
dissertation. The argument is reviewed, the pieces o f the dissertation summarized. Ideas 
for future research are offered and final conclusions are drawn to end the dissertation.
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CHAPTER II
COMPLIANCE AND THE CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY
Introduction
The NPT and IAEA nuclear safeguards are a barrier to nuclear weapons and 
removing them would allow for the development o f nuclear weapons without oversight. 
State compliance with the NPT means a safer world with fewer nuclear weapons. 
W ithout compliance there would be no way o f  monitoring the nuclear materials and 
activities in the world.
Commitment and compliance are key aspects o f international law, and treaties in 
particular. A better understanding o f  when and why states comply with their 
commitments can lead to a strengthening o f the international legal system and 
improvements in the development o f  treaties. But are the drivers for compliance the 
same no matter the issue? Does it m atter if  the issue is o f low politics or high politics? 
Furthermore, can understanding compliance in low politics issue areas, such as human 
rights, help us understand compliance in high politics issue areas, such as the spread o f 
nuclear weapons?
In her domestic politics theory, Simmons extensively explores “the role o f the 
executive, the judiciary, and citizens” on the compliance behavior o f a state.69 In this 
study, her domestic politics theory o f compliance will be expanded to consider 
compliance with the NPT, as opposed to compliance with key human rights treaties.
69 Simmons, Mobilizing fo r  Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics , 126.
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This chapter starts with a focus on developing an understanding o f  what 
compliance and noncompliance look like for the NPT. The particular definitions o f 
compliance and noncompliance in the context o f the NPT will be given.
The next focus is on explaining in detail the mechanisms o f the domestic politics 
theory o f treaty compliance in the low politics issue area o f human rights. These 
variables are the mobilization o f  domestic groups, agenda setting, and litigation. This 
section includes how these three variables can be defined and how they may be 
influential in the high politics o f  nuclear weapons proliferation.
The third focus o f  this chapter is on explaining the methodology for applying the 
domestic politics theory o f treaty compliance to the NPT. This section includes an 
argument for using the case study method by discussing the strengths and weaknesses o f 
this approach.
The fourth focus is on the case study identification. Here is where the explanation 
o f countries to be utilized in the case studies is given. Using the variables influencing 
compliance, that are identified at the beginning o f  this chapter, each state will be assessed 
on compliance with the NPT (and ultimately nonproliferation by proxy). There will be a 
total o f  six states assessed.
These six states are divided into three categories according to their record o f NPT 
compliance. This includes two states that are not o f proliferation concern, two states that 
have already failed to comply and two states that are o f potential proliferation concern. 
The states not o f proliferation concern are Germany and Kazakhstan. The two states that 
have already failed to comply were chosen according to the IAEA Board o f Governors’ 
findings. These are Syria and Libya. Finally, the two states that are potential
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proliferation concerns are Egypt and Saudi Arabia. There will be an emphasis on the 
relationship with Sim m ons’ findings for all six case studies to further understand treaty 
compliance.
Finally, conclusions are offered to understand the connection o f compliance and 
its related variables with the upcoming case study chapters.
Compliance and Noncompliance
Compliance
A working definition o f compliance comes from M erriam-Webster: “a. the act or 
process o f complying to a desire, demand, proposal, or regimen or to coercion b. 
conformity in fulfilling official requirements.”70 Every treaty includes official 
requirements to which the parties to the treaty are committing themselves. Assessing a 
state’s compliance is intended to be a measurement o f  the level o f compliance. In other 
words, states meet these obligations completely, partially or not at all. W ithout 
compliance, a treaty is not worth the paper it is written upon.
In theory, compliance should be simple to assess. Either a state is meeting its 
obligations or it is n o t.. .or so one would think. As with so many things in life, there is a 
grey area. A state that has not been found in noncompliance may not necessarily be in 
compliance. It is precisely this gray area that causes international controversy and creates 
political issues. This concept, and the role o f politics in compliance, will be discussed in
70 Merriam-Webster, "Compliance," M erriam-W ebster Online Dictionary, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/compliance (accessed November 30, 2012).
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detail. The mechanisms o f domestic politics theory presented as independent variables in 
this chapter are ways that treaties may influence compliance.
Compliance with the NPT is challenging to assess in the same way that it is 
difficult to assess within human rights issues. A state in noncompliance will likely not 
readily reveal itself. A violator may attempt to hide details o f  its transgressions. Not 
every violation is as blatant as those that make it into the news. Furthermore, anomalies 
can exist which raise questions about the compliance o f  a state. In some cases, these 
anomalies can be resolved quickly, such as by the IAEA conducting an inventory 
verification or a state providing more information. In other cases, these anomalies 
become part o f the path to a noncompliance finding, such as with Syria.
For this dissertation a state is in compliance as long as it is not in noncompliance 
according to the IAEA Board o f Governors. This dichotomy is a bit simplistic but a clear 
guideline is needed to make this differentiation and using the decisions o f  the 
international community avoids author biasing. There are, o f  course, politics involved in 
the Board o f Governors' decisions so bias is not completely eliminated. The states that 
are o f a potential proliferation concern are currently in compliance and may remain so 
forever. However, they may be sources o f proliferation concern in the future and are 
already being discussed by contemporary scholars. The results o f this research may aid 
in understanding whether domestic politics plays a role in treaty compliance and 
therefore increase or decrease international concern in the future.
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Noncompliance
Noncompliance is occasionally easy to determine: a failure to comply with 
obligations is a failure to comply. But, as stated above, an apparent lack o f compliance is 
not necessarily noncompliance. For the purposes o f  this dissertation, noncompliance is 
technically defined as those states that have been found in noncompliance by the IAEA.
It is not an uncomplicated process for the IAEA Board o f Governors to determine and 
report a noncompliance finding. The IAEA process is explained below but the important 
part now is to understand that using their findings to determine noncompliance is 
reasonable for this dissertation. There is little controversy around the six states chosen 
for this dissertation and their level o f compliance.
Anyone can determine noncompliance for themselves; states are frequently 
crucified in the media by flippant commentators. However, the IAEA has access to and 
requires facts (facts often disputed by the country being investigated) and then the agency 
requires a drawn out period o f debate and votes on various related resolutions. Until 
fairly recently, the IAEA Board o f Governors had always followed the Spirit o f  Vienna 
for big decisions, such as noncompliance findings.
The “Spirit o f Vienna” refers to the cooperative working environment at the 
IAEA that focuses on the technical issues rather than be distracted with politics, 
especially in the first two decades o f the agency’s history.71 A former US ambassador to 
the IAEA has pointed out that the Spirit o f Vienna has been undermined by recent 
noncompliance finding votes in which divisive politics have played a larger role than
7 1 ' *David Fischer, History o f  the International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty 
Years (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1997), 21.
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science.7'  While the IAEA noncompliance findings may increasingly reflect politics, it 
seems a more reasonable measure o f compliance for this dissertation than using personal 
opinion or a single state’s point o f view.
A formal finding o f noncompliance is a political decision among states and 
therefore is sometimes debatable. It is important to note that the IAEA can find states in 
violation o f Safeguards Agreements (INFCIRC/153) but not in noncompliance o f the 
NPT. The IAEA’s purpose is to assess only Article III o f the NPT via safeguards not the 
entire treaty. While noncompliance with the IAEA, and therefore Article III o f  the NPT, 
is likely to mean noncompliance with the NPT, this is not an automatic guarantee.
Former Director Pierre Goldschmidt o f the Department o f Safeguards at the IAEA, has 
cautioned that "the fact that there is no official definition o f what constitutes 
noncompliance should not be used as an excuse by the secretariat for not reporting 
promptly, fully, and factually any significant or intentional failure or breach o f  safeguards 
undertaking."73
If the IAEA secretariat detects a violation or noncompliance, the Department o f 
Safeguards has two choices. The state can be reported to the IAEA Board o f  Governors 
or the incident can be included in the annual Safeguards Implementation Report. The 
Board o f Governors is composed o f  35 member States.74 According to Article X I 1 .C o f 
the IAEA Statute, “the Board shall report the non-compliance to all members and to the
72 Gregory L. Schulte, "Strengthening the IAEA: How the Nuclear W atchdog Can Regain 
Its Bark," in Strategic Forum  (W ashington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 
March 2010).
73 Pierre Goldschmidt, "Safeguards Noncompliance: A Challenge for the IAEA and the 
UN Security Council," Arms Control Today 40, no. 1 (January/February 2010).
74 International Atomic Energy Agency, "IAEA Board o f Governors," 
http://iaea.org/About/Policy/Board/ (accessed November 30, 2012).
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Security Council and General Assembly o f the United Nations.” There is no definition of 
noncompliance to guide the Board’s decision; however, Peter Jenkins suggests that the 
previous decisions can be considered as a kind o f case-law.75
Jenkins also found that, “whether the Security Council needs to be informed o f  a 
case has been the prime consideration” in deciding whether a state is in noncompliance. 
The underlying fact is that Article III.B.4 o f the IAEA Statute says the Security Council 
should be informed when matters concern “international peace and security.”76 The 
Board o f  Governors considers the consequence and severity o f the violations in the 
context o f international peace and security when determining noncompliance.
The Board o f Governors has found six o f  the eight states brought before it to be in 
noncompliance. The two noncompliant states used for the case studies in this dissertation 
are Libya in 2004 and Syria in 2011. The four not being used are Romania in 1992, Iraq 
1991, Iran in 2005, and North Korea, which was found in noncompliance in 1993, in 
1994, and again in 2003. Egypt and South Korea were discussed by the Board o f 
Governors but not found in noncompliance.
Beginning in 1997, states have had the option o f entering an Additional Protocol 
with the IAEA. This gives the IAEA more information and access to implement 
safeguards more efficiently and effectively, in order to confirm states are in compliance 
with their obligations. Perhaps unsurprising, neither o f the noncompliance case studies 
chosen (Syria and Libya) had an Additional Protocol in place when found in 
noncompliance.
75 Peter Jenkins, "Staying Credible: How Precedents Can Help the IAEA Get 
Noncompliance Calls Right," Arm s Control Today 40, no. 7 (September 2010).
76 "Statute o f the International Atomic Energy Agency," ed. International Atomic Energy 
Agency (1989).
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In addition to the Board o f Governors’ decisions on compliance, the United States 
completes its own evaluations. The US State Departm ent’s Adherence to and  
Compliance with Arms Control, Non-proliferation, and  Disarmament Agreements and  
Commitments report “provides an assessment o f  US adherence to obligations undertaken 
in arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements, as well as an assessment 
o f the adherence o f  other nations to obligations undertaken in arms control, 
nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and related commitments.”77
Like the Board o f Governors, the US State Department also identified Libya, Iraq, 
Iran, and Syria as noncom pliant parties to the NPT. According to the 2010 report, Libya
7 0
and Iraq were not compliant in the past but are currently. The report addresses current 
(as o f 2010) US concerns about compliance issues with five states specifically: Iran, 
China, Burma, North Korea, and Syria. In addition, the US finds 18 states are not in 
compliance with Article III o f the NPT as they have failed to bring a Safeguards 
Agreement into effect within 18 months o f  becoming a party to the NPT (as required by 
Article III).
Under Article III, states are required to begin negotiating a Safeguards Agreement 
with the IAEA within 180 days o f  entering the NPT into force, and bring the resulting 
Safeguards Agreement into force within 18 months o f beginning the negotiations.79
77 US Department o f  State, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Non- 
Proliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments," ed. Compliance Bureau 
o f Verification, and Implementation (2010), 1.
78 Ibid., 53.
79 "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons," Article III.
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There are currently 14 states not in compliance with this aspect of the N PT.80 These 
states have not been formally found in noncompliance and reported to the UN Security 
Council most likely because they are not seen as a threat to international security (which 
the IAEA Statute uses as a guideline in determining which states to report).81 There is 
currently a push within the US government to encourage these states to include their 
agreements with the IAEA. The IAEA has limited resources and given the lack o f 
nuclear capabilities in these states (which all have bigger concerns than expending their 
resources on concluding these agreements) there has not been a strong effort to complete 
the agreements.
In addition to the definition o f noncompliance above, there is the possibility that 
states can be in noncompliance under Article III and Article VI. Under Article VI, 
nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT agree to “pursue negotiations in good
R9faith” to disarm. There has been progress in arms control and disarmament but some 
states have long argued that the nuclear weapons states are in noncompliance by their 
failure to negotiate "in good faith" towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.83
Domestic Politics and Treaty Compliance
Scott Sagan has suggested an alternative “domestic politics model, which 
envisions nuclear weapons as political tools used to advance parochial domestic and
80 International Atomic Energy Agency, "Status List," 
http://www.iaea.org/OurW ork/SV/Safeguards/documents/sir_table.pdf (accessed 
November 30, 2012).
81 "Statute o f the International Atomic Energy Agency."
82 "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons," Article VI.
83 Joseph S. Nye, "NPT: The Logic o f Inequality," Foreign Policy 59 (Summer 1985).
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bureaucratic interests.”84 Sagan believes that domestic reasons can drive a state to 
acquire nuclear weapons, because the weapons represent a means to an end (which may 
vary actor to actor). Simmons has demonstrated that domestic reasons can also explain 
and possibly compel treaty compliance with human rights treaties. Her three mechanisms 
(mobilization, litigation and agenda setting) represent a means to an end (treaty 
compliance). Sagan’s domestic model for proliferation therefore suggests another reason 
to use Sim m ons’ domestic politics theory to understand nonproliferation compliance.
The domestic politics theory o f  treaty compliance "privilege[s] domestic political 
actors as agents in their own political fate."85 In other words, Simmons found that 
treaties can influence compliance by empowering domestic actors. She does not rule out 
the impact o f external actors but has found the internal actors can be sufficient for 
gaining compliance in the area o f  human rights law. Simons argues that "international 
law helps local actors set priorities, define meaning, make rights demands, and bargain 
from a position o f greater strength than would have been the case in the absence o f their
o z
government's treaty commitment." This translates into three mechanisms that will be 
used as variables for this dissertation: mobilization, agenda setting, and litigation. In 
human rights, this means that citizens can use their government's international 
commitments to demand change through litigation and mobilize to demand change by 
drawing domestic and international attention to violations. But what does this mean in 
the world o f high politics and national security?
84 Scott Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search o f  a 
Bomb," International Security 21, no. 3 (W inter, 1996-1997): 55.
8:1 Simmons, Mobilizing fo r  Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics, 126.
86 Ibid., 126.
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Simmons found a strong connection between government types and compliance 
with human rights treaties. This may translate well to the high politics o f  security with a 
small twist. Simmons found that true democracies already respected human rights and 
that signing a human rights treaty required little action for a democracy. They were 
sincere in their ratification. Furthermore, the domestic groups may not mobilize, as there 
is little need to on this issue in a democracy.
On the other hand, an autocracy that disregards human rights may ratify with no 
intention o f changing its behaviors. They are insincere in their ratification. The groups 
that may have mobilized in a more democratic nation usually have no credible means o f 
requesting change in an autocracy (whether this is by litigation or mobilization).
Simmons offers this result when describing government type in relation to com pliance.87 
M ost importantly, Simmons found that her theory "works" best for transitional 
democracies where the mechanisms have the most impact.88
W hat does this mean for the nonproliferation regime? Will it be possible to 
separate the sincere ratifications from the insincere? And will the mechanisms o f the 
domestic politics theory o f  treaty compliance be more apparent (i.e. will it make the 





Mobilization o f  Domestic Groups
Simmons concedes that “not all kinds o f  issues elicit identical kinds or degrees of 
domestic mobilization.”89 Simmons uses the example o f torture to illustrate this concept. 
A state can instill fear in its citizens to prevent domestic mobilization.90 For example, a 
government can claim that it is protecting the nation by using torture against a certain 
group because that is the only way to prevent terrorist attacks. It is not a far stretch o f  the 
imagination to think a state may claim that possessing nuclear weapons is the only way to 
prevent attack from other nations. Citizens will mobilize because o f  discontent but 
discontent as Simmons defines it is "structural, arising from the existing political, social, 
and economic relationships within a given society."91 Those that have rallied against 
nuclear weapons have identified their discontent with their governments building what 
they view as dangerous unreliable technology that causes genocide.
Citizens may mobilize not so much because they disagree with their governm ent’s 
decision and desire for compliance, but because it has become personal. Human rights 
treaties are deeply personal because they affect the individual. State acquisition o f 
nuclear weapons does not encroach at the individual level in the same way violations o f 
human rights does. However, sanctions against a state as a result o f noncompliance can 
impact citizens. At which point, the decision not previously affecting the individual now 
matters more. This impact can be even greater if  the international community uses 





A major factor in domestic groups being able to mobilize is ever lowering 
transaction costs. Transactions costs are the non-monetary costs o f doing business.92 In 
this case, it includes telecommunications, internet access, and more. Simmons points out 
that the lowering transaction costs “helped to empower the governed relative to 
governments over the century.’’93 The rise in social media has played a critical role in 
supporting groups organizing around the world on important issues.
In fact, governments attempting to suppress domestic groups that have begun to 
mobilize have shutdown telecommunications providers to stop the ease o f 
communications that leads to better organization.94 During the 2011 Arab Spring, social 
m edia was used extensively to communicate among demonstrators. It should be noted 
that modem technology and social media are not solely responsible for domestic groups' 
ability to mobilize.95 In 1919, domestic groups were able to mobilize effectively in 
Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, without Twitter or Facebook.96
Populations will be most likely to mobilize when they place value on an issue and 
they deem success likely.97 Treaties can increase the likelihood o f successfully
98mobilization. This is especially true in transitional partially democratic governments, 
such as Egypt and Kazakhstan in this dissertation's case study.99 Simmons sees treaties
92 Paul M. Johnson, "A Glossary o f Political Economy Terms: Transaction Costs,"
Auburn University, http://www.aubum.edu/~johnspm/gloss/transaction__costs (accessed 
November 30, 2012).
93 Simmons, Mobilizing fo r  Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics , 352.
94 Ekaterina Stepanova, "The Role o f Information Communication Technologies in the 
'Arab Spring'," in PO NARS Eurasia Policy (May 2011).
95 Lisa Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring," Foreign Affairs (M ay/June 2011).




as resource for populations considering mobilizing. A treaty clearly defines an issue and
gives legal grounds to demand change, which combined increase the likelihood of
100success.
If domestic mobilization played a role, evidence should be found in the form o f 
movements, such as petitions, protests, and organized events by citizens drawing 
attention and publicity to their cause in the hopes o f stopping their nation from pursuing 
nuclear weapons.
Agenda Setting
The second mechanism o f the domestic politics theory is national agenda setting. 
For the issue area o f nonproliferation, this would mean nonproliferation related policies 
would be discussed and enacted in the national agenda. To say that a nation joins and 
complies with a treaty based only on its existing policy preference is perhaps “too 
hasty.” 101 No international treaty can completely reflect a state’s preference (as no state 
has the power to negotiate and influence a treaty without compromises). Therefore, the 
issue o f the treaty comes onto the domestic agenda and given the process o f ratification 
may by default influence compliance. Furthermore, a treaty gives a nonnegotiable text 
for discussion.
Simmons does not claim that a treaty changes preferences but that it may change 
the priorities.102 An issue that could be ignored previously now draws plenty o f  attention, 





interested in an issue previously so much as it was a low priority and not discussed. With 
a treaty there is a clear definition and expectation from the international community 
which a state should respond to positively or negatively. Silence before a treaty is 
developed may have meant ambiguity on the issue but silence with the treaty in existence 
is interpreted as disagreement with the corresponding policy.103
Domestic actors can also use treaties to reinforce a previously set agenda. For 
example, a state unable to pursue nuclear weapons does not have to admit that it is not 
capable but rather ju st point to its commitment as the reason for not pursuing nuclear 
weapons. Furthermore, a national government can use a treaty in line with its agenda o f 
condemning other nations, as we see in the Middle Eastern nations condemning Israel for 
not joining the NPT.
The caveat Simmons offers for agenda setting is that there are no guarantees.104 
Agenda setting is more likely to work in states that are “sincere” in their ratification and 
want to comply. Furthermore, influencing the agenda and bringing attention to an issue 
is not a guarantee o f successful implementation o f the treaty.
If agenda setting plays a role than evidence should be found by looking for 
nonproliferation becoming an issue where it was not previously and the development o f 
national law related to nonproliferation.
Litigation
The ratification o f an international treaty requires a corresponding domestic law. 




specifically implement new laws,105 The IAEA lawyers willingly review national 
legislation to ensure states are creating the best possible regulations for this task.
Citizens can use these domestic and international laws to demand compliance. This can 
be seen in the issue area o f human rights. Individuals and minority groups can use 
litigation to demand their rights be protected. This may also be true for nonproliferation 
but whether litigation is utilized will be the more interesting question. But the ratification 
o f a treaty (and corresponding law) does not guarantee it will be used for litigation 
purposes.106
It may be that domestic groups do not use the judicial system to demand their 
state not pursue nuclear weapons because they have larger more immediate concerns.
For example, a domestic population with high unemployment, economic difficulties and 
risk o f starvation m ay not be concerned with the state breaking its nonproliferation 
commitment. However, if  the illegal pursuit o f  nuclear weapons has resulted in the 
domestic population being punished by international sanctions, perhaps that population 
will mobilize and will use the court system to demand change. This could also happen if 
a state with economic difficulties spends money on nuclear weapons to the detriment o f 
social services and weakening the national economy. Some analysts suppose that it is a 
fear o f  economic collapse that has kept China from pursuing larger nuclear warhead 
stockpiles.107 There is a belief in China that the Soviet Union collapsed because o f its 
arms race with the US. In this case, a group could be rallied to demand change through 
litigation against the government in the court system.
105 Ibid., 130-31.
106 Ibid., 130.
107 Jeffrey Lewis, The Minimum Means o f  Reprisal: China's Search for Security in the 
Nuclear Age  (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007).
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Related to litigation are domestic institutions. Domestic institutions, such as 
national judicial systems, create stability and ease compliance with human rights treaties. 
The courts could assist in compliance with the NPT. Simmons found that having a strong 
independent judicial system contributes to treaty compliance. Ideally, a separate 
institution that is not elected by the people, nor directly responsible to the political
government, could more effectively, and objectively, develop and enforce policies and
108regulations. A credible judicial system allows for compliance issues to be challenged 
domestically and are an avenue for change. An example o f  this is the domestic courts 
being used to change practices o f  government torture in Chili and Israel, based on their 
international treaty obligations.109
Litigation has the ability "to put in place a new or transformed discourse o f  rights 
which goes to the heart o f  the way in which the substantive issues are conceived, 
expressed, argued about, and struggled over."110 This can be applied not ju st to rights but 
other issues, such as possibly to nonproliferation. Individual litigation cases may not 
cause change but "litigation is also a political strategy, with power to inspire rule revision 
and further mobilize political m ovem ents."111 Furthermore, a failed case is not 
necessarily a failure in itself as even this has the potential to bring publicity and public 
mobilization.
I QO
Robert Elgie and Iain McMenamin, "Credible Commitment, Political Uncertainty or 
Policy Complexity? Explaining Variations in the Independence of Non-Majoritarian 
Institutions in France," British Journal o f  Political Science 35, no. 3 (2005): 531.
109 Simmons, Mobilizing fo r  Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics, 284.
110 Alan Hunt, "Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies," Journal 
o f  Law and Society 17, no. 3 (1990).
111 Simmons, Mobilizing fo r  Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics, 132.
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If litigation played a role evidence will be found in the court system. There will 
be court cases brought against the state by individuals and/or domestic groups organized 
for the goal o f nonproliferation and keeping their state from pursuing nuclear weapons.
W hy a Case Study Methodology
Simmons uses a combination o f qualitative and quantitative analyses in her study 
o f compliance with human rights treaties. A qualitative methodology however is more 
appropriate for this dissertation. To be more specific, a case study m ethodology is the 
ideal choice in this situation. A case study methodology is useful because the research 
goal is to explore the implementation o f Sim m ons’ theory within the high politics issue 
area o f  nonproliferation to see what can be learned about treaty compliance.
One o f the strengths o f a case study is the capability to assess generalizations or 
variables in a specific situation.112 As Bennett and George point out in their seminal 
book, case studies allow for several causal mechanisms to be explored within a single 
case.113 Case studies allow “within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons o f  a small 
number o f cases.” 114 In this study, cases will be analyzed individually testing Sim m ons’ 
three components o f domestic politics theory o f  compliance: agenda setting, litigation, 
and domestic mobilization. Then the results are compared across the case studies to 
identify any patterns or anomalies in the conclusions chapter.
112 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in 




There are potential disadvantages to using a case study methodology that should 
be acknowledged. First, there are potential biases in choosing the case s t u d i e s . C a r e  
must be taken that a variety o f cases are chosen and not just the ones that will be support 
the desired results. There has also been an effort to use a variety o f geographical regions, 
cultures, economies, etc. Some states have failed to comply, some are considered strong 
proponents o f nonproliferation, and some are harder to interpret. These categories are 
addressed by choosing six states for case studies (two for each category). This will be 
explained in the next section, Case Study Identification. One final note on selection bias: 
there is a bias in that all o f  the states are members o f the NPT. This bias is acceptable as 
the hypothesis is centered on compliance with this specific treaty.
Another disadvantage o f  the case study methodology is that it does not necessarily 
identify how much a variable influenced/impacted/mattered, only whether it m attered.116 
Etel Solingen faces a similar problem in Nuclear Logics, in which she states it is 
important not to overestimate or underestimate the impact o f any single variable when
I I 7using the case study method. This is not a true disadvantage in this research because 
knowing whether Sim m ons’ findings mattered in compliance with the NPT is sufficient.
If it is possible to discern how much they mattered, or how much the domestic politics 
theory o f compliance mattered as whole, that would be more interesting but it will not be 
considered a failure if  this cannot be discerned. On a related noted, the purpose o f this 
research is to identify whether the variables are necessary. It is not expected that there 
will be a clear answer on whether the variables are sufficient. Bennett and George point
115 Ibid., 23.
116 Ibid., 25.
117 Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 250.
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this out as seeking to find whether a variable “favors1' a specific outcom e.118 In some 
particularly complex case studies, one may only know whether a variable is a 
“contributing cause” but one may not be able to discern if it is necessary for the
i 19outcome.
Case Identification
Before describing the categories that the six states fall into, one needs to 
understand they are all sufficiently technologically advanced to be nuclear capable. As 
Matthew Kroenig has pointed out bluntly, “whether or not a state wants nuclear weapons 
is irrelevant if  it is unable to acquire them.” 120
Several analysts and scholars have made an effort to determine which states have 
the capacity to build nuclear weapons. Example works include, Stephen M. M eyer’s 
seminal work, The Dynamics o f  Nuclear Proliferation,12’ as well as the scholarship o f 
Sonali Singh and Christopher R. W ay,122 and Dong-Joon Jo and Erik G artzke.123 This 
dissertation will use states that have obvious technological and financial assets, although 
as several countries have shown us (for example, North Korea) superiority is not 
necessary in either category to obtain nuclear weapons. The antiquated idea that only
1 18 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 27.
119 Ibid., 27.
120 Matthew Kroenig, "Importing the Bomb," Journal o f  Conflict Resolution 53, no. 2 
(2009): 163.
121 Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics o f  Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University o f 
Chicago Press, 1984).
122 Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, "The Correlates o f Nuclear Proliferation," 
Journal o f  Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (2004).
I~ Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, "Determinants o f  Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," 
Journal o f  Conflict Resolution 51, no. 1 (2007).
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first world states can acquire nuclear weapons has been repeatedly proven wrong since 
China’s first detonation in 1964.124 Furthermore, developing nations may have 
capabilities in manufacturing and machine tools that can be “exploited” by third parties in 
a nuclear weapons program .125
Another important thread between the states, but perhaps most important to the 
noncompliant states is the Additional Protocol. The noncompliant states are chosen 
because their noncompliant findings were post 1997. Since 1997 states have had the 
option o f ratifying the Additional Protocol. This “addition” to current obligations gives 
the IAEA more information and access in order to be able to not just verify declared 
materials and activities, but to confirm the absence o f undeclared materials and activities. 
The Additional Protocol is anticipated to become a new international norm but it is too 
early to tell. In the future it may prove true and the absence o f an Additional Protocol in 
force may be indicative o f  future noncompliance.
In total, there are six states being evaluated. The two states that are not a concern 
and the two states that failed to comply should be straight forward when applying the 
domestic politics theory because the outcomes (compliance) are clear for these case 
studies. The two states that are o f  potential concern o f becoming nuclear weapons states 
in the future may well be the more difficult and interesting cases. This analysis will 
apply the domestic politics theory o f treaty compliance to understand the cases with a
124 David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America's 
Enemies (New York: Free Press, 2010), 5.
125 Ibid., 246.
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known end state in comparison with Simmons' results in human rights and will generate 
information on the potential unknown outcomes o f the other two cases.126
More information on why these particular states were chosen will be given in 
each case study chapter's introduction. Here the basic reasons are outlined in defense o f 
using Germany, Kazakhstan, Syria, Libya, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia for this dissertation.
The two states that are not o f proliferation concern are Germany and Kazakhstan. 
They were both considered potential proliferators at one point in history. Germany 
clearly has the technological and financial capacity to acquire nuclear weapons but 
chooses not to do so. Germany was a concern after World W ar II and again after the 
Cold War. Kazakhstan was also a concern after the Cold W ar, when it inherited nuclear 
weapons (as a result o f the breakup o f the Soviet Union) and it was unknown if  they 
would keep them. This was an immediate and pressing proliferation concern. However, 
Kazakhstan willingly returned the weapons to Russia and joined the NPT. Both Germany 
and Kazakhstan are considered strong supporters o f nonproliferation today.
The two states on “the other side o f  the coin” are states that have already failed to 
comply: Syria and Libya. As mentioned in the noncompliance discussion above, the 
common way o f  defining noncompliance for states is by when they fail to meet their 
safeguards obligations, as outlined in Article III o f  the NPT. Syria and Libya were 
chosen because they are recent cases o f noncompliance that may be considered closed: 
as o f June 2012, the international community believes their programs have been stopped. 
This is as opposed to the ongoing saga o f  Iran and North Korea who may have active
126 There are two other kinds o f case studies that get away from the focus o f this research. 
A fourth type o f case study would include states that have violated the NPT in the past 
and are now complying with the treaty. A fifth case study category would be on states 
who gave up weapons programs in order to join the NPT as compliant states.
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programs at the moment. How their programs progressed and ultimately ended are very 
different stories and will make for an interesting chapter.
Finally, chapter 5 rounds out the case studies with two states that are capable o f 
acquiring nuclear weapons and are future potential proliferation concerns: Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia. These states were selected from The Nuclear Tipping Point, which is an 
edited volume focused on states that could go nuclear and the policies that affect them .127 
Respected nonproliferation expert David Albright, o f  Institute for Science and 
International Security, also lists Egypt and Saudi Arabia in his “to worry about” 
discussion o f proliferators.128 There are other scholars who refer to Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia in this manner, and who they are and what their concerns are w ill be discussed in 
more detail in chapter 5.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia each has a unique history w ith nuclear proliferation and 
each has concerns that could tip them in the direction o f acquiring nuclear weapons. 
Furthermore, both states have the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons i f  the decision is 
made to do so. Egypt, which under the autocracy o f Mubarak had a policy o f  compliance 
to the NPT despite its security incentives to proliferate, may become a transitional 
democracy as result o f the uprising and the Arab Spring. Egypt may be the most 
interesting test o f this theory for explaining treaty compliance.
127 Campbell, Einhom, and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States 
Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices.




The previous chapters have laid the groundwork for the dissertation’s case 
studies. This chapter reviewed the relevant measures o f compliance, the mechanisms that 
comprise Simmons' domestic politics theory o f  compliance, introduced the case study 
methodology, and identified the states to be used in the case studies.
Definitions o f compliance and noncompliance were offered but the ultimate 
decision for this dissertation is based on the IAEA. The states are defined as 
noncompliant with the NPT based on historical findings by the IAEA Board o f 
Governors. States are in compliance if  they have not been found in noncompliance.
The domestic politics theory o f  compliance includes the mobilization o f domestic 
groups, agenda setting, and litigation. These three variables were further defined in this 
chapter. They will be used in the following case study chapters to see if  the domestic 
politics theory o f treaty compliance can help us understand compliance in the high 
politics issue area o f national security. Through the prism o f domestic politics theory we 
should see in the case study states: nonproliferation added to the national agenda where it 
was previously absent, litigation in the courts attempting to stop the acquisition o f nuclear 
weapons, and domestic groups mobilizing in the name o f nonproliferation. The theory is 
not expected to fully explain compliance; nor should the lack o f  the theory’s mechanism 
in noncompliance cases fully explain noncompliance. According to Simmons the 
domestic politics theory o f treaty compliance just helps explain compliance.
The next three chapters are the case studies themselves. Chapter 3 discusses the 
currently compliant states: Germany and Kazakhstan. Both o f  these states were once
55
proliferation concerns but are not consider solid supporters o f the nonproliferation 
regime. Chapter 4 analyzes the recent noncompliant states, Syria and Libya. Since 2003, 
both o f these states have been found in noncompliance by the IAEA Board o f Governors. 
However, the world thinks their programs have been stopped and it is possible to study 
these cases. Chapter 5 concludes the case study chapters with a discussion on the 
potential proliferation states o f Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Both o f these states may support 
the nonproliferation regime, but the world also has reason to be concerned there may be a 
change o f policy in the future.
The politics are evolving and there may be great changes in store for some o f 
these states. But for the sake o f this dissertation, analyses will only use history and 
events up until June 2012. Otherwise, the next chapters would continually need revising 
for years to come as history unfolds.
The next several chapters will explore if  "commitments have made an important 
contribution" to stopping the spread o f  nuclear weapons, as Simmons has found to be true 
in the issue area o f human rig h ts .129 In the very least, the analyses seek to gain a better 
understanding o f  why states keep their commitment not to develop or acquire nuclear 
weapons; nor help others to do so.
129 Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics, 199.
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CHAPTER III 
STATES OF NO PROLIFERATION CONCERN
Introduction
The states in this chapter are the strong NPT supporters. It is expected that these 
states will continue to meet their commitments and will not proliferate. They may even 
demonstrate their commitment by going beyond the obligations of the NPT. Viewing 
these two cases through the lens o f the domestic politics theory of treaty compliance 
should give the expected results: if  the theory is relevant to understanding compliance in 
nonproliferation then the theory’s mechanisms should be present in these two compliance 
cases. There should be the presence o f mobilizing domestic groups, the agenda setting 
should be logical and related to the treaty, and there should be the use o f  litigation.
These two case studies develop a baseline for the theory before moving on to the 
harder noncompliance cases and potential proliferation concern cases. It is important 
before delving in to the case studies to recall that Simmons does not claim domestic 
politics theory o f treaty compliance to be sufficient in explaining compliance. She 
suggests only that the theory can help explain the puzzle that is treaty compliance and 
other factors may be involved as well.
So, what are the two cases and why were they chosen? The states for this chapter 
are Germany and Kazakhstan. After the Cold War, Germany reunified and Kazakhstan 
became an independent nation. Germany and Kazakhstan each have a unique history
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with nuclear weapons. Germany once pursued nuclear weapons and Kazakhstan actually 
had nuclear weapons; but both have made the choice not to possess nuclear weapons.
Germany became the birthplace o f the Atomic Age in 1938 with the discovery of 
a fission reaction in uranium .130 Fission is the key concept behind a nuclear weapon and 
is necessary to create an explosion.131 Germany had an active nuclear weapons program 
during W orld W ar II and after the war the international community sought an assurance 
that the program would not be restarted.132 The original nuclear weapons program under 
Hitler was not successful, and luckily, we never had to learn how he would have used 
these destructive weapons.
Decades later, with the end o f  the Cold War, there were fears that Germany might 
once again be tempted to develop nuclear weapons for security reasons in unstable
133political times. These fears, happily, were unfounded and Germany has stayed the 
non-nuclear course. Kazakhstan had a slightly different story after the Cold War.
Kazakhstan did not seek nuclear weapons but found them in its possession with 
the fall o f the Soviet Union.134 Kazakhstan suddenly had the w orld’s fourth largest 
arsenal o f  nuclear weapons and substantial inventories o f highly enriched uranium and 
plutonium. The Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons test site, Semipalatinsk, was also 
contained within the Kazakhstani borders. Ironically, however, this test site played a role
130 Global Security, "German Special Weapons,"
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/germany/nuke.htm (accessed November 30, 
2012).
131 Federation o f  American Scientists, "Nuclear Weapon Design," 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/design.htm (accessed November 30, 2012).
132 Simpson, Nielsen, and Swinerd, N P T Briefing Book.
133 John J. Mearsheimer, "Why W e Will Soon Miss the Cold War," Atlantic Monthly 
Online 266, no. 2 (1990).
134 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Kazakhstan Profile: Nuclear," http://www.nti.org/country- 
profiles/kazakhstan/nuclear/ (accessed November 30, 2012).
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in Kazakhstan citizens' revulsion for nuclear weapons despite the nation being posed to 
be a nuclear power. After two releases o f radioactivity at the site, citizens living close by 
mobilized to end testing in their new nation.135 The largest event was a protest in August 
1989 that drew more than 50,000 demonstrators to Semipalatinsk.1-’6 The suffering 
caused by the effects o f  fallout and radiation contamination from nuclear weapons testing 
resulted in Kazakhstan giving up its inherited arsenal and becoming a leading player in 
the anti-nuclear weapons testing m ovem ent.137
This chapter, on states o f  no proliferation concern, starts with the case o f 
Germany and is followed by the case o f  Kazakhstan. For each state, there is an 
introduction to the specific situation o f the compliant state. An overview is given next, 
which consists o f the state’s history with the NPT and the international nonproliferation 
regime more broadly, as well as the status o f nuclear power in the state.
Next, each state is analyzed using Simmons’ domestic politics theory o f  treaty 
compliance. This includes reviewing the mechanisms o f agenda setting, litigation, and 
mobilization o f  the domestic population for each state’s particular situation in a scholarly 
search for evidence. Conclusions are offered for each state as to whether these variables 
can explain their individual compliance cases.
135 L. J. Carter, "Soviet N uclear Testing: The Republics Say No," Science 250, no. 4983 
(16 November 1990): 903.
136 Global Nonviolent Action Database, "Kazakhs Stop Nuclear Testing (Nevada- 
Semipalatinsk Antinuclear Campaign), 1989-1991," Swarthmore College, 
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/kazakhs-stop-nuclear-testing-nevada- 
semipalatinsk-antinuclear-campaign-1989-1991 (accessed November 30, 2012).
137 Arms Control Association, "International Day Against Nuclear Tests: Translating 
W ords into Action," http://www.armscontrol.org/events/Intemational-Day-Against- 
Nuclear-Tests-Translating-W ords-Into-Action (accessed November 30, 2012).
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Finally, there are conclusions drawn for the chapter as a whole. The focus o f the 
chapter’s conclusion is whether, based on these two case studies, state compliance with 
the NPT can be effectively understood via domestic politics theory.
Germany
Today, Germany is a nonproliferation global leader. However, it is interesting to 
note that “the impetus behind the atom bomb project in Britain and the United States 
came from a fear o f the consequences o f  a unilateral German success in the military
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exploitation o f atomic energy.” While Germany never did produce nuclear weapons, 
in 1945 the nuclear genie was out o f the bottle in the United States. Germany 
unknowingly drove the Allied nuclear weapons program but today consciously drives the 
international nonproliferation effort.
Germany was one o f  the reasons the international community sought to develop a 
nonproliferation treaty. “Since at least 1960, the basic concern has been to stop or deflect 
Germany from going the way o f France,” to make the acquisition o f weapons by 
Germany as difficult as possible.139 Today there is little doubt that Germany is in 
compliance with its NPT obligations. While Germany proliferation may have been a 
concern at the time that the concept o f a nonproliferation treaty was initially developed, 
Germany is now one o f the treaty's strongest supporters. In 2004, Kurt Campbell called
138 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution o f  Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke, 
Hampshire England; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 14.
139 Catherine M. Kelleher, "The Issue o f  German Nuclear Armament," Proceedings o f  the 
Academy o f  Political Science 29, no. 2 (1986): 95.
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Germany one o f the “mainstays” in the international nonproliferation com m unity.140 
Germany is clearly technologically capable o f  producing a nuclear weapon with minimal 
time but thus far, it has purposefully chosen not to do so .141
This was not always obvious. While Germany did commit to the NPT it did not 
have the strongest set o f domestic laws for meeting its obligations under the treaty. After 
the first G ulf War much information was revealed about the Iraqi nuclear weapons 
program. This included, much to the embarrassment o f  the German government, the 
revelation that German companies had aided the program. In fact, the world would later 
learn o f “extensive illegal deliveries by German companies to Iraq, as well as to Libya 
and other states o f  concern.” 142 In particular, German citizens and companies have been 
accused o f  aiding the development o f gas centrifuges for enrichment in other nations. 
Enrichment is a key step for a uranium based nuclear weapons program .143
It was the German "reputation for technical excellence, combined with its slack 
export controls [that] help to explain why it produced a substantial proportion o f  Iraq’s 
nuclear im ports."144 That is to say German companies contributed to the Iraq program by 
taking advantage o f  the lack o f government oversight. German export controls have
140 Campbell, Einhom, and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States 
Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, 18.
141 Robert F. Mozley, The Politics and Technology o f  Nuclear Proliferation (Seattle: 
University o f Washington Press, 1998), 165.
142 Michael Rietz, "Germany’s Export Control Law in the New Millennium," Institute for 
Science and International Security, http://isis-online.org/conferences/detail/germanys- 
export-control-law-in-the-new-millennium/20 (accessed November 30, 2012).
143 Nuclear Files, "Weapons Basics," Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 
http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/basics/weapons- 
basics.htm#terms (accessed November 30, 2012).
144 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nuclear Black Markets (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), 49.
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greatly improved in recent history.145 Unfortunately, the international standard 
punishments and penalties are not severe for WMD proliferation acts but things are 
beginning to change, such as with UN Security Resolution 1540 (which requires states to 
create regulations against WMD proliferation).146
These violations did contribute to the nuclear weapons programs around the world 
but “it should be stated clearly that those violations were the exception; the majority o f 
German companies have conducted business without cause for objection.” 147 Moreover, 
while Germany did have some problems with individuals abusing the lack o f  export 
controls, there was never an issue that Germany itself was proliferating (i.e. government 
sanctioned proliferation). Germany has now implemented domestic export control laws 
that meet the international standards.148 One o f  the ways Germany does this is by being a 
member o f the Zangger Com m ittee.149 The Zangger Committee developed (and continues 
to update) a Trigger List, which is a list “o f nuclear-related strategic goods to assist NPT 
parties in identifying equipment and materials subject to export controls.” 150 This 
Committee and its list have contributed to international compliance with paragraph 2 o f 
the N PT’s Article III.
145 Michael Rietz, "Germany’s Export Control Law in the New Millennium," Institute for 
Science and International Security, http://isis-online.org/conferences/detail/germanys- 
export-control-law-in-the-new-millennium/20 (accessed November 30, 2012).
146 United Nations Security Council, "Non-Proliferation o f Weapons o f Mass 
Destruction," in Resolution 1540 (28 April 2004).
147 Rietz, "Germany’s Export Control Law in the New Millennium."
148 David Albright, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Concerns and Export Controls in Russia," 
in Testimony before the Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, 
Proliferation, and Federal Services (W ashington, DC, 06 June 2002).
149 Zangger Committee, "Members,"
http://www.zanggercommittee.org/M embers/Seiten/default.aspx (accessed Novem ber 30, 
2012).
150 Zangger Committee, "Zangger Committee,"
http://www.zanggercommittee.org/Seiten/default.aspx (accessed November 30, 2012).
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The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is another export control organization 
through which Germany meets its nonproliferation obligations.131 The Nuclear Suppliers 
Group focuses on developing guidelines for nuclear-related transfers and maintaining 
what is known as the Dual-Use List. This list covers nuclear-related “equipment, 
material and technology” exports that “could make a significant contribution to an 
unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity.” It is anticipated that 
Germany will continue “to observe the NSG guidelines more closely” since discovering 
several o f  its citizens and companies associated with Iraq’s 1980s nuclear weapons 
program .153 By doing so, Germany will be working to stay in compliance with Article II 
o f the NPT, which requires states to refrain from helping other states acquire nuclear 
weapons. This article had been intended to stop state-to-state cooperation but evolving 
times now require states to address individual actors within their borders acting without 
state consent.
This case study begins with an overview on Germany, including the state’s 
history with nonproliferation and use o f nuclear power. The case study then 
systematically goes through the domestic politics theory mechanisms o f  agenda setting, 
litigation, and mobilization. Finally, conclusions are drawn about Germ any’s compliance 
to the NPT and what may be learned by using domestic politics theory.
151 Nuclear Suppliers Group, "Participants,"
http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/03-member.htm (accessed November 30, 
2 0 1 2 ).
152 Nuclear Suppliers Group, "History o f the NSG,"
http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/01-history.htm (accessed November 30, 
2 0 1 2 ).




Germany could have decided to pursue nuclear weapons for prestige and political 
power. At the time o f negotiations for the NPT, Germany and other states had serious 
concerns “that nations without nuclear weapons production will not be able to play the 
role even o f  ‘secondary great pow er.’” 154 Germany may have also wanted to balance the 
power in the region or even compete as a regional hegemonic power with France and the 
UK who had already acquired nuclear w eapons.155
Germany’s main concern at the time was feeling threatened by the Soviet Union. 
Another reason Germany could have desired nuclear weapons is for national security. If 
concerns persisted about the reliability o f  the US as an ally or the capabilities o f NATO, 
Germany could have decided to pursue nuclear weapons to provide for its own 
defense.156
This same reason applied decades later, when, with the end o f  the Cold War, 
Germany could have pursued nuclear weapons because as M earsheimer put it, “Germany 
would no doubt feel insecure without nuclear weapons.” 157 However, Germany has 
continued to choose the path o f nonproliferation and has maintained compliance with its 
NPT commitments.
154 Kelleher, "The Issue o f German Nuclear Armament," 103.
155 Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics.
156 Campbell, Einhom, and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States 
Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, 209-12.
157 Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War."
64
Germany committed not to build nuclear weapons for the first time in 1954, when 
it signed the Paris Protocols to the Treaty o f Brussels.158 It made the commitment again 
in 1975 when it ratified the NPT (this will be discussed in more detail in the next 
section).159 And, finally, Germany once again agreed not to proliferate in 1990, as part 
o f the Two-Plus-Four Treaty that ended the multi-national control in G erm any.160 The 
NPT was perhaps the most important nonproliferation commitment Germany made 
because o f the treaty’s unique characteristics.
Germany is a party to the NPT because the Federal Republic o f Germany and the 
German Democratic Republic both signed in 1969 and ratified in 1975.161 On October 3, 
1990, the United Nations was notified that the Federal Republic o f Germany and the 
German Democratic Republic would be known as “Germany” and would keep their 
previous nonproliferation commitment. Simmons found that states may ratify to avoid 
being singled out as the only state in their region not a party to a treaty. Germany is 
clearly not in this camp o f states ratifying late simply to avoid standing out in the region. 
With a 1969 signature and 1975 deposit, Germany is on par with most o f  its neighbors.
Upon making the original commitment to the NPT, Germany also made a 
declaration. The declaration included a reference to the importance o f NATO to
158 Campbell, Einhom, and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States 
Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, 175.
159 Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "NPT Membership."
160 Campbell, Einhom, and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States 
Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, 175.
161 United Nations, "NPT (Germany),"
http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf/e03053a22d4bf8478525688f00693182/5c88b 
675bd2d0bb68525688f006d2653?OpenDocument (accessed November 30, 2012).
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Germ any’s national security, as well as a statement that the nation maintained its right to 
develop nuclear weapons if  "it considers its supreme interests in jeopardy."162
As all parties to the NPT must do under Article III, Germany negotiated a 
Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. G erm any’s Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA 
came into force in February 1977 and they ratified the Additional Protocol in April 
2004.163 As a European Union member, Germany also needed to bring a safeguards type 
agreement into effect with Euratom. Euratom is the European Atomic Energy 
Community, which is the nuclear watchdog agency within the European Com m ission.164
Germany's other nonproliferation commitments include the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty, which it ratified in 1998.165 Germany is an Annex II state; this means their 
ratification is necessary for the treaty to enter into force. This may be a remnant o f past 
proliferation concerns about Germany. Germany does not belong to any nuclear weapon 
free zones.166
Current Nuclear Status
In 2008, Germany generated about 25% of its electricity from nuclear pow er.167 
Germany had 17 operating nuclear reactors, comprised o f six boiling water and 11
162 Ibid.
163 International Atomic Energy Agency, "Status List."
164 European Atomic Energy Community, "European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom)," European Commission, http://www.euratom.org/ (accessed November 30, 
2 0 1 2 ).
,fo CTBTO Preparatory Commission, "Status o f Signature and Ratification," 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/status-of- 
signature-and-ratification/ (accessed November 30, 2012).
166 Arms Control Association, "Nuclear-W eapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) at a Glance."
167 World Nuclear Association, "Nuclear Power in Germany," http://www.woHd- 
nuclear.org/info/inf43.html (accessed November 30, 2012).
pressured water reactors. All o f the reactors were built by Siemens-KW U and are fairly 
large (totaling 20,339 MWe). The last time a new commercial reactor came online was 
1989. On a related note, after reunification, the Soviet design reactors in East Germany 
were all shutdown. Since the March 2011 disaster at Fukushima in Japan, Germany has 
decided to shutdown all o f  their nuclear power plants by 2022; eleven o f which are being 
completely demolished and being returned to green fields.168
Germany has no uranium mines but it does have an enrichment plant: URENCO 
Deutschland.169 The plant, located in Gronau near the border with the Netherlands, has 
been operational since 1985. AREVA also has a fuel fabrication plant in G erm any.170 
There are no plans to close these plants.
Domestic Politics Theory
Domestic Mobilization
Simmons describes domestic mobilization as social and political movements 
organized by citizens. West Germany saw its first mobilization against nuclear weapons
I n |
in 1958. It was the short lived “Campaign against Atomic Death” which was 
organized by the Social Democratic Party. Another movement began in 1960 as the 
Easter Marches o f Atomic Weapons Opponents; it was later renamed the “Easter
168 Ibid.
169 URENCO, "URENCO Deutschland," http://www.urenco.com/content/45/urenco- 
deutschland.aspx (accessed November 30, 2012).
170 World Nuclear Association, "Nuclear Power in Germany."
171 Holger Nehring, "Cold War, Apocalypse and Peaceful Atoms. Interpretations o f 
Nuclear Energy in the British and West German Anti-Nuclear Weapons Movements, 
1955-1964," Historical Social Research 29, no. 3 (109) (2004).
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Marches o f Atomic W eapons Opponents-Campaign for Disarmament.” Inspired by a 
similar movement in the UK, the “Easter Marches o f  Atomic Weapons Opponents- 
Campaign for Disarmament” organized marches across Germany in the 1950s and 1960s. 
However, in the German and UK movements "there was no agreement, even amongst the 
protesters in either country, about what meaning this resistance was supposed to have."172 
It seems the German movement was framed as an environmental issue and did not 
reference the NPT. This may be because Germany was already keeping its commitments 
and the domestic population was calling on the rest o f  the world, and the UK specifically, 
to disarm.
The anti-nuclear power movement goes back decades in Germany. One o f the 
best known successful movements was the anti-nuclear power movement to stop 
construction o f a nuclear power plant in W yhl.173 The movement included meetings, 
protests, mass occupations, and litigation. In certain regions o f  Germany, there has been 
mobilization against nuclear power recently, which impacted the national agenda to 
shutter all German nuclear power plants after Fukushim a.174
The NPT actually supports peaceful nuclear uses so this example shows it is 
possible for the German citizens to mobilize successfully, but this is certainly not an 
example o f  mobilizing directly for nonproliferation or the N PT.173 More importantly, 
though, the mobilization against nuclear power could be extrapolated and viewed in the
“ Holger Nehring, "The British and West German Protests against Nuclear Weapons 
and the Cultures o f  the Cold War, 1957-64," Contemporary British History 19, no. 2 
(2005): 223.
173 Global Nonviolent Action Database, "Mass Occupation o f Proposed Wyhl Nuclear 
Power Plant Site in Germany, 1974-1977."
174 World Nuclear Association, "Nuclear Power in Germany."
175 "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons."
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context o f  nuclear weapons. A domestic population so opposed to nuclear power would 
clearly be opposed to nuclear weapons. However, there is simply no reason for citizens 
to mobilize against non-existent noncompliance.
Agenda Setting
Simmons found that in human rights treaties, agenda setting had more impact in 
democracies than in autocracies.176 In order for the national agenda setting process to be 
influenced by a treaty, the legislature needs to be fairly independent and "have greater 
control over the national legislative agenda."177 In Germany, the legislature is comprised 
o f the Bundestag and the Bundesrat; and the system is genuinely dem ocratic.178 Before 
unification, the Federal Republic o f Germany was a democracy and the German 
Democratic Republic was an au tocracy .179 According to the Polity IV Project, Germany 
currently scores a ten. This means that it is a “consolidated democracy.” 180 While 
Simm ons’ work finds that domestic politics theory as a whole has less impact in stable 
democracies because their treaty compliance may be pre-determined by a variety o f 
factors, it is still a worthwhile exploration.181
As stated above, the Government o f the Federal Republic o f Germany made a 
declaration with its signature to the NPT. This declaration included statements which 
serve to reconcile its security interests (which were high on the national agenda) with the
176 Simmons, M obilizing fo r  Human Rights: International Law  in Domestic Politics, 149.
177 Ibid., 149.
178 Systemic Peace, "Polity IV Country Report 2010: Germany,"
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Germany2010.pdf (accessed November 30, 2012).
179 Ibid.
180 Systemic Peace, "The Polity IV Project,"
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (accessed November 30, 2012).
181 Simmons, Mobilizing fo r  Human Rights: International Law  in Domestic Politics, 155.
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treaty’s explicit demand that non-weapons states not pursue or acquire nuclear weapons. 
Among the key statements are:
the security o f the Federal Republic o f Germany shall continue to be 
ensured by NATO; the Federal Republic o f Germany for its part shall 
remain unrestrictedly committed to the collective security arrangements o f 
NATO;”182
“ ...in  a situation in which it considers its supreme interests in jeopardy, 
will remain free by invoking the principle o f  international law laid down 
in Article 51 o f the United Nations Charter to take the measures required
I &Tto safeguard those interests;”
As indicated by these statements, agenda setting was influenced by security 
concerns not by the treaty’s text and existence. The treaty did however, force the 
German government to reflect on its view o f nuclear weapons and develop a written 
policy.
Litigation
The centerpiece o f  Germany's judicial system is the Federal Constitutional Court. 
Also known as Bunesverfassungsgericht, it is the “special court for the review o f judicial 
and administrative decisions and legislation to determine whether they are in accord with 
the Basic Law (constitution) o f the country.” 184 The German judiciary is considered
1 o<;
"independent, both constitutionally and in practice." ' The system in Germany "works" 
and citizens could bring forth litigation to be heard by an impartial court system. They
United Nations, "NPT (Germany)."
183 Ibid.
184 Encyclopedia Britannica, "Federal Constitutional Court," 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/203366/Federal-Constitutional-Court 
(accessed November 30, 2012).
185 Systemic Peace, "Polity IV Country Report 2010: Germany."
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have a way to hold their national government and its branches accountable. However, a 
search o f  the literature for the use o f litigation finds that no one has filed a suit disputing 
the nation's commitment to the N PT ; nor calling for compliance with the treaty. 
Presumably, this is because Germany is already complying. If  Germany was not 
complying, citizens could use Article 25 o f the Basic Law to bring a law suit. Under 
Article 25, international law, such as treaty obligations “take precedence” over the 
domestic laws.186
Conclusions fo r  Germany
As recently as 1990, John M earsheimer predicted Germany would pursue nuclear 
weapons to reduce its vulnerability after the Cold W ar.187 So far, that has not come to 
pass. Germany has consistently demonstrated its commitment to the international
nonproliferation regime. For example, Germany signed and ratified the Comprehensive
188Test Ban Treaty. Germany’s ratification is required for this treaty to enter into force. 
Germany also has an Additional Protocol, which means they are voluntarily granting the 
IAEA broader access to locations and inform ation.189
Beyond the possible role o f  mobilization, the domestic politics theory has not 
been effective in aiding understanding o f  Germany's compliance with the NPT. The
186 “Basic Law for the Federal Republic o f Germany,” promulgated by the Parliamentary 
Council on 23 May 1949 and as amended in June 2008.
187 Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War."
188 CTBTO Preparatory Commission, "Status o f  Signature and Ratification."
189 International Atomic Energy Agency, "Status o f Additional Protocols," 
http://www.iaea.org/OurW ork/SV/Safeguards/protocol.html (accessed November 30, 
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treaty did not impact agenda setting or litigation which in turn could have influenced 
national compliance with the NPT.
The mobilization mechanism was more relevant but is still not a strong 
explanation of German compliance. There was a movement to abolish nuclear weapons, 
which is similar to Article VI o f  the NPT. However, the goal was not about German 
commitment to the NPT but other nations' commitments to the NPT. Furthermore, the 
movement has not been successful. There was also a movement to end nuclear power in 
Germany, which is not in line with the NPT pillars, but does serve as a stark warning to 
politicians that the domestic population would likely mobilize against German nuclear 
weapons should it ever become an issue.
Kazakhstan
With the fall o f  the Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan was suddenly an 
independent nation and “for a brief period, Kazakhstan was the fourth largest nuclear 
power on Earth.” 190 This unforeseen nuclear weapons state was faced with a serious 
decision: to keep the weapons or do away with o f  them. The whole world wanted to 
know what Kazakhstan would do (as well as what Ukraine and Belarus would do). The 
Kazakhstan situation received much attention because o f the arsenal’s size and a reported 
plan to sell nuclear material to Iran.191 In the end, Kazakhstan made the “courageous 
decision” to give up its nuclear weapons by returning them to Russia and set an example
190 James E. Doyle, ed. Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and  Nonproliferation (Burlington: 
Elsevier Inc., 2008), 179.
191 Andrew Cockbum and Leslie Cockbum, One Point Safe (New York: Doubleday, 
1997).
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for the w orld.11)2 This process was completed by the negotiation o f the START I treaty 
which was signed in 1992.193 The final weapons were relocated to Russia in 1995.194 
Kazakhstan continues to meet its obligations and is expected to do so in the future.
Overview
History with Nonproliferation
There are several reasons Kazakhstan may have considered keeping the nuclear 
weapons it inherited. It is possible Kazakhstan wanted them for security. As a recently 
independent nation Kazakhstan could have seen the benefits o f  nuclear weapons in 
meeting their national security needs. No one knew exactly what kind o f  political 
environment would follow the Cold War. Perhaps with the end o f the Soviet Union they 
wanted to be self-reliant. Or they could have kept the stockpile because o f the perceived 
prestige associated with nuclear weapons. Finally, it is expensive to develop nuclear 
weapons and by acquiring them from the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan may have been 
tempted to take on the lower maintenance costs and put o ff making a decision for 
decades.
Kazakhstan’s inheritance from the Soviet Union “ included 1,040 strategic nuclear 
warheads mounted on 104 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBMs), 370 nuclear-tipped 
air-launched cruise missiles, nuclear material mining and processing facilities, and the
192 Ban Ki-moon, "Video Message to the International Conference on a W orld Free o f 
Nuclear Weapons" (paper presented at the International Forum for a Nuclear Weapon- 
Free World, Astana, Kazakhstan, 12 October 2011).
193 Freedman, The Evolution o f  Nuclear Strategy, 423.
194 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Kazakhstan Profile: Overview," 
http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/kazakhstan/ (accessed November 30, 2012).
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largest weapons-testing complex in the world.” 195 They had also had stockpiles 
amounting to over ten thousand kilograms o f highly enriched uranium and three thousand 
kilograms o f plutonium, giving the nation the potential to further increase their arsenal 
should they decide to do so .196 Despite this inherited arsenal, Kazakhstan would later 
join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state.
Kazakhstan returned the warheads and their missiles, dismantled the ICBM silos 
and parts o f the test site .197 After ratifying the NPT, Kazakhstan negotiated a Safeguards 
Agreement, as required under Article III, entering it into force in August 1995 .198 
Kazakhstan later entered the Additional Protocol, which came into force in May 2007.
Kazakhstan even took steps beyond its commitments under the NPT. In 
cooperation with the US government, Project Sapphire was carried out to remove over 
500 kilograms o f highly enriched uranium, some o f it being weapons grade m aterial.199 
The material was taken to Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 1994.
In 1989, the local population around the test site played an important role in 
Kazakhstan creating and keeping other nonproliferation commitments. They started a 
movement focused not necessarily for dismantling the weapons, but rather to stop the 
testing o f nuclear weapons.200 They were successful in stopping the tests and more 
importantly in gaining attention o f  their national government and the international 
community. The movement called for a comprehensive test ban treaty that “would not
195 Doyle, ed. Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and  Nonproliferation, 179.
196 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Kazakhstan Profile: Overview," 
http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/kazakhstan/ (accessed November 30, 2012).
197 Doyle, ed. Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Nonproliferation , 179.
198 International Atomic Energy Agency, "Status List."
199 Cockbum and Cockbum, One Point Safe.
200 Robin Stott, "Mushroom Clouds and Blood Pressure," British Medical Journal 302, 
no. 6771 (02 February 1991): 298.
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only put a stop to the local health hazards o f testing but [would be] an essential step in 
stopping the nuclear arms race .” 201 This comprehensive treaty did come to realization.
Kazakhstan’s other nonproliferation commitments include the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty, which they ratified in May 2002 .202 They are members o f the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, which means they try to be responsible 
with their nuclear technology related exports .203 As described in the German section o f 
this chapter, these two export control organizations contribute to NPT compliance by 
developing and maintaining nuclear-related guidelines and lists for states to incorporate 
into their domestic legislation. Kazakhstan also participates in the Proliferation Security 
Initiative with the US government and is party to the Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free 
Zone .204
Current Nuclear Status
Kazakhstan’s civilian nuclear fuel cycle is quite small but the industry is quite 
large .205 There was one power plant in Aktau (the BN-350) but it closed in 1999. It was 
for electricity and desalination purposes. Although, the US government believes that the 
BN-350’s main purpose was to be a plutonium production reactor for the Soviet nuclear 
weapons program rather than produce electricity for the surrounding area. Russia and
201 Ibid., 298.
“ “ CTBTO Preparatory Commission, "Status o f Signature and Ratification."
203 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Kazakhstan Treaty Membership," 
http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/kazakhstan_l .p d f? ^  1340149328 (accessed November 
30, 2012).
204 Ibid.
203 World Nuclear Association, "Uranium and Nuclear Power in Kazakhstan," 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf89.html (accessed November 30, 2012).
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Kazakhstan are cooperating on future plans to build new power plants in Kazakhstan. 
Kazakhstan also has four research reactors . 206
Three o f the research reactors are located at the Semipalatinsk Test Site .207 The 
test site was home to 456 above and below ground nuclear tests. The Semipalatink Test 
Site and its “facilities there comprised the largest underground nuclear test site in the 
world .” 208 In response to protests, the last test was held in 1989, before the site was 
closed by President Nazarbayev in August 1991. The test site includes some o f the 
nation’s research facilities and waste storage.
Uranium mining is the main sector o f the nuclear industry remaining Kazakhstan. 
Kazakhstan has 15% o f the w orld’s natural uranium resources and is the w orld’s largest 
producer annually .209 All mining and exploration is controlled by the government owned 
company, Kazatomprom. Kazatomprom has begun cooperation with companies Cameco 
and AREVA to increase its capabilities in mining, conversion and fuel fabrication.
Kazakhstan has a conversion and fabrication facility, the Ulba Metallurgical 
Plant, which has served a variety o f  functions .210 The most relevant activities are 
conversion o f  the uranium ore to yellow cake and the fabrication o f fuel pellets.
206 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Kazakhstan Profile: Nuclear Facilities," 
http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/kazakhstan/facilities/ (accessed November 30, 2012).
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Domestic Politics Theory o f  Compliance
Domestic M obilization
Kazakhstan did not mobilize in the name o f the NPT. However, there was an 
important movement, the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement which organized to stop 
nuclear weapons testing. The movement began with protests at the test site after two
2 1  iaccidents that vented radioactivity in 1989. While the protestors in the Nevada Test 
Site garnered little attention in the US, they did inspire the citizens living near the
9 J 9Semipalatinsk Test Site to mobilize. The leader o f the movement was poet and 
politician Olzhas Suleimenov. The movement was originally composed o f  citizens living
213near the test site and Kazakh environmentalists.
The goals o f  the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement as outlined in a petition were 
“(1) the closure o f  the Semipalatinsk facility and a cleanup o f the area; (2) the end o f 
nuclear weapon production; (3) citizen control over nuclear waste; (4) the creation o f  a 
map showing the extent o f  radiation damage in the Soviet Union; and (5) the elucidation 
o f the plight o f  radiological victims in the Soviet Union .” 214 There was also a less- 
defined overarching goal to eliminate nuclear weapons. The petition outlining these 
goals had over one million signatures in a matter o f days.
211 Carter, "Soviet Nuclear Testing: The Republics Say No," 903.
212 International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, "1989 - Formation o f  the 
Nevada Semipalatinsk Movement."
213 Global Nonviolent Action Database, "Kazakhs Stop Nuclear Testing (Nevada- 
Semipalatinsk Antinuclear Campaign), 1989-1991."
214 Ibid.
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From 1989 to 1991, the movement spread to other cities and protests against 
testing were held in several cities across Kazakhstan .213 The protests brought much 
attention and people flew in from around the world to join the movement.216 It was 
reported at the time that, “a powerful protest campaign in Kazakhstan has made it 
difficult, if  not impossible to continue testing at the Soviet Union’s primary test site 
there .” 217
The movement did not use litigation to advance their cause but the participants 
did use speeches, meetings, protests, petitions and other non-violent means to influence 
the agenda against nuclear weapons testing .218 While the movement was focused on 
halting nuclear weapons testing, the concept o f  a test ban treaty was seen “as a vital 
prelude to stopping the nuclear arms race .” 219 There was an assumption that i f  the 
movement was successful and testing ended in the Soviet Union, there w ould be 
insurmountable pressure on the US to end testing as w ell.220
Agenda Setting
Kazakhstan gained its independence in December 1991 with the fall o f  the Soviet 
Union. The government is technically a republic “with little power outside the executive
215 Carter, "Soviet Nuclear Testing: The Republics Say No," 904.
216 Stott, "Mushroom Clouds and Blood Pressure," 298.
217 Carter, "Soviet Nuclear Testing: The Republics Say No," 903.
218 Global Nonviolent Action Database, "Kazakhs Stop Nuclear Testing (Nevada- 
Semipalatinsk Antinuclear Campaign), 1989-1991."
219 Stott, "Mushroom Clouds and Blood Pressure," 298.
220 Carter, "Soviet Nuclear Testing: The Republics Say No," 903.
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branch .” 221 Kazakhstan scores only a “-6 ” on the Polity Project IV scale .222 This means
->->3
it is an autocracy.”" The current president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, began as a Soviet 
executive administrator in 1990 and has continuously won presidential elections in less 
than democratic reelections. The agenda setting for the nation is almost exclusively the 
charge o f the elite leadership.
The leadership has a strong hold as the current President is expected to serve until 
at least 2020, as the elections in between have been w aived . 224 He has now given 
him self the title Leader o f  the Nation, which makes him the “de facto leader” even after 
he is no longer president.225 He also receives im munity from any possible persecution by 
the Parliament now and in the future. There was also a 2010 law passed that allows him 
to run for re-election indefinitely. Elections monitors have found that the minimum 
standards o f democratic elections have not been met in Kazakhstan’s past elections. The 
executive power has few limitations, as the legislative body “largely serves as a rubber- 
stamp body (as does the judiciary ) . ” 226
Kazakhstan’s leadership may not have been thinking o f  the international 
community when they chose to return the weapons to Russia. It is more likely they saw 
the weapons as a bargaining chip in the game o f world politics. In exchange for the 
weapons, Kazakhstan “received significant and broad assurances in December 1994 from
221 Central Intelligence Agency, "The W orld Factbook: Kazakhstan," 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kz.html (accessed 
November 30, 2012).
222 Systemic Peace, "Polity IV Country Report 2010: Kazakhstan," 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Kazakhstan2010.pdf (accessed November 30,
2012 ).
223 Systemic Peace, "The Polity IV Project."




France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States .” 227 These assurances were 
focused on security and on respecting the sovereignty o f the new nation o f Kazakhstan.
Litigation
The Kazakhstan judicial system is comprised o f  a Supreme Court and a 
Constitutional Council (also known as the Constitutional Court) .228 The executive 
branch’s influence over the Constitutional Council by the fact when President 
Nazarbayev amended the constitution to allow for unlimited terms, he sent it to the 
Constitutional Council for it to be approved and to give the appearance o f  transparency.
A search for past or current lawsuits returns nothing. There is no litigation related 
to forcing Kazakhstan to keep its nuclear nonproliferation commitments. There was no 
litigation related to stopping nuclear weapons testing either. However, resolutions were 
introduced and passed by the Supreme Soviet under the Soviet Union and in the newly 
formed Kazakhstani Parliament after independence .229
Conclusions fo r  Kazakhstan
As UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stated, “Semipalatinsk has become a 
powerful symbol o f hope. Hope for a world free o f nuclear w eapons .” 230 Kazakhstan 
had a unique opportunity to be a nuclear weapon state automatically at its infancy. 
However, Kazakhstan did the noble thing for itself and for the world's international
227 Writz and Lavoy, eds., Over the Horizon Proliferation Threats, 253.
228 Systemic Peace, "Polity IV Country Report 2010: Kazakhstan."
229 Global Nonviolent Action Database, "Kazakhs Stop Nuclear Testing (Nevada- 
Semipalatinsk Antinuclear Campaign), 1989-1991."
230 Ki-moon, "Video Message to the International Conference on a W orld Free of Nuclear 
Weapons."
80
security. By giving up the weapons Kazakhstan had not ju st set an example for other 
countries but won international favor. Who knows how world politics would look today 
if  Kazakhstan were a nuclear weapons state. W orse, Kazakhstan could have kept the 
weapons and materials and sold them to other states.
Although, this has been an interesting case study, relatively little has been gained 
by applying the domestic politics theory o f treaty compliance. The agenda setting was 
driven not by the treaty itself but by the international com m unity’s urge to secure the 
arsenal. There was no litigation associated with the NPT. The public did mobilize 
against testing nuclear weapons but not actually for nonproliferation and the treaty.
The Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement was a great example o f  domestic groups 
mobilizing for a cause but it was not focused on the NPT; nor did it use the NPT to 
advance its cause. The common opinion in Kazakhstan was that “the only reason for 
continued testing was the need to develop new and improved nuclear weapons .” 231 
Therefore, it is possible there is a link with the NPT.
Conclusions
In this chapter we viewed the cases o f  Germany and Kazakhstan’s 
nonproliferation compliance through the lens o f domestic politics theory. In theory these 
two cases should have been straight forward because we know these states are in 
compliance with the NPT. Germany and Kazakhstan are not current or potential 
proliferation concerns, and both are supporters o f the nonproliferation regime. It seems
231 Stott, "Mushroom Clouds and Blood Pressure," 298.
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that in these cases the agenda setting, litigation, and domestic mobilization mechanisms 
would be readily identifiable. In fact, Kazakhstan was chosen in part because the 
domestic population had mobilized against nuclear testing within their borders.
However, this case proved more complicated than anticipated because there was 
mobilization, but it was not directly about nonproliferation.
Table 1 (on the following page) illustrates the presence of domestic politics theory 
mechanisms evaluating the Germany and Kazakhstan case studies for this chapter. The 
national agenda setting was not influenced by the treaty but rather by the international 
community and world politics at the time. Neither state saw the use o f  litigation to 
enforce the obligations o f the national government under the NPT. Finally, both 
countries had domestic populations mobilize for nonproliferation related issues. The foci 
o f the movements, however, were on disarmament o f other nations, stopping testing, and 
anti-nuclear power.
Neither nation's citizens mobilized in the name o f the NPT nor to keep their 
nations from acquiring nuclear weapons. Given their history o f  mobilizing on nuclear 
issues, it may be that neither state's population is concerned about their governments' 
compliance with the NPT and have purposely chosen to mobilize on these peripheral 
issues. We could expect that mobilization would occur if the pursuit o f  nuclear weapons 
(i.e. NPT noncompliance) were to become a concern in either state. Domestic politics 
theory o f  treaty compliance does not solely explain these cases but the theory does appear 
to offer some insight to German and Kazakhstani compliance.
82
State
Domestic Politics Theory Mechanisms Present?
Agenda Setting Litigation Mobilization
Germany No No
Yes and No - 
Mobilized but did 
not reference treaty 




Yes and No - 
M obilized against 
testing and not 
about the NPT
Table 1. Results o f  Chapter 3 Case Studies
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CHAPTER IV
STATES THAT HAVE ALREADY FAILED TO COMPLY
Introduction
When the world thinks o f states pursuing nuclear weapons certain states come to 
mind right away: Iran, North Korea, and Iraq. However, Libya and Syria are also fairly 
recent cases o f  states pursuing nuclear weapons with less notoriety. In 2003, when the 
international community was focused on the US and Iraq (and its alleged weapons o f 
mass destruction programs) the US and UK were also working in a much quieter 
diplomatic fashion to dismantle the nuclear weapons program in Libya.
In 2007, the world was watching Iran, which had failed to stop enrichment 
activities and was being punished with sanctions. While the international community 
was using diplomacy and the UN system to stop Iran, the Israelis bombed a plutonium 
production reactor to stop Syria from pursuing nuclear weapons. There was relatively 
little outcry from Syria or the international community, especially considering it was such 
a violent and overt action.
The states in this chapter are ones that have already failed to comply with their 
nonproliferation commitments. We already know the outcome (noncompliance) and can 
focus on exploring what influenced the outcome. Failures are as important as successful 
compliance in international law. What can we learn about compliance with the 
nonproliferation treaties by exploring noncompliance? Does viewing Syria and Libya 
through the lens o f the domestic politics theory o f treaty compliance indicate that these
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two nations should have been in compliance? Did agenda setting, litigation, and 
mobilization o f domestic groups play a role at all in not pursuing or pursuing nuclear 
weapons despite being party to the NPT? Were these aspects o f the Sim m ons’ theory 
completely absent?
Exploring two case studies that are “failures to com ply” creates a well-rounded 
investigation o f compliance with the NPT. Comparing factors o f the successful 
compliance and failed compliance may illustrate a clear role for the domestic politics 
theory o f treaty compliance when it comes to the high level politics o f  national security. 
Or the comparison may show that no difference exists in the role o f domestic politics. Or 
comparing the case studies may aid in identifying other variables related to compliance.
Why use Syria and Libya, as opposed to other compliance failure cases? Syria 
and Libya both pursued nuclear weapons but they no longer have programs. This means 
we can consider them "closed" cases for now. This is in contrast to North Korea and Iran 
who have been found in noncompliance but may still have current programs. Another 
important point is that the Arab Spring has left Syria and Libya in flux, so this 
dissertation will only consider the state o f  things as o f June 2012.
Syria and Libya have another commonality that separates them from the other 
noncompliance cases. They both may have been concerned with domestic audiences 
when deciding to pursue nuclear weapons. There was no fear of outside regime change at 
the time that they began their programs. Unlike North Korea, Iraq and Iran whose 
weapons programs seem to be for maintaining regime security from outside intervention, 
Syria and Libya seem to be focused on regime security from domestic forces. They have 
both had disgruntled domestic groups and had reason to fear being overthrown. A
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successful nuclear weapons program would rally the domestic populations behind the 
regime that had brought them to parity with Israel and defied the international 
community.
Both states for this chapter are Middle East North Africa (MENA) states and Arab 
states. These two instances o f noncompliance were deliberately chosen because they 
came after the Additional Protocol was available for ratification. The Additional 
Protocol is an international legal instrument that can signify renewed and/or strengthened 
commitment to NPT obligations by voluntarily giving the IAEA more information and 
access.
As Simmons found, the role o f  government is an important one. Both states had 
cost benefits analyses that may have had their respective national governments leaning 
toward acquiring nuclear weapons. A traditional realist view would say that the national 
governments’ common perceived threats from Israel may have formed the preference to 
cheat their NPT obligations. But was there more to the decision? Did domestic factors 
also play a role?
In addition to the similarities mentioned above (i.e. both states are MENA states, 
Arab states, failures to comply states, and neither has the Additional Protocol), both 
Libya and Syria also received outside assistance with their clandestine activities violating 
the NPT. Libya received assistance from A. Q. Khan and Syria received assistance from 
North Korea. Both states were also hesitant to ratify the Additional Protocol. Libya did 
so after the revelation o f its noncompliance and Syria has been under continuous pressure 
since its clandestine activities came under scrutiny.
86
There are a few differences between these two case studies. Syria and Libya 
differ slightly in the international community's path to a noncompliance finding. Syria’s 
noncompliance was announced to the world in the form o f the 2007 Israeli attack.
Libya’s clandestine program and its dismantlement were discussed behind closed doors 
with the US and UK, and after an agreement was reached Libya announced its own 
program publicly and its plans to terminate said program.
Syria and Libya also differed in their desired type o f  nuclear weapon. There are 
two basic types o f nuclear weapons: the gun-type assembly and the implosion m ethod .232 
The gun-type assembly requires uranium enriched to weapons grade. This explains the 
Libyan enrichment facility. The implosion type typically requires plutonium, a human- 
made element (although it is possible to use uranium). All reactors produce plutonium as 
a byproduct in fuel that has burned up in the reactor (known as a spent fuel) . 233 However, 
reactors can be designed to produce higher amounts o f  plutonium and the features 
necessary to generate and distribute power can be ignored. This explains Syria’s 
clandestine building o f  a plutonium production reactor absent any infrastructure to 
distribute power.
The importance o f  this chapter is to explore w hether the domestic politics theory 
o f compliance can give insight in to the Syrian and Libyan noncompliance with the NPT. 
Did domestic politics theory help explain noncompliance or does it indicate there should 
have been compliance? As discussed in chapter 2, a noncompliance finding by the IAEA 
Board o f Governors is an indisputable measure o f noncompliance for this test.
232 Federation o f American Scientists, "Nuclear Weapon Design."
233 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, "Plutonium M anufacture and Fabrication," 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Library/Plutonium/index.html (accessed Novem ber 30, 
2012).
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This chapter starts with the 201 1 noncompliance finding o f Syria and is followed 
by the twists and turns o f the Libyan case study and its 2004 noncompliance finding. In 
the Libya case study, there is a discussion on why Libya actually moved into compliance 
after violating its NPT commitments for years. For each state, there is an introduction to 
the specific situation o f the noncompliant state. An overview is given next, which 
consists o f  the state’s history with the NPT and the international nonproliferation regime 
more broadly, as well as the status o f nuclear power in the state. This aids in 
understanding the context o f  the noncompliant actions.
Next, each state is analyzed using Simmons’ domestic politics theory o f treaty 
compliance. This includes reviewing the role o f agenda setting, litigation, and the 
mobilization o f the domestic population for each state’s particular situation. Conclusions 
are then drawn for each state on whether these variables can explain the lack o f 
compliance.
Syria
Syria’s noncompliance activities most likely began in 2001.234 It was then that 
the Syrians began building a clandestine nuclear reactor based on a North Korean design. 
The design used is not for a reactor that produces power but rather a reactor specifically 
designed with the purpose o f plutonium production. According to renowned proliferation
234 W orld Nuclear Association, "Nuclear Proliferation Case Studies," http://world- 
nuclear.org/info/default.aspx?id=340&terms=syria (accessed November 30, 2012).
analyst David Albright, the reactor had the potential to produce a w eapon’s worth o f 
plutonium every one to two years.23'
The international community became aware o f Syria’s clandestine activities in 
2007 with Israel’s bombing o f a secret facility at Al-Kabir (referred to as Dair Alzour by 
the IAEA) and the subsequent cover-up by Syria.* What is more surprising than the 
fact that Israel managed to fly over Syria and destroy the facility? That there was no 
chorus o f disapproval. Not from Syria and not from the international community. It was 
silent. The event was reported by the media but there were no comments from the 
leadership in Syria or Israel. This is shocking given that Syria is quick to criticize Israel 
normally. And while Israel's attack made it clear that they will not sit idly by while 
others develop nuclear weapons, at that time it did not want to take credit for its actions.
Few details were initially available, as Israel and Syria remained surprisingly 
quiet concerning the incident (as did the US which later admitted prior knowledge) . 237 
North Korea came to Syria's aid in covering up the incident by removing debris and 
bulldozing the area, in an attempt to remove all traces o f  the facility and attack before 
allowing the IAEA access .238
It is important to note that like other poor developing nations, Syria was not a 
likely candidate to build a nuclear weapon based on its capabilities. Syria was accused of 
developing other types o f weapons o f mass destruction but nuclear weapons had not been
235 Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America's Enemies, 3.
236 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Syria Profile: Nuclear Chronology,"
http://www.nti.org/m edia/pdfs/syria_nuclear.pdf?_=l316466791 (accessed November 30, 
2012 ).
237 George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), 420-21.
238 Office o f the Director o f  National Intelligence, "Background Briefing with Senior U.S. 
Officials on Syria’s Covert Nuclear Reactor and North K orea’s Involvement," (2008).
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a concern .239 According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Syria, “has a weak industrial 
infrastructure, poor scientific capabilities, and lacks trained engineers and other personnel 
needed to run a major civilian or weapons-oriented program .” 240 As the international 
community keeps learning: where there is a will there is a way. More exactly, where 
supply meets demand there is away. A state that has a strong desire (demand) for nuclear 
weapons but lacks some technical resources can find a supplier to fill this gap for the 
right price. A. Q. Khan allegedly approached the Syrians with an offer to assist in 
building a clandestine nuclear weapons program . 241 However, the North Koreans were a 
natural choice o f supplier as they were already cooperating with Syria in the areas o f 
missile technology and related com ponents .242 Like Syria, North Korea was once 
underestimated because o f  a lack o f  resources. Now North Korea has a suspected small 
arsenal o f  nuclear explosive devices and a profitable (albeit scary) business model.
North Korea is accused o f  supplying the designs, knowledge, and experts to help 
the Syrians develop and build their clandestine program .243 North Korea even used its
239 BBC, "Syria Profile: Timeline," BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east- 
14703995 (accessed November 30, 2012).
240 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Syria Profile: Nuclear," http://www.nti.org/country- 
profiles/syria/nuclear/ (accessed November 30, 2012).
41 Office o f  the Director o f National Intelligence, "Unclassified Report to Congress on 
the Acquisition o f Technology Relating to Weapons o f Mass Destruction and Advanced 
Conventional Munitions, 1 January-31 December 2004,"
http://www.dni.gov/reports/2004_unclass_report_to_NIC_DO_16Nov04.pdf (accessed 
November 30, 2012).
242 Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America's Enemies, 
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own clandestine procurement networks and its front company, Namchongang Trading 
Company (NCG), to procure components for Syria’s secret reactor.244
Overview
History with Nonproliferation
The Syrian government has attempted to project an image o f  greatness and 
regional leadership. However, since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, when Syria (and other 
Arab states) suffered a significant defeat, the Arab governments have “struggled to find 
explanations for Arab weakness and strategies that would reverse some o f the perceived 
injustices .” 245 During this time, Syria’s powerful ally the Soviet Union did nothing to 
support Syria. In fact, the Soviet Union worked against Syria with the US to end the 
1973 Yum Kippur W ar in a stalemate .246 This may have played a role in Syria pursing 
weapons o f mass destruction rather than relying on its allies.
Syria may also have hoped that if  they could acquire nuclear weapons it would 
build support for the regime domestically. In addition to being the first Arab state with 
nuclear weapons, Syria would be on par with the Israelis. Syrians "have projected a self- 
image o f  enduring greatness and leadership o f  the pan-Arab cause" and possessing 
nuclear weapons would help this image at home and abroad . 247 Syria may think that 
nuclear weapons would help in the regional balance o f  power and replace the loss o f their
244 Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America's Enemies,
154.
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superpower ally, the Soviet Union. Syria may have been pushed towards nuclear 
weapons in the face o f  an ever-strengthening Israel with its presumed nuclear weapons 
and strong relationship with the US. Finally, in 1978 Syria felt it had lost another ally 
with Egypt signing the Camp David Accords.
Syria was among the first to sign and ratify the NPT; signing in 1968 and
248ratifying in 1969. However, it was not until M ay 1992 that their Safeguards 
Agreement (INFCIRC 407) entered into force, as required in Article III o f  the N PT .249 
Technically, Syria had 18 months to bring this agreement into force but back in the 1970s 
if  a state missed the deadline it was not seen as particularly significant. Failure to enter 
into a Safeguards Agreement within 18 months o f NPT ratification has not been used by 
the IAEA as the basis for noncompliance findings, although technically it is failing to 
comply with the NPT. In the 1970s, it was assumed that a state had nothing to declare if 
it did not enter its safeguards agreement in a timely fashion .250 This may have set a bad 
precedent. Syria signed its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA in 1992 under 
international pressure because the Chinese were building the aforementioned research 
reactor as part o f a Technical Cooperation project with the IAEA.
Syria was found in noncompliance in June 2011. This means that Syria was 
reported by the IAEA secretariat to the Board o f  Governors, who in turn reported Syria to 
the IAEA member states, the UN General Assembly, and most importantly, to the UN 
Security Council.
248 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Syria Profile: Nuclear."
249 International Atomic Energy Agency, "Status List."
250 Campbell, Einhom, and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States 
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The path to an official IAEA noncompliance decision began in 2007 with the 
destruction, by Israel, o f the offending facility in Dair Alzour. Rather than inform the 
UN nuclear watchdog (the IAEA), Israel chose to take unilateral action .251 The IAEA 
Director General Mohammed El Baradei during that time period has accused the US o f 
also being aware o f the facility for years and choosing not to inform the IAEA .252 
George W. Bush states in his memoirs (Decision Points) that Israel informed him o f the 
clandestine reactor but he did not feel it was the U S’ place to intercede . 253
The Israeli government moved forward with a unilateral strike against the Al- 
Kibar facility in September 2007. W ithin days o f the strike, the Syrian government had 
removed site debris, used bulldozers to move part o f  a nearby hill’s dirt onto the now 
leveled site, and then began constructing a new structure on the exact same location .254 
The North Koreans played a supporting role in this cover-up. The Syrian government 
claimed the previous building (which they attempted to erase all traces of) and the new 
facility under construction were military buildings with no nuclear function .255 However, 
they denied the IAEA immediate access so the IAEA was unable to confirm the Syrian 
claims.
251 Mohamed El Baradei, The Age o f  Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous 
Times (New York: M etropolitan Books/Henry Holt and Co., 2011), 229-31.
252 Ibid., 230-31.
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A year later, the IAEA finally was given access to verify the site’s purpose but 
more anomalies were found .256 The inspectors determined that the facility layout was 
consistent with a nuclear reactor (although the IAEA refuses at this point to completely 
reject a non-nuclear possibility). The US has gone further by pointing out that not only 
was the destroyed facility a reactor but it is not consistent with a power plant design and
257must be a plutonium production design.
IAEA inspectors have taken environmental samples which revealed the presence 
o f anthropogenic uranium (human-modified uranium) at the site o f the destroyed 
building .258 The Syrian government tried to blame the Israeli missiles as the source o f  the 
uranium but the IAEA believes this unlikely. In 2008 and 2009, IAEA inspectors found 
similar particles in the hot cell at SSR -l(the research reactor provided by the Chinese
*) SOunder IAEA technical cooperation). The particles did not match any material in the 
Syrian declared inventory to the IAEA. The particles are believed to be from undeclared 
uranium conversion activities in 2004.
Up until the bombing, and resulting revelation to the IAEA, Syria had not been 
accused o f  noncompliance with the NPT by the IAEA Board o f Governors. However, the 
US government had become concerned that Syria’s alleged weapons o f mass destruction
256 Ibid.
257 Office o f the Director o f National Intelligence, "Background Briefing with Senior U.S. 
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programs were beginning to include nuclear weapons .260 The US and others in the 
international community were significantly concerned to interfere with nuclear power and 
technological sales to Syria. The US government issued statements o f concern in its 
national intelligence reports and State Department compliance reports. While issuing 
these reports, the US was also putting pressure on other states not to deal in nuclear 
related sales to Syria .261
After the A1 Kibar raid there were eleven reports by the IAEA Director General 
concerning the implementation o f safeguards in Syria, each describing the lack of 
cooperation and ongoing discrepancies .262 Eventually, on the 9th o f June 2011, the Board 
o f Governors passed a resolution on the decision to report “Syria’s non-compliance with 
its Safeguards Agreement to all Members o f the Agency and to the Security Council and 
General Assembly o f  the United Nations.” As o f April 2012, the issue remains open 
with the IAEA asking Syria for clarifications and to ratify the Additional Protocol.264
The Syrian government may have several reasons for the decision to not comply 
with their nonproliferation obligations. The first and obvious reason is a perceived threat 
from Israel and outside intervention from other nations. This is a classic neorealist point 
o f  view. Simmons, however, has taught us with the domestic politics theory o f  treaty 
compliance to look beyond balance o f power and security threats.
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Current Nuclear Status
Syria currently has one nuclear reactor, Syrian Research R eactor-1 (SSR-1), 
which is located near Damascus. This miniature neutron source reactor was provided by 
the Chinese in the early 1990s, under a Technical Cooperation agreement with the 
IAEA .265 It is under IAEA safeguards and is used for producing medical isotopes, 
research, and training .266 According to IAEA standards, this reactor does not produce 
enough plutonium to be o f a proliferation concern. The reactor does use highly enriched 
uranium but the quantity required is quite low by proliferation standards .267 The deal for 
the research reactor began in 1991 and was made official by the Syrian parliament in 
1 9 9 2  268 j i ^  reactor went crifical (started-up) in in 1996.
Syria had seriously considered buying a research reactor from India in 1991 but 
India retracted the offer after pressure from the US .269 It was not uncommon for the US 
to pressure states from cooperating with Syria on nuclear technology .270
Syria has no known enrichment or reprocessing capabilities, which are also paths 
to a nuclear weapon. Syria did research (and receive IAEA support) in uranium extraction 
solvents and techniques. They also built a hot cell facility. This technique and facility 
could be pure scientific research but both could be misused for nuclear weapons program.
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Domestic Politics Theory o f  Compliance
M obilization o f Domestic Groups
The government may have pursued a nuclear weapons program to impress the 
domestic population and gain support for a weakening regime. Since the bombing in 
2007 and the Arab Spring, the situation in Syria has taken an unexpected turn and the 
government has become even weaker. Previously the lack “o f  any real opposition groups 
inside the country and a pervasive fear o f  the security services were largely cited as the 
culprit behind the seeming passivity o f  the Syrian people.”271
Given the undemocratic nature o f  Syria it was unlikely that the domestic groups 
would mobilize for any cause. However, as we have seen with the Arab Spring in 2011, 
there is a tipping point. The frustrated citizens o f  Syria have organized protests and taken 
to the streets. It is unknown how this will finish but the most important point is despite 
the risk o f  death, the citizens are mobilizing.
They are not, however, mobilizing to stop Syria’s noncompliance with the NPT. 
Nor have they done so in the past. This may be because the domestic population did not 
know noncompliance activities were happening. Or once the activities were revealed the 
domestic groups did not think they could mobilize and make a difference given the strict 
government. Finally, they may have not cared as they clearly have bigger issues with the 
government than compliance with a nonproliferation treaty.
What about the future? It is too soon to te ll.... But what if there is a change o f 
government in Syria? If the population now knows they can mobilize for change
271 Systemic Peace, "Polity IV Country Report 2010: Syria," 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Syria2010.pdf (accessed November 30, 2012).
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successfully will they do it again? Can we expect to see an anti-nuclear weapons 
movement in Syria in the future assuming that the domestic groups want to normalize 
relationships with the rest o f the world (which is necessary for the pariah state to begin 
economic recovery and rejoin the international community).
Agenda Setting
Syria is defined by the CIA as a “republic under an authoritarian regime.”272 This 
corresponds with the Polity IV Project scoring o f  Syria as a "-7" on the polity scale.273 
Bashar al-Assad has been president since 2000, when he took over after the death o f  his 
father, Hafez al-Assad. The government is highly centralized and the nation has been 
under martial law for decades.274 The President is ultimately responsible for the Syrian 
nuclear program.275
Given the strict (let alone often brutal) rule o f Hafez Assad and his son Bashar 
Assad, agenda setting is limited to the elite leadership. W hen the NPT was open for 
signature, Syria’s quick ratification may be explained by Syria’s close relationship with 
the Soviet Union at the time.276 The Soviet Union was a negotiator and early proponent 
o f the NPT. Syria may have secretly hoped the treaty would curb Israel’s pursuit as well,
272 Central Intelligence Agency, "The W orld Factbook: Syria," 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html (accessed 
November 30, 2012).
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but this is unlikely. Ratification did give the leadership the ability to criticize Israel for 
not signing.
There was a need for the elite to modify their agenda to win support from the 
domestic population. The noncompliance activities could have been to demonstrate to 
the citizens (and possibly to the world) that Syria can achieve parity with Israel and even 
surpass other Arab states by acquiring nuclear weapons. There would certainly be the 
possibility o f prestige for the Syrians should they achieve this distinction. Furthermore, 
with the assumption that security is a key component o f  the Syrian agenda, the 
government could point to the nuclear weapons as a program to provide security to its 
citizens and to gam er support for a “caring government.”
Once again it is not necessarily the government type that indicates potential 
noncompliance/compliance. Just as an autocracy is less likely to comply with human 
rights treaties, a government with specific perceived threats may prefer not to follow a 
nonproliferation treaty. The agenda setting o f  the government does not to appear to be 
influenced by ratification o f the NPT. This may have been because o f overriding 
concerns bending the agenda towards noncompliance.
Litigation
Unsurprisingly, Syria has a weak judicial system. The judicial system is 
comprised o f the Supreme Judicial Council, the Supreme Constitutional Court and the 
Court o f Cassation.277 Under the rule o f Hafez Assad, the judicial system has not
277 Systemic Peace, "Polity IV Country Report 2010: Syria."
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“provided a serious check to his authority.”278 Under his son, Bashar Assad, there have 
been attempts at reform in various sectors but the “old guard” within the B a’ath Party 
continues to undermine these efforts.
There has been no reported activity by domestic groups utilizing litigation to 
develop or implement policy related to nuclear weapons.
Conclusions fo r  Syria
It is difficult to understand why Syria thought they would successfully get away 
with building a clandestine facility in this day and age o f technology. The IAEA was 
able to use satellite images and environmental sampling to determine the Syrian 
government’s true intentions. The IAEA did not begin these safeguards verification 
activities until after the Israeli bombing. It seems from  this case study that perhaps 
technology will influence compliance decisions in the future by creating a fear not ju st of 
early detection but also o f  post event analyses.
The Board o f Governors not only called for Syria to come into compliance with 
its NPT obligations but also required Syria to meet the newest international norm in 
nonproliferation. Syria is to “sign and promptly bring into force and implement in full
97Qthe Additional Protocol.” Furthermore, Syria should act in accordance with the 
Additional Protocol until it is in force. On a related note, Syria continues to stay outside 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, having refused to sign or ratify the treaty.280
279 International Atomic Energy Agency, "Implementation o f the NPT Safeguards 
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Despite knowing other states having had their attempts to acquire nuclear 
weapons exposed, Syria moved forward with its clandestine program. Perhaps there was 
still fear o f  being caught because the Syria did go to extraordinary lengths to change the 
facade o f the building.281 Given the assistance o f North Korea, it may be a fair 
assumption that the Syrians planned to build up their capacity and then leave the NPT, as 
their advisors, the North Koreans, did. On the one year anniversary o f  the IAEA 
noncompliance report, Syria remains uncooperative and issues relating to its program 
remain unresolved. Marking the occasion, Robert W ood (Acting US Permanent 
Representative to the International Organizations in Vienna) told the IAEA Board o f  
Governors, "the responsibility remains with Syria to remedy its noncompliance, and to 
demonstrate a constructive approach in its relations to this Agency, the Syrian people, 
and the international community."282 Only time will tell.
It is worth noting that Israel had bombed another nation’s reactor previously. In 
1981, Israel destroyed Iraq’s Osirak reactor before its core was fueled.283 It is believed 
that the attack resulted in a re-doubling o f efforts in Saddam Hussein’s efforts to acquire 
a nuclear weapon and forced the Iraqi’s to try harder to “cheat the system.” Will this
284happen with Syria? Furthermore, was Syria North Korea’s only client or are there 
more?
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While Syria worked with the North Koreans to develop their nuclear capacity via 
a plutonium production reactor, the Libyans agreed to a deal with Khan and his network 
to purchase a turnkey enrichment facility. The facility is referred to as a turnkey because 
the Libyan's purchase was not individual pieces o f technology and materials to support an 
indigenous program, but rather the purchase was an entire program. This was not the 
first attempt by Libya to acquire nuclear weapons. Allegedly, Libya had approached 
China, India and Pakistan in the past in its pursuit o f  nuclear weapons technology and 
knowhow from 1969 until 2003.285 Libya actively pursued nuclear weapons despite its 
commitments under the NPT.
In 2003, Qadhafi announced that Libya would give up its clandestine nuclear 
weapons program. The US and UK were instrumental in arranging the deal that led to 
the announcement but the decision was solely Qadhafi’s. There are a variety o f reasons 
that likely led to this decision, including Qadhafi not wanting to end up like Saddam 
Hussein and his wishing for Libya to reintegrate with the world in order to help the 
domestic economy. Domestic reasons may have played a prominent role in pursuing 
nuclear weapons and for giving up the program in Libya.
‘ Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Libya Profile: Nuclear," http://www.nti.org/country- 




Libya had several reasons to desire nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons could 
have provided regime security by building support for Qadhafi domestically and keeping 
the international community from enforcing a policy o f regime change. Like Syria, Saudi 
Arabia, and Egypt, Libya may have sought a sense o f  pride and prestige by becoming the 
first Arab state to acquire nuclear weapons. There may have been fear associated with 
living in the Middle East and a desire to build up national defenses.
Libya signed the NPT in 1968 under King Idris and later ratified the treaty in 
1975 under Colonel Qadhafi.286 Despite this show o f commitment, it is believed Qadhafi 
began to seek nuclear weapons almost immediately after taking power in 1969. Over the 
years, Qadhafi made many contradictory statements.287 Sometimes the eccentric leader 
stated that Libya had no intention o f  acquiring nuclear weapons and other times he stated 
it was a necessity. This ambiguity caused mistrust o f  Libya within the international 
community.
Libya has been accused o f  trying to buy nuclear weapons from China and India in 
the 1970s.288 Libya was also accused o f  working with Pakistan in the 1970s to develop a 
trade for uranium ore (from Niger) as a thank you to Pakistan for help in developing 
Libya’s nuclear program. Libya has admitted that during the 1980s, the nuclear program
287 Doyle, ed. Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Nonproliferation, 331.
288 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Libya Profile: Nuclear."
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hired a German national to develop gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment.289 After 
nearly a decade, that expert left Libya having been unsuccessful in producing a working 
centrifuge let along enriching any uranium.
Libya tried several acquisition pathways to obtain uranium conversion and 
enrichment capabilities. The US government played active (and successful) role 
pressuring suppliers to cancel sales. However, such pressure can only works on 
legitimate companies and states. Libya eventually found a supplier in the form o f A. Q. 
Khan in the 1990s.
According to the IAEA, in 1995 Libya made a “strategic decision” to once again 
pursue nuclear weapons and acquired its first centrifuges from the Khan network in 
1 9 9 7  29° jQjan Yvouid iater confess he first met with Libyan representatives in 1990.291 
The Khan network’s comprehensive offerings included technology, components, 
manufacturing capabilities, training, instructions, lessons learned from previous 
experience, and even weapon blueprints (believed to be 1960s Chinese design and 
fabrication documents).292 In 2004, the IAEA reported that analysis o f environmental 
sampling swipes o f relevant facilities and equipment in Libya revealed that some o f the 
centrifuges had been used in the Pakistani program prior to being shipped to Libya.293
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This confirmed the connection between the Libyan program and the Khan network (and 
debatably also the connection to the official state nuclear weapons program o f Pakistan).
By 2000, the UK and US intelligence communities had become suspicious that 
Khan was working with Libyans and tracked the situation closely.294 There are a variety 
o f reasons that must have influenced the decision to dismantle the nuclear weapons 
program and these are discussed in the following section. But the important part to note 
now is that in March 2003, just days before the US (and coalition) invasion o f  Iraq, 
Qadhafi sent a secret personal envoy to approach the UK and US about Libya voluntarily 
dismantling its weapons o f  mass destruction program s.295 After quiet negotiations 
Qadhafi agreed to share details o f his programs and give them  up (including nuclear) as 
well as take responsibility for the Pan Am 103 bombing over Lockerbie. The final push 
before full public disclosure and dismantlement by Libya, was the Proliferation Security 
Initiative's interdiction o f  a German owned ship, the BBC China, which was transporting 
enrichment components from Malaysia to Libya on behalf o f the Khan network.296 
Although there is debate whether this interdiction should be attributed to the Proliferation 
Security Initiative or whether it was a separate intelligence mission.297 In the end,
Qadhafi came clean and welcomed the US, UK, and IAEA in to its facilities to examine 
and dismantle its nuclear weapons program. The program was a clear violation o f the 
NPT and a noncompliance finding was imminent.
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“Applauding the voluntary decision” o f  Libya for giving up its nuclear program, 
opening itself to verification by the IAEA, and ratifying the Additional Protocol, the 
Board o f  Governors’ March 2004 noncompliance resolution for Libya was very 
complimentary.298 In April 2004, there was no punishment handed down from the UN 
Security Council in response to the noncompliance report.299 The Security Council 
simply “took note o f the IAEA resolution,” commended Libya for its decision to 
dismantle its program, and encouraged it to do so for all o f its WMD programs, not just 
nuclear.300
Current Nuclear Status
Libya has no civilian nuclear power program but does have plans for a nuclear 
reactor (for power and/or desalinization) in an estimated 15 years.301 This is subject to 
change. They have attempted to establish a nuclear power program in the past. This 
included approaching the Soviet Union, France and a Belgian company for sales 
negotiations during the 1907s and 80s.302 The US had actively discouraged other states 
from cooperating with Libya on nuclear power because o f Libya’s stated intentions o f 
acquiring nuclear weapons.303
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While Libya has not successfully established a power program, they do have a 
strong research program. The Libyan Secretariat o f Atomic Energy oversees the nation’s 
nuclear program and the National Board for Scientific Research manages the research 
and development program s.304 This includes research on the fuel cycle and peaceful 
uses. This same organization established the Tajoura Research Center (TNRC) that is a 
declared facility under IAEA safeguards. The 10 megawatt research reactor, known as 
IRT-1, at TNRC was supplied in the late 1970s by the Soviet Union (and was started up 
in 1981). The IAEA did not detect any safeguards violations prior to the Libyan’s 
revealing their clandestine program.
During the Libyan program ’s dismantlement phase, it was discovered that TNRC 
was also heavily involved with Libya’s clandestine nuclear weapons program .306 Its 
activities include the now infamous centrifuge program and plutonium separation 
activities. During the process o f “coming clean” with the international community, the 
world would leam there were ten more undeclared sites involved with the nuclear
307program.
Domestic Politics Theory o f Compliance
Domestic Mobilization
It is difficult for domestic groups to mobilize in an oppressive regime, but as the 
Arab Spring has shown us, it is not impossible. Within Libya, several groups posed a
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threat to Qadhafi, which may have influenced his decision to reverse and dismantle the 
nuclear weapons program. By doing this, he was able to redirect resources and attempt to 
appease domestic groups.
One such group took the form o f the Islamic movement (sometimes referred to as 
radicals).308 These groups offer social services that the Libyan government was failing to 
make available. As international studies scholars know, non-state actors can begin to 
replace domestic government by providing social services.
The military was another domestic group that may have posed a threat if  the 
nuclear program continued. The nuclear program was demanding a large amount o f 
resources, “competing with other military priorities.”309 The Libyan military had 
previously revolted and were put down in a bloody oppression. Another military coup 
was a serious concern for Qadhafi as well. Redirecting resources from the nuclear 
program to meet other needs and demands o f  the military helped ameliorate this concern.
There are no indications that domestic group are currently m obilizing over 
Libya’s nuclear weapons nonproliferation commitment (the NPT). Nor have they 
mobilized in the past over this issue. It may be that the domestic groups that would have 
were simply unaware their government was violating the NPT. It may also be that their 
concerns for personal safety and security have taken priority.




In 2010, Libya was a "-7" on the Polity IV Project scale of polity, which puts it in 
the autocracy category.310 Qadhafi began the Libyan nuclear program and as the leader
311in an autocracy was the ultimate decision maker for the program. Beginning in 1995, 
Matoug M. Matoug was the Secretary o f the General People’s Committee and Secretary 
o f  the National Board o f Scientific Research, meaning he was in charge o f  the operations 
o f the program. He also represented Libya in discussions with the IAEA during the 
verification o f the disarmament.
Several factors motivated the elite decision makers to create an agenda to pursue 
nuclear weapons and then later reverse that decision. Originally, the agenda may have 
included national security at the top o f  the list. The Libyans live in an unstable region 
and were under harsh economic sanctions, in addition to being viewed as suspicious (at 
best) by the west. Israel’s suspected nuclear weapons capabilities may have been viewed 
as a direct threat and m ay also have been a source o f  a feeling o f inadequacy on the 
Libyan side.
Along that same line o f  inadequacy, the 1967 Israeli victory may have played a 
role in Qadhafi’s determination to obtain nuclear weapons. In 2003, Qadhafi stated that 
Libya had pursued WMDs (including nuclear weapons) because the world was unsafe.
He said that Libya’s urging for WMD free zones in the Middle East and Africa had
310 Systemic Peace, "Polity IV Country Report 2010: Libya," 
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“received no serious responses” and so Libya “sought to develop its defence 
capabilities.”312
The Libyans were interested in abandoning the programs, specifically the nuclear 
program, for economic and national security reasons.313 By reversing its decisions, the 
government could ease and/or end sanctions that after decades were negatively affecting 
the economy. The nuclear program was coming at a high cost and progressing so slowly 
that the cost benefit analysis that may have at one time made sense no longer did. The 
end o f the programs could also lead to normalization o f  relations with the W est and 
perhaps future trade and economic benefits.
While discussions were already quietly underway, the 2003 US invasion o f  Iraq 
occurred and may have sped up the Libyan public confession and dismantlement.314 The 
basic dynamic being that Libya may have been putting itself at risk o f  preemptive war. 
After the US attack on Iraq, partially over the alleged WMD program, Qadhafi may have 
viewed his own program as a liability.315 Qadhafi may have seen the potential threat to 
his regime and feared the same end for him self as Saddam experienced. He was quoted 
as saying, “today it becomes a problem to have a nuclear bomb.”316
Reportedly, Qadhafi wanted security assurances similar to those received by the 
former Soviet Republics Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan after the Cold War. When 
they gave up their weapons in the early 1990s, they received security assurances from the
312 BBC, "Libyan Wmd: Tripoli's Statement in Full," BBC, 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/africa/3336139.stm (accessed November 30, 2012).
313 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Libya Profile: Nuclear."
3 I 4 Doyle, ed. Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Nonproliferation, 340.
313 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Libya Profile: Nuclear."
316 Muammar al-Qadhafi, "Libya: Al-Qadhafi Addresses General People's Congress 
Tripoli" (paper presented at the General People's Congress o f Libya, Triploi, 02 March 
2004).
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P-4 .317 According to some accounts, Qadhafi agreed to the dismantlement o f  the Libyan 
program once he received the security assurance that Bush would not push for “regime 
change .” 318
The decision to reverse the decision to pursue nuclear weapons (ie. modify the 
previous agenda setting) may also have stemmed from the realization that the program 
would fail. Libya could not try to purchase uranium hexafluoride (UF6 ) on the open 
market because it would raise suspicions, and it did not have the network to purchase 
clandestinely .319 UF6  is made from yellowcake and is necessary to feed into the 
enrichment facility. Yellowcake is uranium oxide concentrate, U3O8, which is natural 
uranium that has been m illed .320 Libya eventually received hundreds o f tons o f 
yellowcake from Niger but it did not have the capability to convert it to UF6  feedstock .321
According to a US State Department report, K han’s network supplied an initial 
stock o f UF6  to get the Libyan program started but it would not be able to supply the 
valuable material on the necessary consistent basis .322 Analysis at Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory determined that the shipment o f 1% low enriched uranium supplied by the 
network most likely originated in North Korea .323 Without UF6 , the enrichment
317 Writz and Lavoy, eds., Over the Horizon Proliferation Threats, 253.
318 Michael Hirsh, "Bolton's British Problem," Newsweek (02 May 2005).
319 Reed and Stillman, The Nuclear Express, 270.
320 World Nuclear Association, "The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Education," http://www.world- 
nuclear.org/education/nfc.htm (accessed November 30, 2012).
321 Reed and Stillman, The Nuclear Express, 270.
322 US Department o f State, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Non- 
Proliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments," 85.
Doyle, ed. Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Nonproliferation, 341.
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technology is useless and no weapon can be built. Furthermore, the engineers were not 
able to properly assemble the enrichment technology Qadhafi had purchased.324
Finally, there were domestic issues that may have distracted Libya from its 
original purpose o f  acquiring nuclear weapons. Libya’s domestic population was facing 
a 30% unemployment rate.325 Perhaps the millions o f dollars spent on various methods 
o f acquiring nuclear technology could have been spent on building the economy. The 
major source o f  national income, oil, was facing serious problems from production 
dropping, outdated technology, and sanctions.
There are many influences on agenda setting but there is no evidence that the NPT 
played a role. There was no mention o f  the NPT, or Libya’s commitments under the 
NPT, by the leadership until after the decision to dismantle. Even then, there are no 
statements or indications that the treaty itself was an influencing factor.
With the government overthrow and subsequent death of Qadhafi on October 20th, 
2011, L ibya’s Transitional National Council has become the internationally recognized 
government. It is striving to establish a democracy, but it is too soon to know if  the 
council will successfully unite the various regions and tribes to steer Libya out o f what
326appears to be an ever disintegrating state. This new regime could significantly change 
which issues are on the national agenda and how the agenda is set.
324 US Department o f State, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Non- 
Proliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments," 85.
323 Reed and Stillman, The Nuclear Express, 272.





According to the Polity IV Project, “ the judiciary has demonstrated little 
autonomy from the de fac to  executive and does not serve as an effective check on his 
[Qadhafi] authority.”327 The “new” post-Qadhafi judicial system is currently being 
"reconstituted" as part o f the ongoing reform in Libya.328 It is now beginning to be tested 
by criminal trials associated with violations (mostly o f  human rights) during the Arab 
Spring. There has been no reported activity by domestic groups utilizing litigation to 
develop or implement policy related to nuclear weapons.
Conclusions fo r  Libya
The US suspected Libya o f  noncompliance with the NPT's Article II and Article 
III for many years.329 Robert M ozley predicted in 1998, that given Libya's limited 
scientific resources "it must buy turnkey facilities."330 He also noted that Libya lacked 
uranium resources. In order to acquire nuclear weapons, Libya would have to use its oil 
revenues to purchase the technology and nuclear material.331
Despite being an early signatory o f the NPT and a member o f the IAEA, Libya 
activity pursued nuclear weapons until 2003. After several failed attempts to acquire 
nuclear weapons from other sources, a business partner was found in Khan and his 
network. According to US Ambassador Donald Mahley, the Khan network was vital to
327 Systemic Peace, "Polity IV Country Report 2010: Libya."
328 US Department o f State, "Background Note: Libya," 
http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ei/bgn/5425.htm (accessed November 30, 2012).
3"^ 9 US Department o f State, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Non- 
Proliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments," ed. Compliance Bureau 
o f Verification, and Implementation (2005).
330 Mozley, The Politics and  Technology o f  Nuclear Proliferation, 200-01.
331 Ibid., 201.
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the Libyan program ’s development and the program would never have progressed 
without assistance; the program would in fact have been “thwarted” without the 
network’s effort.332
The Libyan government did have limited success with its program under the 
guidance o f  Khan. While elite decision makers referenced the Libyan commitment to 
international nonproliferation and disarmament, it is unlikely that this was the cause o f 
the decision to reverse and dismantle the nuclear weapons program. More likely it was a 
combination o f the resources used for the nuclear program needed to be redirected to 
meet other needs, Qadhafi fearing the same fate as Saddam Hussein, believing that 
relinquishing the program would help with Libya’s reintegration with the rest o f  the 
world, helping the national economy, etc.
Since that official reversal o f  policy in December 2003, Libya has reaffirmed it 
nonproliferation obligations. Libya’s nonproliferation commitment today is larger and 
more involved than the NPT. After the noncompliance resolution, Libya ratified the 
Additional Protocol in August 2006.333 Libya is also a party to the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty, having ratified it in 2004.334
Since the Arab Spring many issues in Libya have become unpredictable. The 
overthrow and murder o f  Qadhafi has created a power vacuum. Competing domestic 
groups have caused a civil unrest that verges on a civil war. The future o f nuclear power
332 Donald A. Mahley, "Dismantling Libyan Weapons," The Arena 10 (November 2004): 
5.
333 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Libya Treaty Membership,"
http://www.nti.org/m edia/pdfs/libya_l.pdf?j= 1340150036 (accessed November 30, 
2012 ).
334 CTBTO Preparatory Commission, "Status o f Signature and Ratification."
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and nuclear weapons is unknown at this time but it appears that both are non-issues at this 
moment.
In October 2011, NATO ended its seven month Operation Unified Protector to 
protect the citizens o f Libya.335 NATO had been enforcing a no-fly zone and an arms 
embargo. Ultimately NATO played a key supporting role to the domestic groups that 
were mobilizing (and turning to violence) when they could not influence the agenda 
setting or use the legal system to fight blatant violations o f  human rights. W e did not see 
this mobilization o f  citizens calling for nonproliferation action.
Libya’s discrete steps to disarm came before the IAEA Board o f  G overnors’ 
noncompliance resolution. Therefore, they were seen as cooperative and the 
noncompliance was not intended to be punitive or to result in sanctions. In fact, the final 
draft o f the resolution stated that the noncompliance be reported “while commending” 
Libya.336
Conclusions
Syria and Libya were both found to be in noncompliance with NPT in recent 
history. They travelled different paths to noncompliance: Syria relying on another state's 
assistance for a plutonium based weapon and Libya using a non-state actor's assistance to 
pursue a uranium based weapon. Syria was bombed to stop (and perhaps reverse) its 
proliferation program, while Libya reversed its path willingly. What can be learned by
335 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO and Libya: Operation Unified Protector," 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/7l679.htm (accessed November 30, 2012).
336 International Atomic Energy Agency, "Implementation o f the NPT Safeguards 
Agreement o f the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Resolution Adopted by the 
Board on 10 March 2004," 2.
115
viewing these case studies of noncompliance from the perspective o f  the domestic 
politics theory o f treaty compliance?
The domestic politics theory involves agenda setting, litigation, and mobilizing 
o f domestic groups. For Syria these three elements were completely absent. The NPT 
appears to play no role in persuading Syria’s elite to place nonproliferation on the 
national agenda. Nor was the NPT utilized as the basis o f litigation in the court rooms or 
mobilization in the streets.
For Libya, litigation and domestic mobilization were absent. The elite did have a 
change in their agenda setting but there is no evidence this is from the influence o f the 
NPT as much as non-treaty factors (include the urge to maintain the regime). Security 
assurances from aggression and regime change play a vital role in the final negotiations 
for Libya to dismantle its program.337
While the focus was on only two instances o f  noncompliance these negative 
findings are still meaningful. The lack o f  support for the domestic politics theory o f  
treaty compliance indicates that, perhaps, the theory (and its three intertwined variables) 
is necessary for compliance. If so, this aligns with what Simmons has found in the 
human rights realm.
The lack o f freedom of the press is an issue in both these states. This means it 
may be difficult for the citizens and researchers alike to get reliable information about the 
activities in these states. It also means it is difficult for the citizens to be heard and
337 Hirsh, "Bolton's British Problem."
mobilize. Syria is ranked 176th and Libya is ranked out 154th of 179 states in the Press 
Freedom Index.338
Table 2 illustrates the findings o f Syria and Libya for this chapter. The agenda 
setting for nations was not influenced by the treaty but by the international community. 
Neither state saw the use o f  litigation to enforce the obligations o f the national 
government under the NPT. Finally, neither country had domestic population mobilize 
for the NPT and to keep their nations from acquiring nuclear weapons.
State
Domestic Politics Theory Mechanisms Present?
Agenda Setting Litigation M obilization
Syria No No No
Libya No No No
Table 2. Results o f  Chapter 4 Case Studies
338 Reporters W ithout Borders, "Press Freedom Index 2011/2012," Reporters Without 




STATES THAT ARE OF POTENTIAL PROLIFERATION CONCERN
Introduction
The states in this chapter are two for whom proliferation is less predictable at the 
moment. They have not failed to comply but they are considered to have the potential to 
be failures. They are potential proliferation concerns. What can we learn about treaty 
compliance in the issue area o f nonproliferation from viewing these states through the 
lens o f the domestic politics theory? These states were chosen because they have been 
identified as worth watching closely by respected contemporary researchers.339
Iran may come to mind immediately as a proliferation threat. However, the IAEA 
Board o f Governors, despite Iran not possessing nuclear weapons, has already found Iran 
in noncompliance. Rather the focus here is on those states that may not be considered 
active threats to the nonproliferation regime but may possess the resources and urge to 
purse nuclear weapons in the future.
This builds on the concept that the definition o f potential proliferators has 
broadened from traditional proliferation concerns (such as North Korea and Iran) to 
include states that are not accused o f actively pursuing nuclear weapons but may be 
hedging their bets technologically or otherwise.340 These states have the technological
339 This includes scholars such as David Albright, James Wirtz, Peter Lavoy, Thomas 
Reed, and Danny Stillman.
340 Writz and Lavoy, eds., Over the Horizon Proliferation Threats, 222.
potential and the reasons to take the decision to pursue nuclear weapons, but to the best 
o f our knowledge have not yet done so.
Scholars over the past decade have consistently placed Saudi Arabia and Egypt in 
the category o f potential proliferation concern. As recently as 2012, W irtz and Lavoy, 
wrote that these “anxiety-causing” states include Egypt and Saudi Arabia.341 David 
Albright included Egypt and Saudi Arabia (among others) in his “to worry about” list in 
2010.342 Thomas Reed and Danny Stillman warn o f Egypt and Saudi Arabia pursuing 
nuclear weapons in the future in their 2009 book entitled, The Nuclear E xp ress343 In 
2007, scholar Etel Solingen placed Egypt and Saudi Arabia in this category as well, based 
on the likelihood that they would seek to match the Iranian pursuit o f nuclear weapons.344 
And as far back as 2004, Campbell, Einhom, and Riess identified Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt as having the potential to tip towards nuclear weapons.345
In terms o f nonproliferation, these two states have more in common than just 
causing international concern. Both states are parties to the NPT.346 As required by the 
NPT, both states are IAEA member states with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements 
in place; although neither state has an Additional Protocol.347 Egypt is an Arabic
34! Ibid'‘ Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America's Enemies, 
244.
343 Reed and Stillman, The Nuclear Express.
344 Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East, 261.
345 Campbell, Einhom, and Reiss, eds,, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States 
Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, 329.
346 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "NPT Membership,"
http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/apmnpt.pdf?_= 1316545627&_= 1316545627 (accessed 
November 30, 2012).
347 International Atomic Energy Agency, "Status List."
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speaking state with an almost completely Muslim population.348 The same is true for 
Saudi Arabia.349 While Egypt is technically North Africa it is often included in 
discussions on the Middle East. Both nations were under strict authoritarian rule, Egypt 
technically a republic, but in fact tightly controlled by Mubarak and the military. Saudi 
Arabia is under the will o f  the royal monarch family. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are both 
insecure and threatened by Israel’s suspected nuclear capabilities.350 Egypt has strongly 
supported the proposal for a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Z one .351 Saudi Arabia 
politically supports this concept as well.
Finally, both have made statements that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable and they 
may pursue nuclear weapons in response. Egyptian Ambassador Maged Abdel Aziz said 
in a 2010 reference to the Iranian program that, "we are not going to accept to be second- 
class citizens in the region o f  the Middle East."353 However, as o f 2012, the new 
Egyptian government has sent mixed signals and may be taking a more supportive stance
348 Central Intelligence Agency, "The W orld Factbook: Egypt," 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html (accessed 
November 30, 2012).
349 Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Saudi Arabia," 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html (accessed 
November 30, 2012).
350 Campbell, Einhom, and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States 
Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices.
351 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Egypt Profile: Nuclear,"
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Egypt/Nuclear/index.html (accessed November 
30, 2012).
352 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Saudi Arabia Profile: Nuclear,"
http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/saudi-arabia/nuclear/ (accessed November 30, 2012).
353 Elaine M. Grossman, "Egypt Plays Key Nonproliferation Role, but Keeps Nuclear 
Options Open," Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/egypt-plays-key- 
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with Iran in the future.354 Saudi King Abdullah has been reported as saying, "if they get 
nuclear weapons, we will get nuclear weapons."355
A major difference between the two states is that Saudi Arabia is an oil rich state 
with these resources being the backbone o f  their economy. 356 Egypt has limited natural 
resources and a smaller economy. Egypt has seen much change since the Arab Spring, 
while Saudi Arabia has seen minimal change. For this dissertation, the analyses will 
consider the history and events before June 2012, with a look towards the future from that 
point in time.
The importance o f  this chapter is to explore treaty compliance in nonproliferation 
and discover whether the domestic politics theory o f compliance can help understand 
these hard cases and possibly predict the outcome. This chapter starts with the analysis 
o f Egypt and is followed by a study o f Saudi Arabia.
For each state o f  potential proliferation concern, there is an introduction to the 
state’s specific situation. An overview is given next, which consists o f  the state’s history 
with the NPT and the international nonproliferation regime more broadly, as well as the 
status o f nuclear power in the state. This aids in understanding the context o f the 
potential noncompliant actions.
Next, each state is analyzed using Simmons’ domestic politics theory o f  treaty 
compliance. This includes reviewing the role o f agenda setting, litigation, and 
mobilization o f the domestic population for each state’s particular situation in a search
354 Tom Parry, "Brothers in Arms: Egypt's Fresh Links to Iran Reignite Fears over 
Nukes," The M irror, 26 June 2012.
355 Chemi Shalev, "Dennis Ross: Saudi King Vowed to Obtain Nuclear Bomb after Iran," 
H aaretz, 30 May 2012.
356 Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Saudi Arabia."
357 Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Egypt."
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for evidence. Conclusions are then drawn for each state on whether these variables can 
explain (or predict) the potential for continued compliance or a move towards 
noncompliance.
Egypt
Egypt has been reported on by the IAEA Secretariat to the Board o f Governors, 
but it has not been found in noncompliance by the Board o f Governors.358 This does not 
mean its current standing o f compliance will not change in the future. As discussed in 
this chapter’s introduction, a variety o f  scholars and analysts share the view that Egypt 
could under certain conditions decide to pursue nuclear weapons. Egypt is currently a 
supporter o f the NPT generally, but has not supported strengthening measures such as the 
Additional Protocol.
Egypt's history has included moments o f  considering proliferation but never 
committing fully to a nuclear weapons program. The option was left open in the 1950s 
and 1960s under Nasser and was later abandoned along with the idea o f nuclear power in 
the 1980s.359 Although, Egypt did conduct secret activities from 1990 to 2003 including 
creating uranium metal, a key step in developing a nuclear weapon.360 Egypt does not 
have the money to purchase a complete weapon but they have the basic industry and
358 International Atomic Energy Agency, "Implementation o f  the NPT Safeguards 
Agreement in the Arab Republic o f  Egypt: Report by the Director General," in 
GOV/2005/9 (2005).
359 Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East, 229.
360 International Atomic Energy Agency, "The Safeguards Statement for 2004," 
http://www.iaea.org/OurW ork/SV/Safeguards/documents/es2004.pdf (accessed 
November 30, 2012).
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technology needed to support a nuclear weapons program should they choose to do so. 
Some believe a nuclear Iran and/or a potential souring o f the Egypt-US relationship may 
cause Egypt to pursue nuclear w eapons.361 But does domestic politics theory help aid in 
understanding why they may choose to continue to meet their obligations under the NPT?
Overview
History with Nonproliferation
Egypt has several reasons to pursue nuclear weapons. Perhaps they desire a 
deterrent against Israel and/or Iran. It may be as simple as seeking a balance o f  power 
in the region and possibly becoming an undisputable hegemonic power.363 The weapons 
could also serve as a source o f pride for the domestic population wanting to equal the 
Israelis as well as become the first Arab nation with nuclear weapons. There has been a 
strong desire for regional Arab leadership following Nasser.
On the other hand, the Egyptian leadership may want to win the support o f its 
citizens that admire the Iranian program and the Iranian defiance o f  the W est and 
international community. Although, Egypt has said that Iranian weapons are a threat to 
Egypt and Egypt will need weapons to counter this threat. Egypt does not have a nuclear 
security guarantee from one o f  the existing nuclear weapons states, "except for a vague
3 6 1 Campbell, Einhom, and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States 
Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices.
362 Writz and Lavoy, eds., Over the Horizon Proliferation Threats, 49.
363 Campbell, Einhom, and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States 
Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, 43-44.
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Soviet commitment" in the 1960s.364 The weapons would serve national defense 
purposes if  its relationship with the US deteriorated in the future.360 However, despite 
these incentives, Egypt has kept its commitment to not pursue nuclear weapons as 
required under the NPT.
Egypt is a party to the NPT and several other nonproliferation relevant treaties. 
Egypt brought the NPT into force under Sadat in February 1981, years after first signing 
it in 1968. Ratification for the People’s Assembly occurred because it became obligatory 
by other states beginning to provide nuclear facilities, equipment and materials to 
Egypt.366
Egypt joined the IAEA in 1957 and signed a Safeguards Agreement in June 1982, 
the delay was due to the fact that the NPT Article III stated time limit o f  18 months was 
in effect from the time o f ratification (which for Egypt was in 1981).367 Related to the 
Safeguards Agreement is the Additional Protocol which Egypt has thus far refused to 
sign. The Additional Protocol would allow the IAEA more information and access, as 
well as demonstrate Egypt’s commitment to the nonproliferation regim e.368 It is unlikely
364 Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the M iddle East, 232.
365 Campbell, Einhom, and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States 
Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, 72.
366 Federation o f American Scientists, "Nuclear Weapons Program: Egypt," 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/egypt/nuke/index.html (accessed November 30, 2012).
367 tjie Agreement between Egypt and the Agency for the Application o f 
Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f  Nuclear Weapons," 
ed. International Atomic Energy Agency (1982).
368 International Atomic Energy Agency, "Factsheets and FAQs: IAEA Safeguards 
Overview," http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html 
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that Egypt will take on any more obligations while Israel remains outside the NPT.369 
This includes the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Egypt signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996 but has yet to ratify 
it.370 Egypt is an Annex II state, meaning its ratification is required before the treaty can 
enter into force.371 Once again, Egypt has tied the issue to Israel; this time it is refusing 
to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty because Israel has not. Although, it is 
unclear whether if  Israel did sign and ratify the treaty Egypt would then ratify the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It might choose to wait until Israel joined the NPT.372 
Egypt is a signatory to the African Nuclear W eapon Free Zone (also known as the 
Pelindaba Treaty) but has failed to ratify that treaty as well.373 Egypt has tied its 
ratification with the treaty to requiring Israel to jo in  the N PT.374 The Pelindaba Treaty 
entered into force in 2009 (the Egyptian ratification was not necessary for entry into 
force).375
On a more positive note, Egypt does have a stated policy o f supporting a Middle 
East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and the later proposed Middle East W eapons o f Mass 
Destruction Free Zone.376 O f course, these are aimed at restraining Israel. Mubarak 
pursued the concept o f the Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone vigorously after Iran
369 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Egypt Profile: Nuclear."
370 CTBTO Preparatory Commission, "Status o f  Signature and Ratification."
371 "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty," in UN Registration Number NIF-0  (10 
September 1996).
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373 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Egypt Treaty Membership," 
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proposed the idea in 1979 as a UN General Assembly resolution.377 Egypt continues to 
support the idea o f a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone today and speaks to its 
merits at every possible forum.378 Minimal progress has been made but there are plenty 
o f statements in support o f the concept. O f course, as we saw in the failed compliance 
case studies, statements are not always truth.
The Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt's new leading political party) has “ridiculed” 
this idea in the past and called for Egypt to abandon its NPT commitment in favor o f
379acquiring nuclear weapons. There was a 2004 moment o f  doubt in the international 
community about Egypt's commitment.
In 2004, the IAEA became aware o f some suspicious activities and undeclared 
facilities via open source analysis.380 IAEA questioning o f Egyptian officials and 
scientists revealed that there were in fact previously undeclared activities, materials and 
laboratories. The undeclared activities included experiments "involving the irradiation o f 
small amounts o f  uranium and thorium and their subsequent dissolution."381 This is an 
important concept/process to master in order to develop nuclear weapons.382
The Egyptian government cooperated with the IAEA investigation into the 
alleged activities.383 However, the matter was still reported by the Secretariat to the 
Board o f Governors.384 Egypt was not found in noncompliance and was not reported to
377 Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East, 236.
378 Ibid., 237.
379 Writz and Lavoy, eds., Over the Horizon Proliferation Threats, 49-50.
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the UN Security Council.38' According to former deputy director general o f the IAEA 
Pierre Goldschmidt (head o f safeguards), "in the case o f Egypt, the IAEA did not find 
any indication that the reported failures and breaches were part o f concealment efforts or 
a deception strategy."386 However, Goldschmidt argues that the matter should still have 
been defined as noncompliance as the intent is not as important as the violation itself.
The Mubarak regime was toppled in 201 1.387 The military transitional 
government took control until democratically elected officials were chosen. In June 
2012, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsy won the presidential 
election.388 There are concerns as the new government takes shape and the international 
community waits to understand the role o f the military in this new government. This 
change in government and its possible influence on Egyptian compliance with its current 
nonproliferation obligations will be discussed further below.
Current Nuclear Status
Compared to other Middle Eastern states' nuclear infrastructure, Egypt is rather 
advanced in its nuclear capabilities. However, the state has been unsuccessful in 
establishing a nuclear power plant. Egypt currently has two research reactors, one 
provided by the Soviets in 1961 and one provided by an Argentinean company in the
185 Pierre Goldschmidt, "Exposing Nuclear Non-Compliance," Survival 5 1, no. 1 (2009).
386 Goldschmidt, "Safeguards Noncompliance: A Challenge for the IAEA and the UN 
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http://articles.cnn.com/2012-06-02/africa/world_africa_egypt-mubarak-timeline_l_hosni- 
mubarak-omar-suleiman-sharm/2? s=PM:AFRICA (accessed November 30, 2012).
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1990s. Egypt also has facilities for “mining, milling, fuel fabrication, waste 
management, and (small-scale) reprocessing.’’390 The relationship to nuclear weapons can 
be seen in the early research that was used to understand how to reprocess the waste from 
the nuclear reactor to extract the plutonium needed for a bomb (plutonium is a byproduct 
o f  burning up uranium based fuel in a reactor).391
Egypt’s nuclear program started under Nasser with the purpose o f peaceful uses, 
although reportedly the weapons option was not to be entirely ignored.392 The power 
program began with a decision by Nasser in 1954, resulting in the creation o f the Atomic 
Energy Authority (AEA) in 1955. There was also an alleged clandestine nuclear 
weapons program, which ended in the 1970s with the death o f  Nasser. Perhaps not 
ironically, the program that was to maintain Egypt’s “superiority”393 over Israel involved 
German Nazi scientists.394 It has been argued that, “Egypt’s leadership never allocated 
the financial resources and political capital necessary to the success o f  a weapons 
program.” 395 If true, this suggests that there may have been curiosity about nuclear 
weapons but no serious urgency in pursuing them.
Mubarak originally continued N asser’s nuclear power program but in the mid- 
1980s, terminated the nuclear agenda. This was due to the Chernobyl accident, a 
weakening o f  the Egyptian economy, and pressure by the business sector to use the
3 89 Federation o f American Scientists, "Nuclear Weapons Program: Egypt."
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coastal property intended for power plants for tourism instead.396 This standstill o f the 
nuclear program may have caused “Egypt’s nuclear scientific expertise to atrophy” 
making it much more difficult to renew the nation’s pursuit o f  nuclear power.397
Nevertheless, in 2006, M ubarak’s son announced that Egypt would again pursue 
nuclear power to meet the nation’s growing electricity needs.398 He proposed that Egypt 
would build three nuclear power plants by 2020. This was a reversal o f the twenty-year 
policy not to pursue nuclear power, established in 1986. In 2010, Egypt passed 
comprehensive regulation related to nuclear and radiation issues, a necessary step to 
responsible nuclear power development.399 With the end o f  the M ubarak regime nuclear 
power remains a viable option and plans are still in place to move ahead.400
As o f 2012, the Egyptian government, in consultation with international experts 
and the IAEA, has narrowed down possible sites to build and there are plans to put out a 
request for proposals in the near future.401 The plan has risen to 4 power plants. Several 
nations and companies have stated they will place bids to build the Egyptian nuclear 
power plants.
9^7 Campbell, Einhom, and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States 
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399 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Egypt Nuclear Chronology,"
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Domestic Politics Theory o f  Compliance
Domestic Mobilization
There has not been nor is their currently mobilization o f  domestic groups to 
pressure the state to not acquire (or acquire) nuclear weapons. While our focus is on 
domestic groups and their relation to the treaty it is worth noting there are serious 
concerns that domestic groups could mobilize in the name o f noncompliance. Etel 
Solingen has pointed out that Egypt’s renewed interest in nuclear power is most likely the 
result o f “domestic pressures from constituencies mobilized by Iran’s nuclearization.”402 
There may be more domestic groups in the future that mobilize in demand o f Egyptian 
nuclear weapons. The “pro-nuclear inward-looking secular and Islamist forces” calling 
for nuclear weapons in the 1980s could mobilize once again.403 More recently, in 2000, a 
“pan-Arab opposition party” included the acquisition o f  nuclear weapons on its political 
platform.404
Much as in Syria and Libya, the Arab Spring brought about a dramatic 
mobilization o f the domestic populations. Domestic groups may not be mobilizing in the 
name o f nonproliferation but perhaps they have been concerned with more pressing 
personal needs for change. It is important to note the Egyptians mobilized effectively 
and successfully once and they could do so again. Domestic politics theory tells us to 
watch for this to happen in the future as a clue to compliance.




Under the rule o f Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood called for Egypt to pursue 
nuclear weapons.405 Given the current instability o f the nation’s government and the fact 
that the Muslim Brotherhood is running politicians for various offices in the emerging 
dem ocracy... this is unsettling. More importantly, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, 
Mohamed Morsy, won the presidential election in June 2012.406 
Agenda Setting
The Global Report 2009: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility, stated that 
Egypt under M ubarak was “governed by an uninstitutionalized, or ‘w eak,’ autocratic 
regime.”407 Scholars and analysts were concerned with the possibility o f  an Egyptian 
nuclear weapons program, but believed that it was less likely as long as Mubarak 
maintained control over the country.408 Under the strict rule o f  Mubarak, civil society 
was highly constrained and agenda setting was limited to him self and his close advisors. 
Under the new democracy we may see more entities influence the national agenda and by 
default new opportunities to influence the agenda setting.
Under Nasser, the agenda was “ inward-looking self-reliance” which was in line 
with the pursuit o f  nuclear weapons.409 Under Sadat and Mubarak, the agenda was more 
outward looking and was focused on building the economy (within the constraints o f 
maintaining regime security and the pursuit o f self-enrichment). This agenda did not fall 
in line with an expensive nuclear weapons program that would risk an international
405 Writz and Lavoy, eds., Over the Horizon Proliferation Threats, 49-50.
406 Kirkpatrick, "Named Egypt’s Winner, Islamist Makes History."
407 Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, "Global Report 2009: Conflict,
Governance, and State Fragility," (George Mason University, 2009).
408 Campbell, Einhom, and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States 
Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, 44.
409 Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East, 245.
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political backlash. Despite inflammatory comments by Sadat and Mubarak with regards 
to a possible pursuit o f nuclear weapons, both seemed to have not been serious when it 
came to national policy.410
It was during Sadat's rule that the NPT came onto the national agenda.411 Albeit 
not because it was open for ratification but because Egypt's desire for nuclear power 
required the international community to ask Egypt about its stance on nuclear weapons. 
So, an issue not previously discussed was brought up and a decision made. This aligns 
with how Simmons defines agenda setting.
Egypt is one o f the outspoken non-nuclear weapons states focused on the 
“fundamentally discriminatory nature o f  the two-tiered system” codified within the 
N p t  412 jh g  n p x  has categorized the world into nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear 
weapons states.413 No new nuclear weapons states can exist under the system and those 
that exist remain outside the treaty while still receiving assistance from other states rather 
than being outcasts o f the international community (mainly Israel, Pakistan, and India).
The newly elected leadership o f Egypt will be shaping the new national agenda. 
W hile one can assume the economy and government reform are on the agenda there may 
be more controversial issues. President-elect Mohamed Morsy has stated that Egyptian 
foreign policy will include restoring diplomatic relations with Iran and building a close 
relationship.414 He has also said he may reverse the decades old peace deal with Israel. 
He has yet to speak about nuclear weapons for Egypt.
410 Ibid., 243.
411 Federation o f American Scientists, "Nuclear Weapons Program: Egypt."
412 Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle E ast, 236.
413 "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons."
414 Parry, "Brothers in Arms: Egypt's Fresh Links to Iran Reignite Fears over Nukes."
Litigation
A new government is being formed at this moment through a process o f  
democratic elections. The judicial system was reformed quickly and is currently being 
tested. Former President Mubarak has already been tried and convicted and this may 
indicate a positive sign for the future o f  the judicial system ’s legitimacy.415 Mubarak was 
sentenced to life in prison for accessory to murder, relating to the death o f protestors 
calling for the end o f  his rule in February 2011. However, many Egyptian citizens do not 
believe in the legal system and they are protesting that officials directly responsible for 
killing demonstrators have had their charges dismissed. The citizens are also displeased 
that corruption charges against Mubarak and his sons were dropped.
It is too soon to know if  litigation will play a role in nonproliferation for Egypt. 
Researchers should follow what suits are filed in the court system. They can also watch 
for any talk o f  litigation, which is unlikely until domestic groups organize in the name o f 
nonproliferation.
Conclusions fo r  Egypt
Egypt’s commitment to the NPT may have waivered occasionally but so far has 
been mostly against acquiring nuclear weapons. When the discrepancies over Egypt’s 
undeclared facilities, materials, and activities arose in 2004, the Director General o f the 
IAEA at that time (an Egyptian national) stated, “the repeated failures by Egypt to report 
nuclear materials and facilities to the agency in a timely manner are a matter o f
413 David D. Kirkpatrick, "New Turmoil in Egypt Greets Mixed Verdict for Mubarak,"
New York Times, 02 June 2012.
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concern.”416 He went on to say it was not however a proliferation concern and used this 
opportunity to remind the international community to take their obligations seriously.
This is ironic because one has to wonder if  the incident would have been much more 
serious had a different country been involved. The matter was never brought to the 
attention o f the Board o f Governors, neither for a vote on compliance or whether to report 
Egypt to the UN Security Council.
A realist perspective indicates that a nuclear Egypt could be imminent. The 
weapons would assist in its balance o f power in the region both relative to Israel and in 
the future possibly with Iran.417 The ebbs and flows o f the Egyptian program do not line 
up with the Israeli timeline.418 One would expect that Egyptian activity would coincide 
with periods o f aggression or key moments in the Israeli nuclear weapons program. 
However, as Etel Solingen has reviewed in Nuclear Logics , this is not the case which 
further supports the use o f  domestic factors.
In the fall o f 2001, Thomas Graham wrote an analysis on WMD threats for the 
Brookings Review  where he ranked Egypt as a 1 out o f  5 (where 1 is low) on a scale o f 
magnitude o f W MD threats and made no mention o f  nuclear weapons.419
Domestic politics theory may give us more insight in to the future NPT 
compliance o f Egypt. For example, Egypt's practice o f  nonproliferation compliance 
could change if the agenda setting is influenced by global events. This could include a
416 International Atomic Energy Agency, "Implementation o f the NPT Safeguards 
Agreement in the Arab Republic o f Egypt: Report by the Director General."
417 Campbell, Einhom, and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States 
Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, 43-44.
418 Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East, 234-
35.
419 Thomas W. Graham, "Weapons o f Mass Destruction: Does Globalization Mean 
Proliferation?," Brookings Review  19, no. 4 (Fall 2001): 40.
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negative turn in relations with the US 420 Some experts also predict Egypt may pursue 
nuclear weapons if  Iran successfully acquires nuclear weapons.421 Although, under the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt and Iran could revive their relationship, changing a 
perceived threat into an ally.422
With the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power in the 2012 presidential election, 
there is a chance they could return to their earlier rhetoric and pursue nuclear weapons.423 
If this comes to pass, Egyptian citizens might mobilize in favor of nonproliferation. The 
last few years have seen the Egyptian economy hit hard by slow growth, particularly in 
construction and tourism.424 Perhaps the citizens would mobilize in the name o f the NPT 
to demand their new government not pursue nuclear weapons in favor o f  spending 
resources on improving the economy. Sadly, it may be as likely that citizens would 
mobilize in order to demand their government pursue nuclear weapons.
If Egyptian citizens do mobilize for nonproliferation and if  the new government is 
as open and transparent as the citizens have been demanding, then they could take their 
issue to the (hopefully) now legitimate judicial system to demand that Egypt meet its 
nonproliferation commitments. These factors could inform the setting o f  the elite agenda, 
which would be the final “tipping point” for compliance in this case. Domestic politics 
theory o f treaty compliance tells us this is all possible and we should watch for these 
possible events.
420 Campbell, Einhom, and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States 
Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices.
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423 Writz and Lavoy, eds., Over the Horizon Proliferation Threats, 49-50.
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Saudi Arabia
Like Egypt, Saudi Arabia has not been found in noncompliance by the IAEA 
Board o f Governors. Unlike Egypt, Saudi Arabia has very limited scientific resources, 
such as nuclear facilities and experts, which it could utilize to pursue a nuclear weapons 
program.425 Unlike Egypt, Saudi Arabia has the financial resources to purchase a 
complete nuclear weapon therefore overriding the need to have an extensive nuclear 
weapons program. In fact, Saudi Arabia already owns missiles capable o f  carrying 
nuclear warheads.426
There are several allegations o f  direct and indirect support between Saudi Arabia 
and Pakistan’s nuclear program. These allegations remain unsubstantiated by the 
Pakistani and Saudi governments, and in some cases are vehemently denied. Suspicion is 
that Saudi Arabia supported Pakistan's nuclear weapon program in exchange for future 
access to nuclear weapons for Saudi Arabia.427
While Saudi Arabia has not been found in noncompliance it remains a concern 
because o f several disturbing events and discrepancies. An example o f  an issue that 
causes international nonproliferation concern was when Prime Minister Bhutto’s press 
adviser Khalid Hasan asserted that much o f the funding for Pakistan’s nuclear program
425 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Saudi Arabia Profile: Nuclear."
426 Gordon Corera, Shopping fo r  Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and  
the Rise and Fall o f  the A. Q. Khan Network (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
97.
427 Amir Mir, "Where Terror and the Bomb Could Meet," Asia Times, 07 July 2005.
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428under came from Saudi Arabia. This was confirmed by Dr. A. Q. Khan who was a key 
figure in developing Pakistan’s nuclear program.429
Another example are the claims made by First Secretary, and a nuclear expert, 
Mohammed Abdalla A1 Khilewi o f  the Saudi Arabian mission to the United Nations in 
New York.430 He defected to the US where he was granted political asylum in August 
1994. In various outlets, he asserted that he had made copies o f thousands o f official 
Saudi documents that passed through his office. He has not made this archive public, but 
he asserts that the documents show that from 1975 until 1990, the Saudi Arabian 
government provided some $5 billion to help fund Saddam Hussein's nuclear efforts; and 
that it tried to acquire nuclear weapons from Pakistan and the Soviet Union.
In one interview, Khilewi estimated conservatively that the Saudi government 
spent at least $7 billion on nuclear armaments since 1975, including millions o f  dollars to 
buy nuclear reactors for what it calls "scientific" and "peaceful" uses, and for nuclear 
research and data collection. But most o f  the money went to support nuclear programs in 
other countries— Iraq and Pakistan, with most going to Iraq. In his view, Pakistan 
transferred nuclear technology out o f  economic interest.431
Khilewi also claims that the Saudi government, recognizing its technical 
shortcomings in nuclear expertise, attempted “to buy into” the Iraqi and Pakistani nuclear
428 Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New 
York: Henry, Holt, and Co., 2004), 76-77.
429 "Pakistani Scientists Credits Saudi Arabia for N-Test Help," Rawalpindi Nawa-i- 
IVaqt, 23 September 2000.
430 Marie Colvin, "How an Insider Lifted the Veil on Saudi Plot for an Islamic Bomb," 
The Sunday Times, 24 July 1994.
431 Daniel Pipes, "Mohammed A1 Khilewi: Saudi Arabia Is Trying to Kill Me," Middle 
East Quarterly 5, no. 3 (September 1998).
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programs in exchange for weapons.432 Supposedly, a secret agreement was created 
arranging Saudi Arabian finances for the nuclear weapons program if Pakistan would 
defend Saudi Arabia with nuclear weapons in the occurrence that the oil-rich state was 
attacked with nuclear weapons 433
Khilewi has made repeated statements that Saudi Arabia has tried to silence him 
with bribes, threats and attempted assassinations.434 Saudi Arabia continues to maintain 
the allegations are baseless and the documents are fabricated.435 Perhaps, Thomas 
Lippman explained it best when he wrote: “this allegation has never been proved but 
neither has it been effectively refuted.”436
Why would Saudi Arabia support the Pakistani program? Is this a sign o f the 
clandestine sale in the future some suspect?437 Direct and Indirect issues include public 
statements, financial contributions, and national defense purchases.
432 Paul Lewis, "Defector Says Saudis Sought Nuclear Arms," New York Times, 07 
August 1994.
433 Mir, "Where Terror and the Bomb Could Meet."
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Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, 121.
437 In-depth discussion o f the issues that cause international concern over a nuclear Saudi 
Arabia are available in Kimberly Van Dyke and Steve Yetiv, "Pakistan and Saudi Arabia: 
The Nuclear Nexus," Journal o f  South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 24, no. 4 




Saudi Arabia has several reasons to pursue nuclear weapons that are similar to 
Egypt's. The Saudis may feel threatened by a nuclear Iran and seek a balance o f  regional 
power. Or the Saudis may one day decide to be the undisputed hegemonic power in the
438region. In doing so, the Saudis could take pride in being the first Arab nation with 
nuclear weapons. This could result in stronger support from the citizens for the 
monarchy. The Saudis live in a volatile region and may seek to increase their national 
defenses with nuclear weapons, especially if  their relationship deteriorates with the US. 
They are not explicitly under the US nuclear umbrella, which is also a concern. Despite 
the reasons Saudi Arabia has to pursue nuclear weapons, they have, so far, committed 
themselves not to do so.
Saudi Arabia joined the NPT in 1988, nearly 20 years after the treaty entered into 
force.439 Saudi ratification o f the NPT was actually forced by the US and the 
international community due to a suspicious Saudi military purchase o f  Chinese missiles.
In 1988, Riyadh purchased long-range CSS-2 ballistic missiles from China.440 
This particular missile is quite inaccurate and therefore only useful when mounted with 
something that does not need precision targeting, such as a nuclear weapon. The CSS-2 
ballistic missile is meant to carry nuclear warheads and does so in all other known
438 Graham Allison, "Nuclear Disorder: Surveying Atomic Threats," Foreign Affairs 89, 
no. 1 (January/February 2010).
439 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "NPT Membership."
440 Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and  the Rise  
and Fall o f  the A. Q. Khan Network , 97.
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deployments. Pakistan served as the middleman and initiated the deal between China and 
Saudi Arabia. In return, Pakistan received cash from China and Saudi Arabia.441
Furthermore, Riyadh purchased the missiles with the understanding that once the 
Pakistani nuclear program was successful, several nuclear bombs would be sold to the 
House o f Saud for mounting on the missiles. It is believed that this arrangement died the 
same year as Pakistani President Zia, who had been the one to originally make the 
secretive deal. It was an interesting deal and a bit surprising as the Saudis already had 
military capabilities within their air force to strike with greater precision then the CSS-2s 
and at a lower cost.442 This is especially true given the $3 billion price tag on the CSS- 
2 8 443
In 1988, the US was shocked by the discovery o f the Chinese missiles deployment 
to a remote desert area o f Saudi Arabia, where they were being manned by the 
Chinese 444 To ameliorate US and international concern, the Saudis struck a deal with the 
US. The missiles could stay but Saudi Arabia needed to sign and ratify the NPT, 
demonstrating their commitment to not pursue nuclear weapons.445 This helped put the 
US and Saudi Arabia’s neighbors at ease. It also allowed the US and Saudi Arabia to 
continue their strategic relationship, including arms sales. To this day, the missiles are in
441 Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Nuclear Deception: The Dangerous 
Relationship between the United States and Pakistan (New York: W alker & Company, 
2008), 173-74.
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Information Service, http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2008/ioi/080209- 
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the Saudi desert being maintained by a Chinese crew and have never been inspected by 
the US. The missiles were “grandfathered” and therefore excluded from the missile 
proliferation commitment the Chinese made, in 2000, that included not to aid states in 
acquiring missiles that can be used for W M D.446
As mentioned in the previous section, the CSS-2s are not the only eyebrow raising 
incident in Saudi A rabia’s nonproliferation history. There were also the statements by 
Prime M inister Bhutto’s press advisor and Dr. A. Q. Khan. There are also the various 
controversial statements by Khilewi described above.
While the Saudis did ratify the NPT, they were slow to enter into a Safeguards 
Agreement as required within 180 days by Article III o f  the NPT. As mentioned in 
previous case studies, there is no precedence o f  this issue being used as grounds for a 
noncompliance finding. Saudi Arabia signed a Small Quantities Protocol in 2005.447 
This agreement is for states with minimal amounts o f nuclear material and no material in 
a fuel cycle facility.448 This agreement and a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement 
entered into force in 2009.449 Saudi Arabia has no Additional Protocol in place.
Outside o f the NPT, Saudi Arabia also supports the concept o f a Middle East 
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, which has seen slow progress in coming to fruition.450 Saudi 
Arabia has not signed, let alone ratified, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.451 Their
446 Campbell, Einhom, and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States 
Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, 112-16.
447 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Saudi Arabia Signs Small Quantities Protocol," 
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451 CTBTO Preparatory Commission, "Status o f Signature and Ratification."
141
ratification is not required for the treaty to enter into force, but it shows a lack of 
commitment to the international nonproliferation regime.
Current Nuclear Status
Saudi Arabia does not currently have nuclear fuel cycle facilities or research 
reactors.452 Within the Gulf, Saudi Arabia is a primary “producer and consumer” o f 
electricity from oil and gas.453 With an expected annual 8% growth in demand, Saudi 
Arabia has taken the decision to pursue nuclear power. In 2011, it was announced that 16 
power plants will be built over the next 20 years. The first 2 reactors are expected to 
come online by 2021. Deals are also in the works for smaller Argentine plants for 
desalination purposes.
Domestic Politics Theory o f  Compliance
Domestic Mobilization
Saudi Arabia’s “strict implementation o f the Shari’a laws prohibits or restricts 
freedom o f speech, the press, assembly, and association.”454 Therefore, it will be very 
difficult for the domestic population to mobilize in the name o f nonproliferation. 
Furthermore, the monarchy has “both the capacity and the willingness to suppress
452 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Saudi Arabia Profile: Nuclear."
453 W orld Nuclear Association, "Nuclear Power in Saudi Arabia," http://www.wodd- 
nuclear.org/info/nuclear_power_in_saudi_arabia.html (accessed November 30, 2012).
454 Systemic Peace, "Polity IV Country Report 2010: Saudi Arabia," 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/SaudiArabia2010.pdf (accessed November 30, 
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opposition activities and even views.”4' 5 But as history has shown repeatedly, it is still 
not impossible for oppressed populations to mobilize.
In 2010 and 2011, pre-dominantly Shia domestic groups inspired by the Arab 
Spring mobilized and were met with strong opposition from the government 456 These 
"modest incidents” occurred across Saudi Arabia but were put down with minimal 
bloodshed.457 The King did, however, enact new domestic policies to appease citizens 
“including funds to build affordable housing, salary increases for government workers, 
and unemployment benefits.”458
In 2004, a human rights organization formed for the first time in Saudi Arabia. 
This organization, called the National Human Rights Association, collects information on 
violations from the population and seeks to ensure Saudi A rabia’s compliance with its 
international human rights agreements. This is a huge first step and domestic politics 
theory leads us to believe there may be change in human rights compliance in the future. 
Given this example, perhaps it will be possible for groups to mobilize in the name o f 
nonproliferation. It is too soon to tell but we should watch for this type o f event in the 
future.
455 Ibid.





The Polity Project IV scores the government on the far end o f the autocracy
4*>9spectrum. ‘ Within the autocracy, the nation’s citizens are quite repressed and do not 
influence the government.460
This obviously means that the King is the ultimate authority and has no 
restrictions enforced upon him by a constitution or legislation.461 Currently the ruler is 
King and Prime Minister Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz A1 Saud 462 Therefore, the agenda is 
set almost exclusively by the royal family. Decisions are often taken by the K ing’s 
cabinet.463 The cabinet, called the Council o f  M inisters, is comprised o f  18 people 
appointed by the King. The Council’s membership is family members and close family 
friends. This has begun to change; there has been some reform with the goal o f  pleasing 
the domestic constituency and perhaps W estern critics. This includes a move to hold 
elections for certain positions.
While there is little that appears to influence the Saudi agenda, a 2008 Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations report stated that the United States’ relationship with 
Saudi Arabia may be the only factor that keeps the Saudis from going nuclear.464 
Campbell et al. also believe that US policy weighs heavily on the agenda setting o f Saudi
459 Systemic Peace, "Polity IV Country Report 2010: Saudi Arabia."
460 Ibid.
461 Ibid.
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463 Systemic Peace, "Polity IV Country Report 2010: Saudi Arabia."
464 This same report corroborates what many scholars and diplomats already believe: 
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regarding nuclear weapons.” Committee on Foreign Relations, Chain Reaction: Avoiding  
a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East, Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations,
110th cong., 2nd sess., February 2008.
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Arabia.46:1 A change in the relationship for the worse may end with Saudi Arabia 
believing it needs to be more self-reliant and acquire nuclear weapons.
Simmons also defines agenda setting within domestic politics theory as a treaty 
bringing an issue up that otherwise would not be discussed. In Saudi Arabia, the treaty 
became an issue when the Chinese missile purchase was revealed to the international 
community. At that point the US and others wanted a solid answer on Saudi Arabia's 
view o f nuclear weapons. W here nonproliferation was not a previous issue, the treaty 
came on to the national agenda not when it was open for ratification but when the world 
asked for a commitment.
Litigation
Since 2007, there has been a reform to make the judicial system more transparent 
and consistent.466 Previously, judges could enforce Shira’i law as they (the individual) 
interpreted it with no regard for the codification o f law or the use o f precedents. The 
reform included the elimination o f the Supreme Judicial Council and replacing it with the 
newly created Supreme Court and a corresponding Appeals Court. The King and his 
family still influence the judicial system despite its relative independence.
Finally, there is no legislature to develop laws that could be used for litigation.467 
The King and his close advisors develop new laws as they see fit and the public has little 
input. The Council o f Ministers, mentioned in the Agenda Setting  section above, does 
play an advising role in development o f laws.
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Given the limited independence o f the courts and the complete lack o f legislature, 
the domestic population has no manner o f using these government elements to call for 
and implement change.
Conclusions for Saudi Arabia
Above all, the Saudis would clearly be more interested in obtaining nuclear 
weapons, if  Iran goes nuclear.468 Riyadh has seen Iran as a threat, especially since the 
Iranian Revolution in 1979, when the Shah was overthrown by Ayatollah Khomeini.
This was when the m ajority Shiite state o f Iran “had begun denouncing the corrupt oil 
sheikdoms.”469 Today, “Iran’s nuclear programme has provided a potent symbol o f the 
growing Shia threat.”470 Should it obtain nuclear weapons, Iran could become the 
regional hegemonic power, if  it is not already, given the demise o f Saddam Hussein.
Beyond the threat o f a nuclear Iran, Saudi Arabia is located in a volatile region 
where it may feel “always insecure and fearful o f encirclement.”471 Israel’s 
unannounced nuclear capability is seen as a threat by Riyadh and the Saudis repeatedly 
call for Israel’s disarmament. And while Israel has nuclear arms, it most likely will not
468 Kate Amlin, "Will Saudi Arabia Acquire Nuclear Weapons?," N uclear Threat 
Initiative, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/will-saudi-acquire-nuclear-weapons/ 
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allow an Islamic nuclear weapons program to advance too far down the path o f 
proliferation.472
Given the lack o f nuclear infrastructure and expertise the Saudis are unlikely to 
pursue nuclear weapons on their own. Furthermore, to begin a program now would leave 
Saudi Arabia quite far behind the perceived threats that are the Israeli and Iranian nuclear 
weapons programs. In fact, “ if  the Saudis do pursue nuclear weapons, they will almost 
surely draw in part on the already established Saudi-Pakistani nexus.”473 Some people 
believe that a deal has already been struck; that Pakistan will provide a nuclear weapon to 
Saudi Arabia in exchange for assistance received during the years o f  pursuit.
The agenda setting o f Saudi Arabia is not clear cut. Should it decide nuclear 
weapons are important to the state’s survival and obtain a nuclear capability, it may well 
get caught on the horns o f  a security dilemma; what it believes to be defense may well be 
perceived as offensive by other states.474 As Thomas Lippman stated, “the acquisition or 
development o f  nuclear weapons would be provocative, destabilizing, controversial and 
extremely difficult for Saudi Arabia, and ultimately would likely weaken the kingdom 
rather than strengthen it.”475
Simmons found that treaties and the domestic politics theory had the most 
"impact" in transitional democracy.476 At this point, Saudi Arabia is most definitely not a
472 Corera, Shopping fo r  Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise 
and Fall o f  the A. Q. Khan Network, 13.
473 Van Dyke and Yetiv, "Pakistan and Saudi Arabia: The Nuclear Nexus," 69.
474 John H. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and  
Realities (Los Angeles: University o f  California Press, 1951).
475 Lippman, "Nuclear W eapons and Saudi Strategy."
476 Simmons, Mobilizing fo r  Human Rights: International Law  in Domestic Politics, 155.
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transitional democracy.477 It would be difficult to know the true opinions o f the domestic 
population given the lack o f freedoms. Saudi Arabia is ranked 158th out o f  179 states in 
the Press Freedom Index.478 As it appears currently, domestic politics theory does not 
help us understand Saudi Arabia's compliance with the NPT.
Conclusions
Egypt and Saudi Arabia offer interesting cases o f states that may be considered 
potential proliferation concerns. This makes them hard cases o f the dissertation. They 
are currently complying but should aspects o f their situations change in the future they 
could become proliferators. What can be learned by viewing these case studies o f 
potential proliferation concern through the lens o f  the domestic politics theory o f treaty 
compliance?
Experts have believed “that as long as President Mubarak or a like-minded 
successor remains in charge, there is little prospect- short o f  such traumatic events as a 
military attack on Egyptian territory or the use o f  nuclear weapons somewhere in the 
Middle East -  that Cairo’s response would be to embark on a nuclear weapons 
program.”479 With Mubarak sitting in jail and his successor a member o f  the Muslim 
Brotherhood, what can we expect for the future o f nonproliferation in Egypt?
As mentioned above, Saudi Arabia does not have the scientific resources to 
launch a nuclear weapons program and has no immediate reasons to do so. However,
477 Systemic Peace, "Polity IV Country Report 2010: Saudi Arabia."
478 Reporters Without Borders, "Press Freedom Index 2011/2012."
479 Campbell, Einhom, and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States 
Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, 44.
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Saudi Arabia could more than afford to finance a nuclear weapons program (or purchase) 
with its GDP o f $676.7 billion, with oil accounting for “80% o f budget revenues, 45% of 
GDP, and 90% o f export earnings.”480 In the context o f strained relations with the US, 
and a possibly nuclear Iran, Saudi Arabia may hedge its bets. In fact, there is evidence 
that it has already begun to by supporting the Pakistani's in its pursuit o f  the nuclear 
bomb. W hat can we expect for the future?
One can look back at history and quickly remember that things were not so 
different in the 1960s. Instead o f an Iranian pursuit o f nuclear weapons causing 
headlines, it was an Israeli pursuit o f nuclear weapons. In response to Israel's nuclear 
program, in 1960, Nasser threatened to arm Egypt with nuclear weapons.481 More 
recently it was M ubarak's ambassador saying that “if  others will acquire nuclear weapons 
— and if others are going to use these nuclear weapons to acquire status in the region o f 
the Middle East — let me tell you, we are not going to accept to be second-class citizens 
in the region o f the Middle East.”482 More recently it was Saudi King Abdullah allegedly 
saying about a nuclear Iran, "if they get nuclear weapons, we will get nuclear 
weapons."
If Iran obtains nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia or Egypt might well be pushed to 
develop their own nuclear capability as a deterrent to Iran and also perhaps as a matter o f 
regional prestige as the first Arab state to match the Persians. It is important to note, and 
the Saudis understand this well, that even a small nuclear weapon could destroy major oil
480 Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Saudi Arabia."
481 "Nasser Threatens Israel on A-Bomb."
482 Grossman, "Egypt Plays Key Nonproliferation Role, but Keeps Nuclear Options 
Open."
483 Shalev, "Dennis Ross: Saudi King Vowed to Obtain Nuclear Bomb after Iran."
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facilities and cities, and threats o f radiological, chemical and biological weapons attacks 
cannot be discounted. In addition, even if  Iran or other states in the region never use 
weapons o f mass destruction, they could enable brinkmanship or coercion because others 
would be aware o f  their existence.
Domestic politics theory has not helped us understand treaty compliance in these 
countries. Nonproliferation did become an agenda item for both nations, but not because 
o f  domestic pressures. With the treaty open for ratification they were under pressure 
from the international community and also wished to use the nonproliferation issue to 
condemn Israel. There has been no litigation or mobilization on nuclear issues to date.
Domestic politics theory gives variables that one can watch for in the future to 
understand w hether Egypt and Saudi Arabia w ill comply with their international 
nonproliferation obligations. There may be elements o f agenda setting, litigation, or 
domestic mobilization in the name o f nonproliferation in the future. Egypt is the more 
likely case because it is the transitional democracy that, according to Simmons, the 
theory may work best for explaining.484 For these methodologies o f  change to be used 
both governments will have to become more open and transparent; which is already 
beginning to happen but only time will tell if there will be real change.
Table 3 illustrates the findings o f Egypt and Saudi Arab for this chapter. The 
agenda setting for nations was not influenced by the treaty but by the international 
community. Neither state saw the use o f litigation to enforce the obligations o f the 
national government under the NPT. Finally, neither country had domestic population 
mobilize for the NPT and to keep their nations from acquiring nuclear weapons.
484 Simmons, Mobilizing fo r  Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics, 155.
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State
Domestic Politics Theory Mechanisms Present?
Agenda Setting Litigation M obilization
Egypt No No No
Saudi Arabia No No No
Table 3. Results o f Chapter 5 Case Studies
W hile domestic politics theory does not seem to have helped us understand the 
mechanisms for compliance with the NPT in these cases, there are legitimate concerns 
that these mechanisms could actually be used in support o f proliferation. As exemplified 
by the Muslim Brotherhood, citizens could mobilize in favor o f  nuclear weapons.
Perhaps they want the perceived prestige for their nation or to emulate Iran. Or perhaps 





There are scholars and practitioners, that credit the NPT for being "more 
successful in preventing new states from acquiring nuclear weapons than it has been in 
either slowing down or disarming states that already possess nuclear weapons."485 
However you interpret the evidence, there are fewer nuclear weapons today than 
anticipated at the time o f the creation o f  the NPT. Is this because treaties do have an 
impact on state behavior, as put forth by Simmons in the form o f the domestic politics 
theory?
Given the theory’s ability to explain treaty compliance in human rights issue area 
it was expected that this might apply to other issue areas. Nonproliferation does have 
some commonalities with human rights (both are about security, both have monitoring 
systems, both have high levels o f ratification, both gained momentum around the same 
point in history, etc.) but the details concerning the type o f security and the resulting 
implications are on opposite ends o f  the spectrum.
While there is a clear link between the theory’s three mechanisms (mobilization, 
agenda setting, and litigation) and state compliance in human rights treaties, the last three 
case study chapters have shown that the domestic politics theory is not very useful when 
studying compliance with the NPT. In this research on the NPT and the domestic politics
485 Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu in Williams, ed. Security Studies: An Introduction , 362.
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theory, mobilization was partially present in the compliant states, but the other two 
mechanisms are completely absent.
This chapter begins by exploring what can be inferred about the theory from 
studying its application to the NPT. What can be learned about the theory’s relative 
ineffectualness in explaining NPT compliance? The theory has already proven its value 
in the low politics issues area o f human rights but it struggles to explain compliance in 
the high politics issue area. Therefore it is not that theory is not useful but it needs to be 
revised. Or perhaps it is not the theory but that nonproliferation has characteristics that 
make the domestic politics theory.
The second section expands on the characteristics o f nonproliferation, and what 
the research results may mean for the issue area. Noncompliance with the NPT equates 
to new nuclear weapons states. This has high costs for the state that chooses to develop 
nuclear weapons and the international community whose relationship must change with 
the noncompliant state.
Thirdly, given the relative importance o f  mobilization, is it the key to 
understanding compliance and nonproliferation? M obilizing may have more weight than 
the other mechanisms o f the domestic politics theory. After all, Simmons even uses this 
mechanism in the title o f  her book introducing the theory. It is the only mechanism 
present in this nonproliferation research, and even then it is not a direct relationship.
Finally, conclusions are drawn for the analyses as a whole. This sums up what 
was learned from viewing the NPT compliance (and noncompliance) cases through the 
lens o f the domestic politics theory, what this all means for the NPT, and if  mobilization 
is the most important concept gained from the domestic politics theory.
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What Can Be Inferred About the Theory?
There were three chapters o f case studies, each with a different type o f 
compliance situation with the NPT. There were states o f no proliferation concern 
(compliant), already failed to comply, and potential compliance concerns. Each o f these 
compliance situations contributes to the analysis o f the domestic politics theory’s 
explanatory capability.
Compliant States
Germany and Kazakhstan both had limited mobilization but neither had the 
mechanisms o f litigation and agenda setting. Perhaps, mobilization is more important 
than the other two mechanisms. Or given the obvious strong stance against (most things) 
nuclear and the current unquestionable compliance, the theory does not gain much 
traction because there is no concern that these governments would ever consider building 
nuclear weapons. The other mechanisms are missing because there is no need for them.
Given the past mobilization against testing o f nuclear weapons, nuclear power, 
and the British nuclear arsenal, there is an implicit constraint upon the national 
governments in Germany and Kazakhstan that the domestic populations would mobilize 
again. The governments would not broach the subject o f violating their international 
nonproliferation commitments. Therefore, it is not that the theory does not work so much 
as the compliance (the threat o f mobilization) is so unquestionable that theory cannot be 
applied in a meaningful manner.
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Noncompliant States
Libya and Syria developed nuclear weapons programs despite their international 
obligations, with no outcry from their citizens. There are several reasons for this, which 
may explain the domestic politics theory’s weak application in these two cases. First, 
both nations’ citizens are facing direct threats to their individual security. It is likely that 
these threats are much more pressing than the national level security concerns. M aslow ’s 
Hierarchy o f Needs explains that physiological needs (such as health and survival) are a 
hum an’s most basic need. Therefore, if  a citizen had to prioritize his/her concerns, the 
proliferation o f  nuclear weapons is likely further down the list than safety for his/her 
family or establishing a stable fair democracy. Second, neither Syria nor Libya’s 
domestic populations likely knew o f the clandestine programs nor their governm ent’s 
noncompliant actions before the international community knew. Their governments did 
not promote their progress with the same propaganda that, for example, the North 
Koreans commonly use.
The more pressing concerns o f Libyan citizens really came to light during the 
2011 Arab Spring. The Arab Spring was a movement by domestic groups to overthrow 
their governments in "a common call for personal dignity and responsive government."487 
In Libya, the killing o f peaceful protestors by Qadhafi's regime prompted an international 
outcry.
486 A. H. Maslow, "A Theory o f  Human Motivation," Psychological Review  50, no. 4 
(July 1943).
487 Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring."
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A noticeable difference o f  the Libyan Arab Spring (from other Arab Spring 
nations) was the supporting role o f  the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).488 
In response to the February 2011 UN call for security o f the Libyan people from their 
government, NATO allies and partner countries formed a coalition for Operation Unified 
Protector (OUP). OUP enforced the no-fly zone, enforced the arms embargo, and 
protected civilians.
The ability o f the Libyan citizens to mobilize was the first major step. NATO and 
the international community than gave legal standing and text the citizens could use to 
vindicate their position against their government and continue their demand for change. 
The agenda setting quickly became about independence from a ruthless dictator.
One has to wonder if  the international community had supported the citizens in 
mobilizing against nuclear weapons if  it would have made a difference. Instead, secret 
negotiations were held to arrange the reverse in Libya’s program. Change came from the 
outside rather than from within. O f course, the citizens could have chosen to side with 
their government had they known about the program. This concept o f  mobilizing for 
noncompliance is discussed later in this chapter.
Potential Proliferation Concerns
Egypt and Saudi Arabia are similar to the already failed to comply states, in that 
there are other more pressing concerns that could distract from proliferation. Both states 
were impacted by the Arab Spring, Egypt much more so than Saudi Arabia. The 
domestic politics theory did not prove an effective lens for viewing and understanding
488 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO and Libya,"
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_71652.htm (accessed November 30, 2012).
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future compliance. Perhaps, trying to understand potential compliance with the NPT in 
these cases was too much to demand o f the theory. The theory cannot indicate future 
compliance (or noncompliance) if  the mechanisms are absent. Or is the absence o f  the 
mechanism a sign o f future noncompliance?
As seen in our compliance and noncompliance cases, the absence o f the 
mechanisms is not a true indicator o f anything. In these countries there is no reason to 
mobilize against nuclear weapons as there are more personal concerns for which to 
mobilize.
Overall Trends
All three case study categories have commonalties. Despite varying compliance 
all are missing litigation and agenda setting mechanisms o f the domestic politics theory. 
Furthermore, with the slight exception o f  Kazakhstan and Germ any’s mobilization on 
related nuclear issues, there is an absence o f mobilization for nonproliferation. Table 4 
illustrates the findings o f all six states evaluated in this dissertation. For each o f  the 
domestic politics theory mechanisms (agenda setting, litigation, and mobilization) no 
state demonstrated an impact on treaty compliance with the NPT.
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State
Domestic Politics Theory Mechanisms Present?
Agenda Setting Litigation M obilization
Germany No No
Yes and No - 
M obilized but did 
not reference treaty 




Yes and No- 
M obilized against 
testing and not 
about the NPT
Syria No No No
Libya No No No
Egypt No No No
Saudi Arabia No No No
Table 4. Results o f All Case Studies
The weak performance o f  the domestic politics theory shows that the theory needs 
to be modified. Its usefulness in human rights does not extend to all issue areas. Based 
on this research there should be an added stipulation that in the area o f  national security 
related treaties (high politics) the theory appears to be less useful. It is too brazen to say 
it is completely useless as nonproliferation may be a special case. Nonetheless, there 
may still be some ways in which testing the domestic politics theory has aided in 
understanding proliferation.
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What Do the Results Tell Us About Nonproliferation?
Given that domestic politics theory did not provide much leverage for 
understanding state compliance with the NPT: what does this tell us about 
nonproliferation? Is nonproliferation unique?
Simmons discussed extensively those states that were insincere in their 
ratification o f treaties. These are the states that ratified treaties with no intention o f 
meeting their obligations. However, she argues that they m ay eventually comply as a 
result o f  the combined mechanisms o f the domestic politics theory. It seems that the NPT 
has fewer insincere ratification states than human rights treaties because there is a higher 
cost to ratification. With human rights treaty ratification there is little cost for 
noncompliance. W ith the NPT ratification, noncompliance means pursuing nuclear 
weapons, which other states see as a direct threat to their survival. Therefore, they are 
more likely to respond to noncompliance and by default the costs are higher for the 
noncompliant state (than for noncompliance with a human rights treaty).
The cost o f  noncompliance with a treaty whose issue area has such far reaching 
international implications (such as the NPT) can be dire. The noncompliant actions o f 
states party to the NPT have led to diplomatic and military pressures, and even wars.
And yet, one would be hard pressed to think o f an intervention based solely on the 
violation o f a human rights treaty. There would be no more suffering, let alone genocide, 
if  the international community took as harsh an approach to noncompliance with human 
rights treaties as they do with weapons related treaties.
The monitoring systems o f the NPT build further on the cost o f noncompliance. 
The IAEA Department o f Safeguards is specifically designed to verify NPT treaty 
compliance. This is done in a variety o f  ways, including: on-site inspections, open source 
information analyses, satellite imagery analyses, trade analyses, etc. There are also the 
intelligence communities o f individual states and independent NGOs that are interested in 
verifying compliance for their own reasons. Nonproliferation has a variety o f actors that 
collectively form a relatively strong monitoring system.
The international security nature o f the treaty and the perceived threats associated 
with violations combined with a strong monitoring system may in fact increase 
compliance, without depending on the influence o f domestic politics.
Is M obilization the Key?
The only part o f the domestic politics theory o f  treaty compliance that seems to 
have an impact is the mobilization mechanism. M obilization must come before there can 
be agenda setting or litigation. Or perhaps it is simply more important than the other two 
mechanisms in high politics issue areas.
The Kazakhstan and German case studies demonstrated that treaty mobilization 
can be subsumed within related causes. In these two cases, nuclear testing and nuclear 
power subsumed the anti-nuclear weapons (anti-proliferation) position. Given transitive 
preferences, one can safely assume the citizens would agree with the lesser demands o f 
the anti-proliferation agenda. Neither nation’s governments would choose to pursue 
nuclear weapons knowing the strength o f the opposition on related nuclear issues. There
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is no need for citizens to mobilize in the name o f  treaty compliance because the 
consensus is so strong on related issues that proliferation is a non-issue in their countries.
Related to this lack o f mobilization for the NPT is the situation in states where 
there is treaty noncompliance and yet the citizens do not mobilize. As discussed in the 
case o f Syria and Libya, this may have been for several reasons. The leading reason 
behind the lack o f mobilization for nonproliferation is that the populations have more 
immediate concerns in their lives (specifically safety and economics) that demand their 
mobilization efforts more than nonproliferation.
In recent history, both Syria and Libya have proven that their populations can 
mobilize despite oppressive government. This contributes to the idea that mobilization is 
the most important mechanism o f the domestic politics theory. M obilization in an 
oppressive regime is difficult but does draw the attention o f the national leadership and of 
the international community. This may be one o f  the only ways for the citizens to 
influence the national agenda setting in a non-democratic government which offers no 
mechanism for citizen input. Furthermore, litigation in a repressive and corrupt 
government is pointless. It can be ignored and is likely to be a fruitless effort, especially 
on an issue for which the national leadership has much to lose. Therefore, mobilization 
must come before the agenda setting and litigation.
This concept o f mobilization coming first can also be seen in Germany and 
Kazakhstan. By mobilizing against nuclear weapons testing and nuclear power, both 
nations’ citizens were also mobilizing against nuclear weapons more generally. It is safe 
to say the transitive preferences for these citizens move from anti-nuclear weapons 
testing to anti-nuclear weapons. The same goes for nuclear power. Those against nuclear
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power will undoubtedly be against the non-civilian use o f nuclear technology for 
weapons. In this case, the national governments have taken the point and there is no need 
for litigation. Furthermore, these mobilizations successfully influenced the agenda. The 
nuclear weapons test site is closed in Kazakhstan and Germany is closing its nuclear 
power plants.
On the other hand, there is the possibility o f mobilization in support o f  
noncompliance. Perhaps the domestic population really believes that their nation’s intent 
is peaceful uses only, or they may aspire to the national prestige presumed to accrue for 
nuclear weapons states. Either way, in this proposed instance, a state found in non- 
compliance with a treaty has citizens actually mobilizing in support o f  their nations’ 
defiance.
Finally, it is important to note that mobilization as a mechanism may be directly 
influenced by a country’s history and tradition o f mobilization. To generalize: 
mobilization may be a common way o f drawing attention to an issue in the Arab world, 
or even a way o f trying to accomplish things in France, it may not be as likely to occur in 
other places. It is hard to imagine an issue that would unite and mobilize apathetic 
citizens across America. Likewise, in Germany, stereotypically citizens are more likely 
to use the established governmental process than take to the streets.
Research Conclusions
The nonproliferation regime, the NPT and the IAEA safeguards (a requirement 
under Article III) ameliorate the international com m unity’s peace o f mind against the
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spread o f nuclear weapons. Compliance is critical for the treaty and regime to remain 
relevant.
This dissertation has explored case studies through the lens o f  the domestic 
politics theory o f treaty compliance to understand why states comply (or do not comply) 
with the NPT. Chapter 2 set out a definition o f compliance and noncompliance in the 
context o f the NPT for the purposes o f this dissertation. The concept o f the domestic 
politics theory o f treaty compliance was discussed with time spent on its three main 
points (agenda setting, litigation, and mobilization o f  domestic groups) and how they may 
apply in the high politics issue area o f  nonproliferation. An explanation is made in 
defense o f using a case study methodology for this research followed by an identification 
o f the case studies to be used.
In the effort to answer the question o f whether the domestic politics theory is 
useful for understanding compliance in the high politics issue area o f national security, 
and nonproliferation specifically, this dissertation looked at a total o f  six states divided 
into three categories o f  case studies: no proliferation concern, failure to comply, and 
potential proliferation concern. Chapter 3 covers the states o f  no proliferation concern 
(Germany and Kazakhstan) and chapter 4 covers the states that have already failed to 
comply (Syria and Libya). Chapter 5 covers the states are o f potential proliferation 
concern (Egypt and Saudi Arabia). In each o f these chapters, after an overview o f each 
state’s situation, the basic background information was covered including the state’s 
history with the NPT and with the nonproliferation regime more broadly, as well as the 
current nuclear power status. Then, most importantly, each state was analyzed for the 
domestic politics theory variables o f agenda setting, litigation, and domestic
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mobilization. All o f the case studies were based on the facts up until June 2012. Things 
may change in the future; especially in those nations most affected by the Arab Spring.
The New Stipulation fo r  the Domestic Politics Theory
Simmons never claimed that the domestic politics theory was the panacea for 
treaty compliance issues. This dissertation has shown this to be appropriate because the 
theory appears to work very poorly outside o f the human rights issue area. The domestic 
politics theory does not appear to apply to high politics issues and its limits need to be 
recognized. Domestic politics theory will be more or less useful depending on the issue 
area. However, if  there is one thing that appears to transcend issue areas it is 
mobilization.
W hen looking at other issue areas, mobilization appears to be the most important 
mechanism o f the domestic politics theory o f treaty compliance. It appears to be the most 
effective tool and is utilized first by citizens. I f  successful, it influences the national 
agenda and removes the need for litigation. If it is not successful it may lead to litigation 
and attempts to influence the national agenda by relying on the treaty (that is in-line with 
the need for mobilization).
Current Nonproliferation Challenges
There are several current proliferation challenges in the world. Two o f the most 
important are the ongoing issues with Iran and North Korea. The domestic politics 
theory does not look likely to help the international community work with North Korea or 
Iran. The citizens o f North Korea will not be mobilizing anytime soon for the leadership
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to stop building nuclear weapons. In fact they could one day mobilize (albeit in a 
suspiciously well-choreographed manner) to support their nation’s nuclear weapons 
development. Likewise, Iran appears to have vacillating domestic support for its nuclear 
policies.489 In neither country can we expect new litigation or influence on the national 
agenda by nonproliferation supporters.
With those states have remained outside the treaty (Israel, India and Pakistan) the 
NPT has minimal impact. However, it seems unlikely that the domestic politics theory 
can be applied to those states that never committed themselves to the treaty in the first 
place.
Finally, there are the five nuclear weapons states that have committed themselves 
to good faith negotiations on disarmament.490 This can be explored further in future 
research but it seems viewing this issue through the domestic politics theory o f  treaty 
compliance would be difficult given how difficult compliance is to define for Article VI.
Hope for the Future
The nonproliferation regime has “helped to create predictability, stability, and 
security in many regions o f  the world.”491 Elements o f the regime are coordinated around 
the NPT. The NPT may not be a perfect treaty but it is the best we have and it serves a
489 Shahram Chubin, "The Politics o f Iran's Nuclear Program," United States Institute o f 
Peace, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/politics-irans-nuclear-program (accessed 
November 30, 2012).
490 US Department o f State, "Treaty on the Nonproliferation o f Nuclear W eapons," ed. 
Treaties and Other International Acts Series (1970).
491 Amy Sands, "Nonproliferation Regimes at Risk," in Occasional Paper Number 3, ed. 
Michael Barletta and Amy Sands (Monterey, November 1999).
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real purpose and international community need. The German ratification o f the NPT
included the following declaration statement, which says Germany:
regards the Treaty not as end but rather a starting point for the 
negotiations, provided for the Treaty itself as its natural supplement and to 
ensure its effective implementation, concerning disarmament, the peaceful 
uses o f nuclear energy, and the benefits arising for the peaceful 
applications o f  nuclear energy;492
The treaty is a starting po in t and the international community must continue to 
strive for this noble cause. There are those that do not believe that the treaty is working 
to stop the spread o f  nuclear weapons and is doomed to be a failure and meaningless. 
There is a real danger in this way o f thinking as "this prophecy is not only at risk o f  being 
self-fulfilling, but would remove the legal norms (and perceived consequential improved 
security context) that may be constraining some states from nuclear weapons 
acquisition."493
As this dissertation has shown, the domestic politics theory o f  treaty compliance 
is not a very useful prism for understanding nonproliferation treaty compliance. In fact, 
the mechanism may even work against compliance in high politics. M ost likely the result 
o f “domestic pressures from constituencies mobilized by Iran’s nuclearization,” caused 
Egypt’s renewed interest in nuclear power.494 The same domestic pressure could 
mobilize for matching Iranian weapons in the future.
492 United Nations, "NPT (Germany)."
493 Owen C. W. Price and Jennifer Mackby, eds., Debating 21st Century Nuclear Issues 
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 281.
494 Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East, 236.
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As David Albright states, “our security should rest on the first lines o f  defense, 
such as institutionalized approaches like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”495 Sadly, 
this is not a perfect system and sometime a first line o f defense is not enough. The world 
has had to rely on last line o f defense measures several times. The classic example being 
the 2003 Iraq war, for which nonproliferation was a partial justification. This preventive 
war, Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu o f  the Geneva Centre for Security Policy in Switzerland 
calls "the first (and last) non-proliferation war."496
Hopefully, this research on nonproliferation and the domestic politics theory o f  
treaty compliance aids in understanding nonproliferation compliance. And by default a 
better understanding o f compliance may lead to more compliance and make the world a 
safer place.
495 Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms A m erica’s Enemies, 
245.
496 Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu in Williams, ed. Security Studies: An Introduction , 373.
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